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PROPERNESS WITHOUT ELEMENTARICITY
S. SHELAH
Abstract. We present reasons for developing a theory of forcing notions
which satisfy the properness demand for countable models which are not
necessarily elementary submodels of some (H(χ),∈). This leads to forcing
notions which are “reasonably” definable. We present two specific prop-
erties materializing this intuition: nep (non-elementary properness) and
snep (Souslin non-elementary properness). For this we consider candidates
(countable models to which the definition applies), and the older Souslin
proper. A major theme here is “preservation by iteration”, but we also
show a dichotomy: if such forcing notions preserve the positiveness of the
set of old reals for some naturally define c.c.c. ideals, then they preserve the
positiveness of any old positive set. We also prove that (among such forcing
notions) the only one commuting with Cohen is Cohen itself.
Annotated Content.
Section 0: Introduction We present reasons for developing the theory
of forcing notions which satisfy the properness demand for countable models
which are not necessarily elementary submodels of some (H(χ),∈). This will
lead us to forcing notions which are “reasonably” definable.
Section 1: Basic definitions We present two specific properties mate-
rializing this intuition: nep (non-elementary properness) and snep (Souslin
non-elementary properness). For this we consider candidates (countable
models to which the definition applies), and the older Souslin proper.
Section 2: Connections between the basic definitions We point
out various implications (snep implies nep, etc.). We also point out how
much the properties are absolute.
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2 S. SHELAH
Section 3: There are examples We point out that not just the rea-
sonably definable forcing notions in use fit our framework, but that all the
general theorems of Ros lanowski Shelah [14], which prove properness, actu-
ally prove the stronger properties introduced earlier.
Section 4: Preservation under iteration: first round First we ad-
dress a point we ignored earlier (it was not needed, but is certainly part
of our expectations). In the definition of “q is (N,Q)-generic” predensity
of each I ∈ pd(N,Q) was originally designed to enable us to say things on
N [G
˜
Q], i.e. N [GQ] ∩H(χ)V = N , but we should be careful saying what we
intend by N [GQ] now, so we replace it by N〈G
˜
Q〉. The preservation theorem
5.5 says that CS iterations of nep forcing notions have the main property
of nep. For this we define p〈〈N〉〉 if N |=“ p ∈ Lim(Q¯) ”. We also define and
should consider (5.2) the “K-absolute nep”.
Section 5: True preservation theorems We consider two closure op-
erations of nep forcing notions (cl1, cl2), investigate what is preserved and
what is gained and prove a general preservation theorem (6.13). This is
done for the “straight” version of nep.
Section 6: When a real is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over V We define the class
K of pairs (Q, η
˜
), in particular when η
˜
is the generic real for Q, and how
nice is the subforcing Q′ of Q generated by η
˜
.
Section 7: Preserving a little implies preserving much We are
interested in the preservation of the property (of forcing notions) “retaining
positiveness modulo the ideal derived from a c.c.c. nep forcing notion”,
e.g. being non-null (by forcing notions which are not necessarily c.c.c.). In
[17, Ch.VI,§1,§2,§3, Ch.XVIII,§3] this is dealt with but mainly in the limit
case. Our main aim is to show that for “nice” enough forcing notion we
have a dichotomy (which implies preservation under e.g. CS iterations (of
proper forcing) of the property above) retaining the positiveness of ωω (or
in general every positive Borel set) implies retaining the positiveness of any
X ⊆ ωω.
Section 8: Non-symmetry We start to investigate for c.c.c. nep forc-
ing: when does “if η0 is (Q0, η
˜
0)-generic over N and η1 is (Q1, η
˜
1)-generic
over N [η0] then η
˜
1 is (Q
˜
0
, η
˜
0)-generic over N [η1]”? This property is known
for Cohen reals and random reals above.
Section 9: Poor Cohen commute only with himself We prove that
commuting with Cohen is quite rare. In fact, c.c.c. Souslin forcing which
adds η
˜
which is (absolutely) nowhere essentially Cohen does not commute
with Cohen. So such forcing makes the set of old reals meagre.
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Section 10: Some c.c.c. nep forcing notions are not nice We
define such forcing notions which are not essentially Cohen as long as ℵ1
is not too large in L. This shows that “c.c.c. Souslin” cannot be outright
replaced by “absolutely c.c.c. nep”.
Section 11: Preservation of “no dominating real” We would like
to strengthen the main conclusion of §7, (that retaining of positiveness is
preserved by composition) of nice forcing notions (i.e. if each separately
has it, then so does its composition) to additional natural ideals, mainly
the one mentioned in the title, which does not flatly fall into the context of
§7. Though 11.2 contains a counterexample, we prove it for “nice” enough
forcing notions.
Section 12: Open problems We formulate several open questions.
0. Introduction. The thema of [18], [17] is:
Thesis 1.1. It is good to have general theory of forcings, particularly for
iterated forcing.
Some years ago, Judah asked me a question (on inequalities on cardinal
invariants of the continuum). Looking for a forcing proof we arrived to the
following question:
Question 1.2. Will it not be nice to have a theory of forcing notions Q
such that:
(⊕) if Q ∈ N ⊆ (H(χ),∈), N a countable model of ZFC− and p ∈ N ∩Q,
then there is q ∈ Q which is (N,Q)-generic.
Note the absence of ≺ (i.e. N is just a submodel of (H(χ),∈)), which is
the difference between this property and “properness”, and is alluded to in
the name of this paper. This evolved to “Souslin proper forcing” (see 2.10)
in Judah and Shelah [12], which was continued in Goldstern Judah [11].
There are still some additional desirable properties (absent there):
(a) many “nicely defined” forcing notions do not satisfy “Souslin proper”,
in fact not so esoteric ones: the Sacks focing, the Laver forcing;
(b) actual preservation by CS iteration was not proved, just the desired
conclusion (⊕) hold for Pα when 〈Pi,Q
˜
j
: i ≤ α, j < α〉 is a countable
support iteration and i < α ⇒ ⊢Pi“ Q
˜
i
is a Souslin proper forcing
notion”;
(c) to prove for such forcing notions better preservation theorems when
we add properties in addition to properness.
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Martin Goldstern asked me some years ago on the inadequacy of Souslin
proper from clause (a). I suggested a version of the definitions here, and
this was preliminarily announced in Goldstern [10].
The intention here is to include forcing notions with “nice definition” (not
ones constructed by diagonalization like Baumgartner’s “every ℵ1-dense sets
of reals are isomorphic” [3] or the forcing notions constructed for the oracle
c.c.c., see [18, Ch.IV], or forcing notions defined from an ultrafilter).
Note that our treatment (nep/snep) in a sense stands between [17] and
Ros lanowski Shelah [14]. In [17] we like to have theorems on iterations
Q¯, mainly CS, getting results on the whole Lim(Q¯) from assumptions on
each Qi, but with no closer look at Qi – by intention, as we would like to
cover as much as we can. In Ros lanowski Shelah [14] we deal with forcing
notions which are quite concrete, usually built from countably many finite
“creatures” (still relative to specific forcing this is quite general).
Here, our forcing notions are definable but not in so specific way as in
[14], which still provides examples (all are included), and the theorems are
quite parallel to [17]. So we are solving the “equations”
x/“theory of manifolds” =
theory of proper forcing [18],[17]/general topology =
theory of forcing based on creatures [14]/theory of manifolds in R3.
Thesis 1.3. “Nice” forcing notions which are proved to be proper, normally
satisfy (even by same proof) the stronger demands defined in the next sec-
tion.
History: The paper is based on the author’s lectures in Rutgers Uni-
versity in Fall 1996, which results probably in too many explanations. An-
swering Goldstern’s question was mentioned above. A version of §8 (on
non-symmetry) was done in Spring of ’95 aiming at the symmetry question,
and the rest in the Summer and Fall of ’96. I thank the audience of the
lectures for their remarks and mainly Andrzej Ros lanowski for correcting
the paper.
Notation: We try to keep our notation standard and compatible with
that of classical textbooks on Set Theory (like Bartoszyn´ski Judah [2] or
Jech [13]). However in forcing we keep the older tradition that a stronger
condition is the larger one.
For a regular cardinal χ, H(χ) stands for the family of sets which are
hereditarily of size less than χ. The collection of all sets which are heredi-
tarily countable relatively to κ is denoted by H<ℵ1(κ).
Tcord(x) is defined by induction on rk(x) = γ as follows:
if γ = 0 then Tcord(x) = x ∪ {x},
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if γ > 0 then Tcord(x) = x ∪
⋃
{Tcord(y) : y ∈ x, y not an ordinal} ∪ {x}.
So H<ℵ1(κ) = {x ∈ H(κ) : Tc
ord(x) is countable}.
We say that a set M ⊆ H(χ) is ord–transitive if
x ∈M & x is not an ordinal ⇒ x ⊆M.
Notation 1.4. We will keep the following rules for our notation:
1. α, β, γ, δ, ξ, ζ, i, j . . . will denote ordinals,
2. θ, κ, λ, µ, χ . . . will stand for cardinal numbers, θ ≤ κ if not said oth-
erwise,
3. a tilde indicates that we are dealing with a name for an object in
forcing extension (like x
˜
),
4. a bar above a name indicates that the object is a sequence, usually X¯
will be 〈Xi : i < ℓg(X¯)〉, where ℓg(X¯) denotes the length of X¯,
5. For two sequences η, ν we write ν ⊳ η whenever ν is a proper initial
segment of η, and ν E η when either ν ⊳ η or ν = η. The length of a
sequence η is denoted by ℓg(η).
6. A tree is a family of finite sequences closed under initial segments. For
a tree T the family of all ω–branches through T is denoted by lim(T ).
7. The Cantor space ω2 and the Baire space ωω are the spaces of all
functions from ω to 2, ω, respectively, equipped with natural (Polish)
topology.
8. The fix “version” ZFC−∗ should be such that the forcing theorem holds
and for any large enough χ, the set of (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates (defined
in 2.1) is cofinal in {N : N ⊆ (H(χ),∈)} and whatever we should use
(fully see 2.11).
9. C, B . . . will denote models (with some countable vocabulary). For a
model C, its universe is denoted |C| and its cardinality is ‖C‖. Usually
C’s universe is an ordinal α(C) and κ(B) ⊆ |B| ⊆ H<ℵ1(κ(B)), κ(B)
a cardinal.
10. K will denote a family of forcing notions including the trivial one (so
a K–forcing extension of V is V[G] when G ⊆ P ∈ K is generic over
V) and ⊢P“ Q
˜
∈ KV
P
” ⇒ P ∗ Q
˜
∈ K. Usually K is the class of
(set) forcing notions.
1. Basic definitions. Let us try to analyze the situation. Our intuition
is that: looking at Q inside N we can construct a generic condition q for N ,
but if N ⊀ (H(χ),∈), Q ∩N might be arbitrary. So let Q be a definition.
What is the meaning of, say, N |=“r ∈ Q”? It is N |=“r satisfies ϕ0(−)” for
a suitable ϕ0. It seems quite compelling to demand that inside N we can
say in some sense “r ∈ Q”, and as we would like to have
q ⊢ “ G
˜
Q ∩Q
N is a subset of QN generic over N ”,
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we should demand
(∗)1 N |=“ r ∈ Q ” implies V |=“ r ∈ Q ”.
So ϕ0 (the definition of the set of members of Q) should have this amount
of absoluteness. Similarly we would like to have:
(∗)2 if N |=“ p1 ≤Q p2 ” and p2 ∈ GQ then p1 ∈ GQ.
So we would like to have a ϕ1 (or <
ϕ1) (the definition of the partial order
of Q) and to have this upward absoluteness for ϕ1.
But before we define this notion of properness without elementaricity, we
should define the class of models to which it applies.
We may have put in this section the “straight nep” (see 6.11) and/or
“absolute nep” (see 5.2). Advice: The reader may concentrate on the
case of local correct explicit simply good and nep forcing notions which
are normal (see Definitions 2.1, 2.3(11), 2.3(2), 2.3(5), 2.3(1),(4), 2.11(3),
2.11(4), respectively).
When we consider “preservation by iteration”, it is natural to define the
following:
Definition 2.1. 1. Let ZFC−∗ be a fixed version of set theory e.g. ZFC
−+
“i7 exists” which may speak on C (or see more in the end of this
section), and let C be a fixed model with countable vocabulary (say
⊆ H(ℵ0)) and universe an ordinal α = α∗(C) and let ∆ be a fixed set of
first order formulas in the vocabulary of C (closed under subformulas
normally). Let B denote another such model (not fixed) but we may
allow the universe to satisfy κ(B) ⊆ |B| ⊆ H<ℵ1(κ(B)) for some
cardinal1 κ(B).
2. We say that N is a class (B,p, θ)–candidate if:
(a) N ⊆ (H(χ),∈) for some χ,
(b) N is countable,
(c) N is a model of ZFC−∗ ,
(d) C ∈ N , p ∈ N , B ∈ N (but see below),
(e) B |`N ≺∆ B but2 for transparency we treat B as relations of N
and B |`N are their interpretations in N ; so we allow |B| ∩ |N | \
|B |`N | 6= ∅, and τ(B), the vocabulary of B, belongs to N , but
N |=“x ∈ B” ⇒ x ∈ B. Similarly for C (this is less essential),
(see 3.9(3)),
1We do not fix the order between α∗(C) and κ(B), but there is no loss if we assume
that θ ≥ α∗(C), θ ≥ κ(B).
2so if ∆ = ∆1 = {∃yψ : ψ is q.f.}, C,B have Skolem functions, we have
(e)’ C |`N ≺ C, B |`N ≺ B;
can use (e)’ instead of (e)
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(f) if N |=“α is an ordinal < θ, or ≤ |C| (that is α∗(C) or ≤ κ(B)”
then α is an ordinal,
(g) if N |=“x is countable” then x ⊆ N ,
(h) if N |=“x is an ordinal” then x is an ordinal.
3. We omit the “class” if additionally
(i) p = ϕ¯ is a tuple of formulas, ϕ0 = ϕ0(x) and in N , ϕ0(x) defines
a set3.
4. We add the adjective “semi” if we omit clause (b) (the countability
demand).
5. If p is absent (or clear from context) we may omit it, similarly θ when
θ = ℵ0 or clear from the context. We tend to “forget” to mention C
(e.g. demand B expands it).
6. We say that a formula ϕ is upward absolute for (or from) class (B,p, θ)–
candidates when: if N1 is a class (B,p, θ)–candidate, N1 |= ϕ[x¯], and
N2 is a class (B,p, θ)–candidate or is (H(χ),∈) for χ large enough,
and N1 is a set or just a class of N2, then N2 |= ϕ[x¯].
We say above “through (class) (B,p, θ)–candidates” if N2 is de-
manded to be a (class) (B,p, θ)–candidate. Note that we can omit
H(χ) in the correct case (see 2.3(11)).
If B,p, θ are clear from the context, we may forget to say “for class
(B,p, θ)–candidates”.
7. We say that ϕ defines X absolutely through (B,p, θ)–candidates if
(α) ϕ = ϕ(x) is upward absolute through (B,p, θ)–candidates,
(β) X =
⋃
{XN : N is a (B,p, θ)–candidate}, where XN = {x ∈
N : N |= ϕ(x)}.
If only clause (α) holds then we add “weakly”.
Discussion 2.2. Should we prefer |B| = α an ordinal or |B| ⊆ H<ℵ1(α)?
The former is more convenient when we “collapse N over κ ∪ θ” (see 3.9).
Also then we can fix the universe whereas |B| = H<ℵ1(α) is less reasonable
as it is less absolute. On the other hand, when we would like to prove
preservation by iteration the second is more useful (see §5). To have the
best of both we adopt the somewhat unnatural meaning of B |`N ≺∆ B in
clause (e) of Definition 2.1.
We may have forgotten sometimes to write ‖B‖ instead of κ = κ(B).
In some cases, we may omit the demand (h) in the definition 2.1 of
(B,p, θ)–candidates (and then calling them “impolite candidates”), but still
we should demand then that
N |= “ x is an ordinal from B or C” ⇒ x is an ordinal,
3This is normally the forcing notion Q.
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and we should change “ordinal collapse” appropriately. However, there is
no reason to attend the “impolite” company here.
This motivates:
Definition 2.3. 1. Let ϕ¯ = 〈ϕ0, ϕ1〉 and B be a model as in 2.1, κ =
κ(B), and of countable vocabulary, say ⊆ H(ℵ0). We say that ϕ¯ or
(ϕ¯,B) is a temporary (κ, θ)–definition, or (B, θ)–definition, of a nep-
forcing notion4 Q if, in V:
(a) ϕ0 defines the set of elements of Q and ϕ0 is upward absolute from
(B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates,
(b) ϕ1 defines the partial (or quasi) ordering ofQ, also in every (B, ϕ¯, θ)–
candidate, and ϕ1 is upward absolute from (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates,
(c) if N is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate and p ∈ QN , then there is q ∈ Q such
that p ≤Q q and
q ⊢ “ G
˜
Q ∩Q
N is a subset of QN generic over N ”
where, of course, QN = {p : N |= ϕ0(p)}.
2. We add the adjective “explicitly” if ϕ¯ = 〈ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2〉 and additionally
(b)+ we add: ϕ2 is an (ω + 1)-place relation, upward absolute through
(B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates and ϕ2(〈pi : i ≤ ω〉) ⇒ “{pi : i ≤ ω} ⊆ Q
and {pi : i < ω} is predense above pω”, not just in V but in every
Q–candidate (which, if Q is correct, implies the case in V); in this
situation we say: {pi : i < ω} is explicitly predense above pω,
(c)+ we add: if N |= “I ⊆ Q is dense open” (or just predense) (so
I ∈ N) then for some list 〈pi : i < ω〉 of I ∩ N we have ϕ2(〈pi :
i < ω〉⌢〈q〉).
3. For a class (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate N we let pd(N,Q) = pdQ(N) = {I : I
is a class of N (i.e. defined in N by a first order formula with param-
eters from N) and is a predense subset of QN}. If N is a candidate,
it is {I ∈ N : N |=“I is predense”}.
4. We replace “temporary” byK if the relevant proposition holds not only
in V but in any forcing extension of V by a forcing notion P ∈ K. If
K is understood from the context (normally: all forcing notions we
will use in that application) we may omit it.
5. We say that (ϕ¯,B) is simply [explicitly] K–(κ, θ)–definition of a nep–
forcing notion Q, if:
(α) (ϕ¯,B) is [explicitly] K–definition of a nep-forcing notion Q,
(β) Q ⊆ H<ℵ1 (θ); i.e. P ∈ K implies ⊢P “if ϕ0(x) then x ∈ H<ℵ1 (θ)”,
(γ) B, κ, θ are the only parameters of ϕ¯ (meaning there are no others,
but even B, κ, θ do not necessarily appear).
4so in the normal case (see 2.11(4), 2.13), ϕ¯ defines Q
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6. We add “very simply” if in addition:
(δ) Q ⊆ ωθ.
7. We may say “Q is a nep-forcing notion”, “N is a Q-candidate” abusing
notion. If not clear, we write Qϕ¯ or (Qϕ¯)V. If not said otherwise,
∆ is the set of first order formulas. Inversely, we write (B, ϕ¯, θ) =
(BQ, ϕ¯Q, θQ) and ZFCQ for the relevant ZFC−∗ .
8. We say “I ⊆ QN is explicitly predense over pω” if ϕ2(〈pi : i ≤ ω〉) for
some list {pi : i < ω} of I.
9. We add the adjective “class” if we allow ourselves (in clauses (b),
(c) of part (1) and (c)+ of part (2)) class (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates N ; so
in clauses (c), (c)+, I is a class of N ; i.e. first order definable with
parameters from N , and use the weak version of absoluteness.
If we use (B,p, θ) we mean ϕ¯ is an initial segment of p.
10. We say (B, ϕ¯, θ) (or abusing notation, Q) is class=set if every class
(B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate.
11. In 2.3(1) we add the adjective “correctly” (and we say that (B, ϕ¯, θ)
is correct) if, for a large enough regular cardinal χ:
(a) the formula ϕ0 defines the set of members of Q absolutely through
(B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates, that is
Q =
⋃
{QN : N is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate },
QN = {x : N |= ϕ0(x)},
(b) the formula ϕ1 defines the quasi order of Q absolutely through
(B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates, that is ≤Q=
⋃
{(≤Q)N : N is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–
candidate}, (≤Q)N = {(p, q) : N |= ϕ1(p, q)}.
Similarly when we add “explicitly”.
So in those cases we can ignore H(χ) |= ϕℓ(x) and just ask for
satisfaction in suitable candidates. (Note: correct is less relevant to
snep.)
Convention: We may say “Q is . . . ” when we mean “(B, φ¯, θ) is . . . ” or
“(B,p, θ) is . . . ”.
Remark: The main case for us is candidates (not class ones), etc; still
mostly we can use the class version of nep. Also we can play with various
free choices.
Discussion 2.4. 1) Note: if x ∈ I ∈ N , N |=“ I ⊆ Q”, possibly x /∈ Q so
those x are not relevant (e.g. though α < κ(B) have a special role).
2) We think of using CS iteration Q¯ = 〈Pi,Q
˜
i
: i < δ〉, each Q
˜
i
has a
definition ϕ¯i and we would like to prove things on Pα for α ≤ δ. So the
relevant family Ki of forcing notions we really should consider for ϕ¯
i is
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{Pβ/Pi : β ∈ [i, δ)}, at least this holds almost always (maybe we can look
as help in other extensions).
3) Note that a significant fraction of iterated forcing of proper forcing
related to reals are forcing notions called “nice” above. The proof that they
are proper usually gives more and we think that they will be included even
by the same proof.
4) If K is trivial, (i.e. has only the trivial forcing notion as a member) this
means we can replace it by “temporarily”.
5) See also 5.2 for “K-absolutely”.
6) Note a crucial point in Definition 2.3, the relation “{pn : n < ω} is
predense above p” is not demanded to be absolute; only a “dense” family
of cases of it is demanded (we also allow other basic relations; e.g. q /∈ Q
to be non-absolute but those are less crucial). This change may seem tech-
nical, but is central being the difference between including not few natural
examples and including all those we have in mind.
7) Note that in clause (c) of 2.3(1) we mean: G ∩ QN is directed (by
≤Q
N
, not only by ≤Q) and G ∩N ∩ I 6= ∅ for I ∈ pd(N,Q).
8) Note that the demand described in 7) above almost implies “incompat-
ibility is upward absolute from N”, but not quite.
Let us consider a more restrictive class, where the absoluteness holds
because of more concrete reasons, the usual ones for upward absoluteness,
the relations are Σ11, or more generally, κ–Souslin.
Definition 2.5. 1. We say that T¯ is a temporary (κ, θ)–definition of a
snep–forcing notion Q if:
(a) T¯ = 〈T0, T1〉 where T0 ⊆ ω>(κ × κ) and T1 ⊆ ω>(κ × κ × κ) are
trees (i.e. closed under initial segments, non-empty) and θ ≤ κ,
(b) the set of elements of Q is
proj0(T0)
def
= {ν ∈ ωθ : for some η ∈ ωκ we have
ν ∗ η
def
= 〈(ν(n), η(n)) : n < ω〉 ∈ lim(T0)},
(c) the partial order of Q, {(p0, p1) : Q |= p0 ≤ p1} is
proj1(T1)
def
= {(ν0, ν1) : ν0, ν1 ∈ Q and for some ηη ∈ ωκ we have
ν0 ∗ ν1 ∗ η
def
= 〈(ν0(n), ν1(n), η(n)) : n < ω〉 ∈ lim(T1)},
(d) for a large enough regular cardinal χ, if N ⊆ (H(χ),∈) is a
(BT¯ , T¯ , θ)–candidate and κ ∈ N , T¯ ∈ N , p ∈ Q
N then there
is q ∈ Q such that p ≤Q q and
q ⊢ “ G
˜
Q ∩Q
N is a generic subset of QN over N ”,
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where BT¯ is the model with universe κ and the sequence relations
T0 ∩ n(κ× κ), T1 ∩ n(κ× κ× κ) for n < ω.
2. We add “explicitly” if T¯ = 〈T0, T1, T2〉 and we add
(a)+ also T2 ⊆ ω>(θ × θ × κ) and we let
proj2(T2)
def
=
{
〈νi : i ≤ ω〉 : for some η ∈ ωκ we have ν ∗ νω ∗ η ∈ lim(T2)
where ν = code(〈νℓ : ℓ < ω〉) is the member
of ωθ satisfying ν
((
ℓ+k+1
2
)
+ ℓ
)
= νℓ(k)
}
and 〈νi : i ≤ ω〉 ∈ proj2(T2) implies {νi : i ≤ ω} ⊆ Q (even in
candidates; the natural case is that witnesses are coded).
(d)+ we add: q is T¯–explicitly (N,Q)–generic, which means that
if N |= “I is a dense open subset of Q”
then for some list 〈pn : n < ω〉 of I∩N we have 〈pn : n < ω〉⌢〈q〉 ∈
proj2(T2),
(e)+ if νi ∈ Q for i ≤ ω and for some η ∈ ωκ we have code(ν0, ν1, . . . ) ∗
νω ∗ η ∈ lim(T2) then {ν0, ν1, . . . } ⊆ Q is predense above νω (and
this holds in candidates too).
3. We will also say “Q is a snep-forcing notion”, “N is a Q–candidate”,
etc.
4. We say η is a witness for ν ∈ Q if ν ∗ η ∈ lim(T0); similarly for T1, T2.
We say that I is explicitly predense over pω if code(〈pi : i ≤ ω〉) ∈
proj2(T2) for some list {pi : i < ω} of I.
Remark 2.6. In clause (a)+ we would like the proj2(T2) to be an (ω + 1)-
place relation on Q, but we do not like the first coordinate to give too much
information so we use the above coding, but it is in no way special. Note:
we do not want to have one coordinate giving 〈ϕℓ(0) : ℓ < ω〉.
Another possible coding is code(ν0, ν1, . . . ) ∼= 〈〈νℓ |` i : ℓ ≤ i〉 : i < ω〉, so
T ⊆ ω>(ω>(ω>θ)× θ × κ).
Proposition 2.7. Assume that T¯ is in V a temporary (κ, θ)–definition of
a snep forcing notion which we call Q. Let V′ be a transitive class of V
containing T¯ . Then:
1. also in V′, Q is snep,
2. if V′ |=“p ∈ Q” then V |=“p ∈ Q”,
3. if V′ |=“p ≤Q q” then V′ |=“p ≤Q q”,
4. if in V′, the model N is a (BT¯ , ϕ¯T¯ , κT¯ )–candidate then also in V, N
is a (BT¯ , ϕ¯T¯ , κT¯ )–candidate.
Definition 2.8. 1. Let Q be explicitly snep. We add the adjective “lo-
cal” if in the “properness clause i.e. 2.5(2)(d)+” we can add:
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(⊗) the witnesses for “q ∈ Q”, “〈pIn : n < ω〉 is Q–explicitly predense
above q” are from ω(N ∩ κ).
2. Let Q be explicitly nep. We add the adjective “K-local” if in the
“properness clause i.e. 2.3(2)(b)+” we can add: for each candidate N
which is ord–transitive we have
(⊕) for someK–extension N+ of N , it is a Q–candidate (in particular a
model of ZFC−∗ ) and N
+ |= “QN is countable” and q ∈ N+, N+ |=
“p ≤Q q and for each I ∈ pd(N,Q), IN is explicitly predense over
q”.
(Note that B |`N+ = B |`N .)
If K is the family of set forcing notions, or constant understood
from the context, we may omit K.
Discussion 2.9. 1) Couldn’t we fix θ = ω? Well, if we would like to have
the result of “the limit of a CS iteration Q¯ of such forcing notions is such
a forcing notion”, we normally need θ ≥ ℓg(Q¯). Also κ > ℵ0 is good for
including Π12–relations.
2) In “Souslin proper” (starting with [12]) the demands were
Definition 2.10. A forcing notion Q is Souslin proper if it is proper and:
the relations “x ∈ Q”, “x ≤Q y” are Σ11 and “the notion of incompatibility
in Q” is Σ11 (where, of course, the compatibility relation is Σ
1
1).
This makes “{pn : n < ω} is predense over pω” a Π12–property, hence an
ℵ1-Souslin one. So we can get the “explicitly” cheaply, however possibly
increasing κ. Note that for a Souslin proper forcing notion Q, also p ∈
QN ⇔ p ∈ Q & p ∈ N and similarly for p ≤Q q.
∗ ∗ ∗
If you like to be more pedant on the ZFC−∗ , look at the following defini-
tion. Normally there is no problem in having ZFC−∗ as required.
Definition 2.11. 1. We say ZFC−∗ is a K–good version [with parameter
C, possibly “for (B,p, θ)” forB,p, θ as in 2.3 from the relevant family]
if:
(a) it contains ZC−; i.e. Zermelo set theory without power set,
[and the axioms may speak on C]
(b) C is a model with countable vocabulary (given as a well ordered
sequence, so C is an individual constant in the theory ZFC−∗ ) and
universe |C| is an ordinal α(C),
(c) for every χ large enough, if X ⊆ H(χ) is countable then for some
countable N ⊆ (H(χ),∈), N |= ZFC−∗ , X ⊆ N and
x ∈ N & N |= “|x| = ℵ0” ⇒ x ⊆ N
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and C ∈ N and C |` (N∩|C|) ≺ C (can be weakened to a submodel or
≺∆, we do not loose much as we can expand by Skolem functions);
in the “for (B,p, θ)” version we add “N is a (B,p, θ)–candidate”,
(d) ZFC−∗ satisfies the forcing theorem
5 (see e.g. [17, Ch. I]) at least
for forcing notions in K,
(e) those properties are preserved by forcing notions in K (if P ∈ K,
G ⊆ P generic over V[G] then KV[G] will be interpreted as {Q
˜
[G] :
P ∗Q
˜
∈ K}).
2. If K is the class of all (set) forcing notions, we may omit it.
3. We say ZFC−∗ is normal if for χ large enough any countable N ≺
(H(χ),∈) to which C belongs is O.K. (for clause (1)(c) above).
4. We say ZFC−∗ is semi-normal for (B,p, θ) if for χ large enough, for
any countable N ≺ (H(χ),∈) (to which appropriate p,C,B, θ(∈ H(χ))
belong), for some Q ∈ N such that N |=“Q is a forcing notion” we
have:
(∗) if N ′ is countable N ⊆ N ′ ⊆ (H(χ),∈), N ′ ∩ χ = N ∩ χ and
(∀x)[N ′ |= “x is countable ” ⇒ x ⊆ N ′],
and N ′ is a generic extension of N for QN
then N ′ is (B,p, θ)–candidate and QN
′
|`N = Q |`N , ϕN
′
2 |`N =
ϕN2 |`N .
We say “K–semi-normal” if we demand N |= Q ∈ K.
5. We say ZFC−∗ is weakly normal for (B,p, θ) if clause (c) of part (1)
holds.
6. In parts (4), (5) we can replace (B,p, θ) by a family of such triples
meaning N is a candidate for all of them.
7. In parts (4), (5), (6) if (B,p, θ) = (BQ, ϕ¯Q, θQ) we may replace
(B,p, θ) by Q.
Discussion 2.12. 1) What are the points of parameters? E.g. we may have
κ∗ an Erdo¨s cardinal, C codes every A ∈ H(χ) for each χ < κ∗, ZFC−∗ =
ZFC−+ “κ∗ is an Erdo¨s cardinal C as above”, K = the class of forcing
notions of cardinality < κ∗. Then we have stronger absoluteness results to
play with.
2) On the other hand, we may use ZFC−∗ = ZFC
− + (∀r ∈ ω2)(r# exists)
+ “i7 exists”. This is a good version if V |= (∀r ∈ ω2)(r# exists) so we can
e.g. weaken the definition snep (or Souslin-proper or Souslin-c.c.c).
5for 8.8 we need: if P,Q are forcing notions, G
˜
is a P–name for a subset of Q such
that ⊢“ G
˜
is a generic subset of Q ”, and q ∈ Q ⇒ 6⊢P“q /∈ G
˜
” then for some Q–name R
˜of a forcing notion, Q ∗ R
˜
, P are equivalent
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3) What is the point of semi-normal? E.g. if we would like ZFC−∗ ⊢ CH,
whereas in V the Continuum Hypothesis fails. But as we have said in the
beginning, the normal case is usually enough.
Proposition 2.13. 1. Assume ZFC−∗ is {∅}–good. Then the clause (c)
+
of 2.3(2) is equivalent to clause (c) + (∗), where
(∗) if p ∈ Q and In is predense over p (for n < ω), each In is count-
able,
then for some q, p ≤ q ∈ Q, and for some pnℓ ∈ In for n < ω,
ℓ < ω we have ϕ2(〈pnℓ : ℓ < ω〉
⌢q)
(this is an obvious abusing of notation, we mean that this holds in
some candidate).
2. If ZFC−∗ is normal for (B,p, θ) then in Definition 2.3(1),(2) there is
no difference between “absolutely through” and “weakly absolutely”.
Proposition 2.14. 1. Assume V1 ⊆ V2 (so V1 is a transitive class of
V2 containing the ordinals, C,B, θ,p,∈ V1). If ZFC
−
∗ is temporarily
good then also in V1 it is temporarily good.
2. If co-(κ+ θ)-Souslin relations are downward absolute (from V2 to V1)
then also inverse holds.
Proof By Shoenfield–Levy absoluteness.
2. Connections between the basic definitions. We first give the
most transparent implications: we can omit “explicitly” and we can replace
snep by nep (this is 3.1) and the model B can be expanded, κ, θ increased,
(see 3.2). Then we note that if κ ≥ θ+ℵ1 and we are in the simple nep case,
we can get from nep to snep because saying “there is a countable model
N ⊆ (H(χ),∈) such that . . . ” can be expressed as a κ–Souslin relation
(see 3.3) and comment on the non-simple case. Then we discuss how the
absoluteness lemmas help us to change the universe (in 3.4), to get the case
with a class K from the case of temporarily (3.5) and to get explicit case
from snep or from Souslin proper (in 3.6).
Proposition 3.1. 1. If (ϕ¯,B) is explicitly a K–definition of a nep-forcing
notion Q, then ϕ¯ |` 2 is a K–definition of a nep-forcing notion Q.
2. If T¯ is explicitly a K-definition of a snep-forcing notion Q, then (T¯ |` 2)
is a K–definition of an snep-forcing notion Q.
3. If T¯ is [explicitly] a K–(κ, θ)–definition of a snep-forcing notion Q,
and B any model with universe κ coding the Tℓ’s and ϕℓ is defined as
projℓ(Tℓ), then (ϕ¯,B) is very simply [explicitly] K–(κ, θ)–definition of
a nep forcing notion Q (and let B = BT¯ , ϕ¯ = ϕ¯T¯ ).
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Proof Read the definitions.
Proposition 3.2. 1. If (ϕ¯,B) is [explicitly] a K–definition of a nep-
forcing notion and B is definable in B′ (and ∆ is Lω,ω, or change
∆ accordingly to the interpretation), then (ϕ¯,B′) is [explicitly] a K-
definition of a nep-forcing notion; moreover, if B is the only parameter
of the ϕℓ, we can replace it by B
′ (changing trivially the ϕℓ’s).
2. Similarly we can increase κ and θ and add “simply” (to the assumption
and the conclusion); we may also add “very simply”.
Proof Straight.
A converse to 3.1(1)+(2) is
Proposition 3.3. 1. Assume that κ′ = κ+ θ + ℵ1 + ‖B‖ and
(⊕) (ϕ¯,B) is a correct very simple [explicit] K–(κ, θ)–definition of a
nep forcing notion Q.
Then some T¯ is an [explicitly] K–(κ′, θ)–definition of a snep forcing-
notion Q (the same Q).
2. If κ = θ = κ′ = ℵ0 we get a similar result with the ϕℓ being Π
1
2-sets.
3. If in clause (⊕) of 3.3(1) we replace very simple by simple (so we
weaken Q ⊆ ωθ to Q ⊆ H<ℵ1(θ)), then part (1) still holds for some Q
′
isomorphic to Q.
Proof 1) This is, by now, totally straight; still we present the case
of ϕ0 for part (1) for completeness. If in Definition 2.1(2), clause (e) we
use ≺, let 〈ψ1n(y, x0, . . . , xn−1) : n < ω〉 list the first order formulas in the
vocabulary of B in the variables {y, xℓ : ℓ < ω}, (so in ψ
1
n no xℓ, ℓ ≥ n
appears, but some xℓ, ℓ < n may not appear); if we use ≺∆ let it list
subformulas of members of ∆. Similarly 〈ψ2n(y, x0, . . . , xn−1) : 4 ≤ n < ω〉
for the vocabulary of set theory. Let us define T0 by defining a set of ω-
sequences Y0, and then we will let T0 = {ρ |`n : ρ ∈ Y0 and n < ω}. For
α < ω1 let {βα,ℓ : ℓ < ω} list {β : β ≤ α}.
Now let Y0 be the set of ω-sequences ρ ∈ ω(θ × κ′) such that for some
(B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate N ⊆ (H(χ),∈) (so B, θ, κ belong to N) and some list
〈an : n < ω〉 of the member of N we have: ρ = ν∗η; i.e. ρ(n) = (ν(n), η(n))
and
(i) a0 = B, a1 = θ, a2 = κ, a3 = ν,
(ii) {n : N |= an ∈ κ′} = {η(8n + 1) : 0 < n < ω},
(iii) every η(8n + 2) is a countable ordinal such that:
N |= “ rk(an) < rk(am)” iff η(8n + 2) < η(8m+ 2) < ℵ1 ≤ κ
′,
(iv) ifB |= (∃y)ψ1n(y, a0, . . . , an−1) thenB |= ψ
1
n[aη(8(n+1)+3) , a0, . . . , an−1],
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(v) N |= ϕ0[ν]; i.e. N |= ϕ0[a3],
(vi) N |=“ aℓ ∈ am ” iff η(8(
(
ℓ+m+1
2
)
+ ℓ) + 4) = 0,
(vii) if n ≥ 4 and N |= (∃y)ψ2n(y, a0, . . . , an−1)
then N |= ψ2n[aη(8n+5), a0, . . . , an−1] and η(8n + 6) = 1,
(viii) if N |=“an is a countable ordinal” and ak = βan,ℓ
then η(8(
(
ℓ+n+1
2
)
+ ℓ) + 7) = k.
Let T0 = {ρ |`n : ρ ∈ Y0, n < ω}.
Claim 3.3.1. 1. Y0 is a closed subset of
ω(θ × κ).
2. Q = {ν ∈ ωθ : (∃η)(η ∈ ω(κ′) & ν ∗ η ∈ Y0(= lim(T0))} = proj0(T0).
Proof of the claim: 1) Given ν ∗ η ∈ lim(T0) we can define a model N ′
with set of elements say {a′n : n < ω} by clause (vi), it is a model of ZFC
−
∗
by clause (vii) (and the demand N |= ZFC−∗ ), it is well founded by clause
(iii) (and the earlier information).
We start to define an embedding h of N ′ intoH(χ) and we put h(a′0) = B,
h(a′1) = θ, h(a
′
2) = κ and h(a
′
n) = η(8n + 1) if N
′ |= a′n ∈ a
′
2, n > 0. Then
let h(a′3) ∈
ωθ be such that h(a′3)(ℓ) = γ iff letting n be such that ψ
2
n ≡ [y =
x3(ℓ)], so necessarily N
′ |=“a′3(ℓ) = a
′
η(8n+5)”, we have η(8(n + 5) + 1) = γ
(see clause (vii)).
Lastly we define h(a′n) for the other a
′
n by induction of rk
N ′(a′n), note that
we can give then dummy elements to relation Rang(h)∩κ = {η(8(n+1)+1) :
n < ω}.
The model h[N ′] above should be built in such a way that it is ord–
transitive. This (and clause (viii)) will ensure that the clause (g) of the
demand 2.1(2) is satisfied.
Note that, actually, the coding (of candidates) which we use above does
not change when passing to the ord–collapse.
2) Should be clear from the above noting: p ∈ Q iff for some N as above,
N |= ϕ0(p) [as⇐ holds by the definition and⇒ holds as there are countable
N ≺ (H(χ),∈) to which p,B, θ, κ belong].
This finishes the proof of the claim and so the first part of the proposition.
(2), (3) Easy. 3.3
What if in 3.3 we omit “the only parameters of ϕ¯ are B, θ, κ”, so what do
we do? Well, the role ofB is assumed by the transitive closure of 〈ϕ¯,B, θ, κ〉,
which we can then map onto some κ∗ ≥ κ.
Proposition 3.4. 1. Assume ZFC−∗ is ∅-normal for (B, ϕ¯, θ), and, in
V, ϕ¯ is a (B, θ)–definition of an [explicit] nep forcing notion. Then
we get “correctly”.
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2. Assume ϕ¯ is a K–(B, θ)–definition of a nep-forcing notion Q (the
“nep” part is not really needed). Let V′ be a transitive class of V such
that
(i) ϕ¯ and B belong to V′ (and of course C),
(ii) the family of (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates is unbounded in V′, moreover
(iii) for χ large enough, in V (or just in V′) the set
{N ⊆ (H(χ),∈) : N is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate }
is stationary, or at least
(iii)− V′ |=“ϕℓ(x¯)” implies that
for unboundedly many (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates N (inV), N |=“ϕℓ(x¯)”,
which in other words says that in the universe V′, (B, ϕ¯, θ) is a
correct definition of [explicitly] nep forcing notion (see part (1)
above and Definition 2.3(11)).
Then:
(a) if V′ |=“p ∈ Q” (i.e. ϕ0(p)) then V |=“p ∈ Q”,
(b) if V′ |=“p ≤Q q” (i.e. ϕ1(p, q)) then V |=“p ≤Q q”,
(c) if in V′, N is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate then also in V, N is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–
candidate.
3. If in (2) we add “explicitly” then
(d) if V′ |= ϕ2(〈pi : i ≤ ω〉) then V |= ϕ2(〈pi : i ≤ ω〉),
(e) if in V′, N is a (ϕ¯,B)–candidate and q is explicitly (N,Q)-generic
then this holds in V.
4. If in (2) we add “ϕ¯ is a temporary explicit correct (B, θ)–definition of
a nep forcing notion” (in V) then also in V′, ϕ¯ is a temporary explicit
correct (B, θ)–definition of a nep-forcing notion,
(∗)3 κ = θ = ℵ0 or κ = ℵ0 and ([θ]≤ℵ0)V
′
is cofinal in ([θ]≤ℵ0)V1 or
(there are large enough cardinals to guarantee) any co–(κ+θ+ℵ1)–
Souslin relation in V′ is upward absolute to V1.
5. If in (2) we add (∗)4 below and we add “local” to the assumption,
then also in V′, ϕ¯ is a temporary explicit (B, θ)–definition of a local
nep-forcing notion, where
(∗)4 ([κ ∪ θ]≤ℵ0)V
′
is cofinal in ([κ ∪ θ]≤ℵ0 ,⊆)V.
Proof 1) Straight.
2) There are two implications implicit in 3.4(2) concerning the versions of
clause (iii). Let
Sχ
def
= {N : N ∈ V, N is a countable submodel of (H(χ),∈)V
and N is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate }
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and let
S′χ
def
= {N : N ∈ V′, N is a countable submodel of (H(χ),∈)V
′
and N is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate }.
Let <∗χ∈ V be a well ordering of H(χ) and let
C
def
= {N : N ∈ V, N is a countable elementary submodel of
(H(χ)V,∈,V ∩H(χ), <∗χ) to which (B, ϕ¯, θ) belongs }.
If clause (iii) for V then clause (iii) for V′. Why? Just observe that
(⋆)1 in V: C is a club of [H(χ)]≤ℵ0 and {N ∩ V′ : N ∈ C} is a club of
[H(χ)V
′
]≤ℵ0 .
Now suppose that, in V′, C ′ is a club of H(χ)V
′
and we should prove
C ′ ∩ S′χ 6= ∅ (say for some model B ∈ V
′ with countable vocabulary, the
universe H(χ)V
′
and Skolem functions, C ′ = {N : N ≺ B countable }).
As S′χ is stationary in V, also C1 = {N ∈ C : N ∩ V
′ ∈ C ′} is club of
[H(χ)V
′
]≤ℵ0 in V. Hence there is N ∈ Sχ ∩ C1. Now, N ∩V′ is almost a
member of C ′ ∩S′χ, it satisfies the requirements in the definitions of C
′ and
S′χ. But N ∩ V
′ is a countable subset of H(χ)V
′
, so by Shoenfield–Levy
absoluteness it exists.
If clause (iii) for V′ then clause (iii) for V. Work in V′. So let x ∈ Q
and let χ be large enough such that (H(χ),∈) ≺Σn V
′ for n large enough.
The set
C∗
def
= {N : N ∈ V, N is a countable elementary submodel of
H(χ) to which x,B, ϕ¯, θ,C belong }.
is a club of [H]≤ℵ0 , hence has non-empty intersection with any stationary
subset of [H]≤ℵ0 . In particular, by the assumption, there is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–
candidate N ∈ C∗. So N ≺ (H(χ),∈), x,B, ϕ¯, θ,C ∈ N . So
V′ |= ϕ0(x) ⇒ (H(χ),∈) |= ϕ0(x) ⇒ N |= ϕ0(x) ⇒ x ∈ Q
N .
3) Straight.
4) Suppose that
V′ |= “ N is a (ϕ¯,B)–candidate and p ∈ QN ”.
In V′, let 〈In : n < ω〉 list the I such that N |=“I is a predense subset of
Q”. We know (by 3.4(2)(c)) that N is a candidate in V1. Hence, in V1,
there are q, 〈pnℓ : ℓ < ω, n < ω〉 such that:
(i) 〈pnℓ : ℓ < ω〉 lists In ∩N ,
(ii) p ≤Q q ∈ Q,
(iii) ϕ2(〈pnℓ : ℓ < ω〉
⌢〈q〉) for each n < ω.
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So there is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidateN1 such thatN ∈ N1, 〈pnℓ : ℓ < ω〉 : n < ω〉,
q and 〈In : n < ω〉 belong to N1, and N1 |=“p ≤Q q”, and N1 |= ϕ2(〈pnℓ :
ℓ < ω〉⌢〈q〉) for n < ω (by “correct”). It is enough to find such N1 ∈ V′,
which follows from 2.13.
(We use an amount of downward absoluteness which holds as V′ is a tran-
sitive class including enough ordinals).
5) Similar proof. 3.4
Proposition 3.5. 1. Assume T¯ is an explicit temporary (κ, θ)–definition
of a snep–forcing notion Q. For any extension V1 of V, this still holds
if (∗)3 of 3.4(4) above holds. So we can replace “temporary” by K =
class of all set forcing notions.
2. Assume (ϕ¯,B) is a simple explicit temporary (κ, θ)–definition of a
nep–forcing notion Q. For any extension V1 of V this still holds in
V1 if (∗)3 of 3.4(4) holds. So we can add/replace “temporary” by
the class K of all forcing notions preserving “([θ]≤ℵ0)V is cofinal in
([θ]≤ℵ0)V1”.
3. Assume (ϕ¯,B) is a local explicit temporary (κ, θ)–definition of a nep
forcing notion Q. Then for any extension V1 of V this still holds,
provided that:
(∗)4 ([κ ∪ θ]≤ℵ0)V is cofinal in ([κ ∪ θ]≤ℵ0 ,⊆)V1 .
Proof 1), 2) Left to the reader (and similar to the proof of part (3)).
3) Let θ1 = κ+ θ, and let a ∈ [θ1]ℵ0 , and consider the statement
⊠a if N is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate satisfying N ∩ θ1 ⊆ a and p ∈ QN (i.e.
N |= ϕ0[p]),
then there are N ′, a generic extension of N (so have the same ordi-
nals and N is a class of N ′) which is a (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate such that
N ′ |=“P(θ)N is countable” and
N ′ |= “ (∃q)[q ∈ Q & q is explicitly (N ∩ P(Q),Q)–generic] ”.
Note: for [x ∈ N ′∧N ′ |=“x is countable” ⇒ x ⊆ N ′] just use a suitable
collapse.
Now, only (N ′, c)c∈N/ ∼= and (N,α)α∈a/ ∼= and (N ′, N, α)α∈a are impor-
tant and we can code N as a subset of a (as all three are countable). Thus
the statement is essentially
(∀N)[(N is not well founded (or not B |` (N ∩ a) ≺∆ B, etc.)∨
∨(∃N ′)(N ′ as above)].
So it is Π12, hence it is absolute from V to V1. Now, both in V
′ and
in V1 the statement “Q is simply, locally, explicitly nep” is equivalent to
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(∀a ∈ [θ1]ℵ0)⊠a, which is equivalent to S = {a ∈ [θ1]ℵ0 : ⊠a} is cofinal in
[θ1]
ℵ0 . But by the previous paragraph S[V] ⊆ S[V1]. Now (∗)4 gives the
needed implication. 3.5
Proposition 3.6. 1. Assume T¯ is a temporarily (κ, θ)–definition of a
snep–forcing notion Q. If (∗) below holds, then we can find a tree
T2 ⊆ ω>(θ × θ × κ′) such that T¯⌢〈T2〉 is an explicit temporary (κ, θ)–
definition of a snep-forcing notion Q, where
(∗) κ = θ = ℵ0, κ′ = ℵ1 or enough absoluteness.
2. If Q (i.e. 〈ϕ0, ϕ1〉) is a Souslin proper forcing notion (see 2.10) and
B codes the parameter (so has universe κ = ℵ0 and let θ = ℵ0),
then (ϕ¯,B) is a simple explicit temporary (κ, θ)–definition of the nep-
forcing notion Q.
Proof 1) The question is to express “{pn : n < ω} is predense above
q” which is equivalent to
(∀ν ∈ ωθ)[ϕ0(ν) & ϕ1(q, ν) ⇒ (∃ν
′ ∈ ωθ)(
∨
n
ϕ1(pn, ν
′) & ϕ1(ν, ν
′))].
So, as κ = θ = ℵ0, this is a Π12-formula and hence it is ℵ1-Souslin.
2) Similarly (for ϕ2 being upward absolute note that the relation is now
Π11 and Π
1
1 formulas are upward absolute). 3.6
Definition 3.7. Assume that (ϕ¯,B) is a temporary (κ, θ)–definition of a
nep forcing notion Q, and N is a Q–candidate. We say that a condition
q′ ∈ Q is essentially explicitly (N,Q)-generic if for some candidate N ′,
N ⊆ N ′, N ∈ N ′, q′ is explicitly (N ′,Q)-generic and for some q0 ∈ QN
′
,
q0 ≤Q q′ and N ′ |=“q0 is (N,Q)-generic”.
Note: if Q is a snep-forcing for T¯ , this relation is (κ + θ + ℵ1)–Souslin,
too.
Proposition 3.8. Assume Q is a correct explicitly nep-forcing notion, say
by (ϕ¯,B). If q is (N,Q)-generic, then for some q′ we have
q ≤ q′ ∈ Q and q′ is essentially explicitly (N,Q)-generic.
Proof Let ϕ2(〈pIn : n < ω〉, q) hold for some list 〈p
I
n : n < ω〉 of
I ∈ pd(N,Q). For I ∈ pd(N,Q) let NI be a Q–candidate such that NI |=
ϕ2(〈pIn : n < ω〉, q).
Let N ′ ⊆ H(χ) be a countable Q–candidate satisfying
{N, q} ∪ {NI : I ∈ pd(N,Q)} ∈ N
′.
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By our assumptions there is q′ such that: q ≤ q′ ∈ Q and q′ is explicitly
(N ′,Q)-generic.
Proposition 3.9. 1. If N is a B–candidate, so in particular
[N |= “α < κ ∨ α < θ”] ⇒ α ∈ κ ∨ α ∈ θ,
and |B| is an ordinal, then there is a unique N ′ = MosColκ,θ(N) and
f such that
(a) f is an isomorphism from N onto N ′,
(b) f |` (N ∩ κ) = id, f(κ) = κ and f |` (N ∩ θ) = id, f(θ) = θ,
(c) if x ∈ N\(κ+ 1)\(θ + 1) then f(x) = {f(y) : N |=“y ∈ x”},
(d) N ′ is a B–candidate.
2. Note that if N |=“x ∈ H<ℵ1(κ) ∪H<ℵ1(θ)” then f(x) = x.
3. If |B| is not an ordinal (so κ ⊆ |B| ⊆ H<ℵ1(κ)), then N
′ is still a
(B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate, using the “but” of clause (e) of Definition 2.1(2).
Fact 3.10. In the definition of nep (or snep) in the “properness” clause, it
is enough to restrict ourselves to a family I of predense subsets of QN such
that:
if I ∈ pd(N,Q)
then for some J ∈ I we have (∀p ∈ I ∩N)(∃q ∈ J )(N |= p ≤Q q).
Proposition 3.11. 1. Assume T¯ defines an explicit (κ, θ)–snep forcing
notion. Let ϕ¯ = ϕ¯T , B = BT¯ (see 3.1(3)). If Q
T¯ is local then Qϕ¯ is
local, in fact in Definition 2.8(2).
2. If (ZFC−∗ is K–good and) ZFC
−
∗ says that (B, ϕ¯, θ) is explicitly nep,
and ϕ¯ is correct then (Bϕ¯, ϕ¯, θ) is explicitly nep and local.
Moving from nep to snep (and inversely) we may ask what occurs to
“local”. It is usually preserved.
3. There are examples. In this section we show that a large family
of natural forcing notions satisfies our definition. Later we will deal with
preservation theorems but to get nicer results we better “doctor” the forcing
notions, but this is delayed to the next section.
In fact all the theorems of Ros lanowski Shelah [14], which were designed to
prove properness, actually give one notion or another from §1 here (confirm-
ing the thesis 1.3 of §0). We will state them without giving the definitions
from [14] and give a proof of (hopefully) well known specific cases, indicating
why it works.
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Lemma 4.1 (Ros lanowski Shelah [14]). 1. Suppose that Q is a forcing
notion of one of the following types:
(a) Qtreee (K,Σ) for some finitary tree-creating pair (K,Σ), where e = 1
and (K,Σ) is 2-big or e = 0 and (K,Σ) is t-omittory (see [14, §2.3];
so e.g. this covers the Sacks forcing notion),
(b) Q∗s∞(K,Σ) for some finitary creating pair (K,Σ) which is growing,
condensed and of the AB–type or omittory, of the AB+–type and
satisfies ⊕0,⊕3 of [14, 4.3.8] (see [14, §3.4]; this captures the Blass–
Shelah forcing notion of [4]),
(c) Q∗w∞(K,Σ) for some finitary creating pair which captures single-
tons (see [14, §2.1])
(d) Q∗f (K,Σ) for some finitary, 2-big creating pair (K,Σ) with the
Halving Property which is either simple or gluing and an H-fast
function f : ω × ω −→ ω (see [14, §2.2]).
Then Q is an explicit ℵ0–snep forcing notion, moreover, it is local.
2. Assume that Q is a forcing notion of one of the following types:
(a) Qtreee (K,Σ) for e < 3 and a tree-creating pair (K,Σ), which is
bounded if e = 2 (see [14, §2.3]; this includes the Laver forcing
notion),
(b) Q∗∞(K,Σ) for a finitary growing creating pair (K,Σ) (see [14,
§2.1]; this covers the Mathias forcing notion).
Then Q is an explicit ℵ0–nep forcing notion, moreover, it is local.
Proof Let N be a Q-candidate and p ∈ QN . Let 〈Jn : n < ω〉 list
{J : N |= “J ⊆ Q is open dense”}. Then there is a sequence 〈(pn,In) :
n < ω〉 such that pn,In ∈ N , N |= pn ≤ pn+1, In ⊆ Jn is a countable
set, 〈pn : n < ω〉 has an upper bound in Q and In is predense above
pn+1, moreover, in an explicit way as described below (see the respective
subsections in [14]). Moreover,
in part (1) cases (a)+(c), In is finite and moreover, we can
say “In is predense above pn+1” in a Borel way.
For the Sacks forcing notion: for some k < ω, In = {p
[η]
n+1 : η ∈ pn+1, ℓg(η) =
k}, so In corresponds to a front of pn+1, which necessarily is finite. This
property serves as ϕ2 (compare with more detailed description for the Laver
forcing below).
In part (1) case (b) (e.g. the Blass–Shelah forcing notion) In is countable.
We do not know which level will be activated, but if use n, then we get into
In, so In countable but the property is Borel not Π11.
Now, in part (2), In is countable and again it corresponds to some front
A of pn+1 in an appropriate sense. So In = {p
[η]
n+1 : η ∈ A}, but to say “A is
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a front” is Π11 (in some instances of 2(a) we have e-thick antichains instead
of fronts, but the complexity is the same).
Recall that for a subtree T ⊆ ω>ω,A ⊆ T is a front of T if
(∀η ∈ lim(T ))(∃n)(η |`n ∈ A)
(usually members of A are pairwise incomparable).
Specifically, for the Laver forcing notion, we can guarantee In = {p
[η]
n+1 :
η ∈ A}, where A is a front of pn+1. Now being a front is a Π11–sentence (see
the definition above) which is upward absolute and this is our choice for ϕ2.
Let us write this formula in a more explicit way (for the case of the Laver
forcing notion):
ϕ2(〈pi : i ≤ ω〉) ≡ each pi is a Laver condition and∧
i∈ω
(∃!η)(η ∈ pω & p2i = p
[η]
ω )
[call this unique η by ηi] and∧
i 6=j
ηi 5 ηj (incomparable) & (∀ρ ∈ lim(pω))(
∨
n
∨
m
ρ |`n = ηm)
[this is: {pi : i ∈ ω} is explicitly predense above pω].
So it is Π11 (of course, Σ
1
2 is okay, too.) 4.1
Note that even for the Sacks forcing notion, “p, q are incompatible” is
complete Π11. So “{pn : n ∈ ω} is predense above p” will be Π
1
2. For Laver
forcing we cannot do better. Now, generally Π12 is not upward absolute from
countable submodels, whereas Π11 is.
Proposition 4.2. All the forcing notions Q defined in [14], [15], are cor-
rect, and we can use ZFC−∗ = ZC
− which is good and normal (see 2.11).
Also the relation “p, q are incompatible members of Q” is upward absolute
from Q–candidates (as well as p ∈ Q, p /∈ Q, p ≤ q, and “p, q are compati-
ble”).
Proof Check.
4. Preservation under iteration: first round. We give here one
variant of the preservation theorem, but for it we need some preliminary
clarification. We have said “there is q which is (N,Q)-generic”; i.e. q ⊢Q“
G
˜
Q ∩ QN is a generic subset of QN over N ”. Note that we have said QN
and not Q∩N as we intended to demand N |=“r ∈ Q” ⇒ V |=“r ∈ Q”
rather than r ∈ N ⇒ [N |=“r ∈ Q” ⇔ V |=“r ∈ Q”] (the version we
use is, of course, weaker and so better). Now, to use Definition 2.3(1) we
usually use N [GQ] (e.g. when iterating).
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But what is N [G] here? In fact, what is the connection between N |=“τ
˜is a Q–name” and V |=“τ
˜
is a Q–name”? Because [x ∈ Y ∈ N ; x ∈ N ],
none of the implications holds.
For our purpose, the usual N [G] = {τ
˜
[G] : τ
˜
∈ N is a Q-name} is not
appropriate as it is not clear where being a Q-name is defined. We use N〈G〉
which is N [G ∩ QN ] when we disregard objects in V\N . Of course, if the
models are ⊆ H<ℵ1(κ ∪ θ) life is easier; but we may lose N |= ZFC
−
∗ .
We then prove (in 5.5) the first version of preservation by CS iteration.
We aim at proving only that Pα = Lim(Q¯) satisfies the main clause, i.e.
clause (c) of Definition 2.3 (but did not say that Pα is nep itself). For
this we need again to define what is N〈G〉 for N which is not necessarily
a candidate. The second treatment (in §5) depends just on Definition 5.1
from this section.
Definition 5.1. 1. Assume N |=“Q is a nep-forcing notion” and G ⊆
QN is generic over N . We define N〈G〉 = N〈G ∩ QN 〉 “ignoring V”
and letting BN〈G〉 = BN for the relevant B. In details,
N〈G〉
def
= {τ
˜
N 〈G〉 : N |= “τ
˜
is a Q–name”},
where τ
˜
N 〈G〉 is defined by induction on rkN (τ
˜
) (see e.g. [17, Ch.I]):
(a) if for some p ∈ G ∩ QN and x ∈ N we have N |= [p ⊢Q“τ
˜
= x”]
then τ
˜
N 〈G〉 = x,
(b) if not (a) then necessarily N |=“τ
˜
has the form {(pi, τ
˜
i) : i < i
∗},
pi ∈ Q, τ
˜
i a Q–name of rank < rk(τ
˜
)”; now we let
τ
˜
N 〈G〉 = {(τ
˜
′)N 〈G〉 : τ
˜
′ ∈ N and for some p ∈ G∩QN we have (p, τ
˜
′) ∈ τ
˜
}.
2. If N |=“τ
˜
is a Q–name” we define a Q–name τ
˜
〈N〉 as follows:
(a) if N |=“τ
˜
= xˇ”, x ∈ N , we let τ
˜
= xˇ (see e.g. [17, Ch.I]),
(b) if N |=“τ
˜
= {(pi, τ
˜
i) : i < i
∗}, where pi ∈ Q, τ
˜
i a Q–name of rank
< rk(τ
˜
)” then
τ
˜
〈N〉 =
{
(p, (τ
˜
′)〈N〉) : N |= “(p, τ
˜
′) ∈ τ
˜
”
}
.
3. We say “q is 〈N,Q〉–generic” if q ⊢Q“G
˜
Q∩QN is a subset of (QN , <NQ )
generic over N”.
Definition 5.2. 1. In Definition 2.3(1) replacing “temporarily” by “K–
absolutely” means
(a) if V1 is a K–extension of V (i.e. a generic extension of V by a
forcing notion from KV) then
(i) V |=“x ∈ Qϕ¯” ⇒ V1 |=“x ∈ Qϕ¯”,
(ii) V |=“x <Q
ϕ¯
y” ⇒ V1 |=“x <Q
ϕ¯
y”,
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(iii) in the explicit case we have a similar demand for ϕ2; otherwise,
if N is a Qϕ¯–candidate in V, q ∈ Qϕ¯ is 〈N,Q〉–generic (see
5.1(3)) in V then q is 〈N,Q〉–generic in V1,
(b) if V1 is a K–extension, then the relevant part of Definition 2.3 and
clause (a) here holds in V1,
(c) if Vℓ+1 is a K–extension of Vℓ for ℓ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, V0 = V then V3
is a K–extension of V1.
2. We omit K when we mean: any set forcing.
Note that (a)(i) + (ii) is automatic for explicitly snep, also (a)(iii). One
can make “absolutely nep” to the main case.
The following is natural to assume.
Definition 5.3. 1. We say ZFC−∗ is nice to χ1 if χ1 is a constant in C,
ZFC−∗ says χ1 is strong limit and ZFC
−
∗ is preserved by forcing by
forcing notions of cardinality < χ1.
2. We say Q is nice (or ZFC−∗ nice to Q) if for some χ1, ZFC
−
∗ is nice to
χ1 and it says Q ∈ H(χ1).
Proposition 5.4. If N is a Q–candidate, Q is a nep-forcing notion, GQ ⊆
Q is generic over V and GQ ∩QN is generic over N then:
(a) N |=“τ
˜
is a Q-name” implies τ
˜
N 〈G〉 = τ
˜
〈N〉[G],
(b) N〈G〉 is a model of ZFC−∗ and moreover it is a Q–candidate and is a
forcing extension of N , provided that the forcing theorem applies, i.e.
ZFC−∗ is K–good, Q ∈ K (see Definition 2.11),
(c) N〈G〉 ∩ κ = N ∩ κ, N〈G〉 ∩ θ = N ∩ θ.
Remark: It seems that usually (but not in general) we have:
(H<ℵ1(κ))
V[G] ∩N〈G〉 = H<ℵ1(κ)
V ∩N and
(H<ℵ1(θ))
V[G] ∩N〈G〉 = (H<ℵ1(θ))
V ∩N.
Proposition 5.5. Assume
(a) Q¯ = 〈Pi,Q
˜
j
: i ≤ α, j < α〉 is a CS iteration,
(b) for each i < α
⊢Pi “(ϕ¯i,Bi) is a temporary (κi, θi)–definition of a nep-forcing notion Q
˜
i
”
and the only parameter of ϕ¯i is Bi, so we are demanding 〈(ϕ¯i,Bi) :
i < α〉 ∈ V,
(c) B is a model with universe α∗, or including α∗ and included inH<ℵ1(α
∗),
where α∗ ≥ α, α∗ ≥ κi = κ(Bi), B codes 〈(Bi, ϕ¯i) : i < α〉 and the
functions α− 1, α+ 1.
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We can use a vocabulary ⊆ {Pn,m : n,m < ω} where Pn,m is an n-place pred-
icate to code 〈Bi : i < α〉: let PBn+1,2m = {〈i, x1, . . . , xn〉 : 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈
PBin,m}, P2,1 = {(α,α + 1) : α + 1 < α
∗} (and ∆ is the set of first order
formulas).
Then: if N ⊆ (H(χ),∈) is a B–candidate, p ∈ Pα ∩ N , then for some
condition q, p ≤ q ∈ Pα and q is 〈N,Pα〉–generic (in particular Pα is
defined from B) which is defined below.
Definition 5.6. Under the assumptions of 5.5, in N we have a definition
of the countable support iteration Q¯ = 〈Pi,Q
˜
j
: i ≤ α, j < α〉. We define
by induction on j ∈ N ∩ (α+ 1) when q ∈ Pj is 〈N,Pj〉–generic:
(⊛) if q ∈ Gj ⊆ Pj and Gj is generic over V then G
〈N〉
j is a generic subset
of PNj over N , where
G
〈N〉
j
def
= {p : N |= “p ∈ Pj” and p
〈〈N〉〉 ∈ Gj},
where p〈〈N〉〉 is a function with domain Dom(p)N , and p(γ) is the fol-
lowing Pγ–name: if p(γ)〈N〈G˜ γ
∩N〉〉 ∈ Q
˜
γ
, then it is p(γ); if not, then
it is ∅Q
˜ γ
.
Remark 5.7. The major weakness is that Pα is not proved to be in some
of our classes (nep or snep). We get the “original property” without the
“support team”, i.e. the Q
˜
i
are nep, but on Pα we just say it satisfies the
main part of nep. A minor one is that Bi is not allowed to be a Pi–name in
any way. In the later theorems, we use P′α ⊆ Pα consisting of “hereditarily
countable” names.
Note: inside N , if “N |= p ∈ Pα” then Dom(pα) ∈ [α]≤ℵ0 in N ’s sense
hence (see Definition 2.1(2)), Dom(pα) ⊆ N and similarly the names are
actually from N , members outside N do not count, they may not be in Pα
at all.
Proof of 5.5 We imitate the proof of the preservation of properness.
So we prove by induction on j ∈ (α+ 1) ∩N that:
(∗)j if i ∈ j∩N , q is (N,Pi)–generic, and q ⊢Pi“(p |` i)
〈N〉 ∈ G
˜
Pi” then we can
find a condition r ∈ Pj such that r |` i = q, and r ⊢Pj“(p |` j)
〈N〉 ∈ G
˜
Pj”,
r is (N,Pj)–generic, and Dom(r) \ i ⊆ N”.
Case 0: j = 0.
Left to the reader.
Case 1: j = j1 + 1.
So j1 ∈ N (why? use P2,1 and 2.3(2)(e)), and by the inductive hypothesis
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and the form of the conclusion without loss of generality i = j1. Let q ∈
Gi ⊆ Pi, Gi generic over V. So N〈G
〈N〉
i 〉 ∩ α
∗ = N ∩ α∗ (by 5.4), and
hence B |`N〈G
〈N〉
i 〉 = B |`N ≺ B. But i ∈ N , so this applies to Bi, too.
So V[Gi] |=“N〈G
〈N〉
i 〉 is a Bi–candidate”. Also N〈G
〈N〉
i 〉 |=“p(i)
〈N〈G
〈N〉
i 〉〉 ∈
Qi” because G
〈N〉
i is a generic subset of P
N
i = {x : x ∈ N , N |=“x ∈ Pi”}
over N and use the property of Qi.
Case 3: j is a limit ordinal.
As in the proof for properness (see [17, Ch.III, 3.2]). 5.5
Remark: Note that if N |=“w is a subset of α” then we can deal with
Pw, as in §5.
5. True preservation theorems. Let us recall thatQ is nep if “p ∈ Q”,
“p ≤Q q” are defined by upward absolute formulas for models N which are
(Bθ, ϕ¯θ, θQ)–candidates; i.e. N ⊆ (H(χ),∈) countable, BQ ∈ N a model
on some κ, BQ |`N ≺∆ BQ, N model of ZFC
−
∗ and for each such model
we have the properness condition. Usually Q ⊆ ωθ, or H<ℵ1(θ) or so.
We would like to prove that CS iteration preserves “being nep”, but CS
may give “too large” names of conditions (of Q
˜
i
, i > 0) depending say
on large maximal antichains (of Pi). Note: if Q0 is not c.c.c. normally it
has maximal antichain which is not absolutely so; start with a perfect set
of pairwise incompatible elements and extend it to a maximal antichain.
Then whenever a real is added, the maximality is lost. Finally, c.c.c. is
normally lost in Pω. So we will revise our iteration so that we consider only
hereditarily countable names.
But in the iteration, trying to prove a case of properness for a candidate
N and p ∈ PNα+1, considering q ∈ Pα which is 〈N,P
N
α 〉–generic, we know that
in V[GPα ] (if q ∈ GPα), there is q
′ ∈ Q
˜
α
[GPα ] which is 〈N [GPα ],Qα[Gα]〉–
generic. But under present circumstances, we have no idea where to look
for q′, so no way to make a name of it, q
˜
′, which is hereditarily countable,
without increasing q ∈ Pα. Except when Q is local (see 2.8), of course; it is
not unreasonable to assume it but we prefer not to and even then, we just
have to look for it in, essentially, a copy of the set of reals. The solution is
to increase Qi insubstantially so that we will exactly have the right element
q′:
p(α) &
∧
I∈pdQ(N)
∨
p∈I∩N
p,
as explained below. We give two variants.
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Notation 6.1. Let pdQ(N) = pd(N,Q) = {I : N |=“I is a predense subset
of Q”} and I[N ] = IN = I ∩N .
Definition 6.2. Let Q be an explicitly nep-forcing notion. Then we define
Q′ = cl(Q) as follows:
(a) the set of elements is
Q ∪
{
p &
∧
I∈pdQ(N)
∨
r∈I∩N
r : p ∈ QN and N is a Q–candidate
}
[we are assuming no incidental identification] and, in any reasonable
way, code them, if Q is simple, as members of H<ℵ1(θ), for snep (or
very simple) Q we work slightly more to code them as members of ωθ,
pedantically easier in ω(θ + ω)),
(b) the order ≤Q
′
is given by q1 ≤Q
′
q2 if and only if one of the following
occurs:
(α) q1, q2 ∈ Q, q1 ≤Q q2,
(β) q1 ∈ Q, q2 = p &
( ∧
I∈pdQ(N)
∨
r∈I∩N
r
)
and q1 ≤Q p,
(γ) q1 = p &
( ∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r
)
and q2 ∈ Q, p ≤Q q2 and if I ∈
pd(N,Q) then
(∃q′ ∈ Q)(∃〈pn : n ∈ ω〉)(q′ ≤Q q2 & ϕ
Q
2 (. . . , pn, . . . , q
′) &
{pn : n < ω} lists I ∩N)
(δ) qℓ = pℓ &
( ∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r
)
(for ℓ = 1, 2) and: q1 = q2 or
q1 ≤ p2 by clause (γ).
Remark: In [17], for a hereditarily countable name, instead of
p &
∧
I∈pdQ(N)
∨
r∈I∩N
r
we use the first member of Qi which forces this. Simpler, but when we ask
whether this guy is ≤ q (for some q ∈ Q) we run into uncountable antichains.
Proposition 6.3. 1. Assume Q is explicitly nep. Then:
(a) in Definition 6.2, Q′ is a (quasi) order,
(b) ≤Q
′
|`Q =≤Q,
(c) Q is a dense subset of Q′.
2. Assume in addition:
(⊠2) Q is explicitly nep in every Q–candidate.
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Then:
(d) if N is a Q–candidate, N |=“p ∈ Q′”, then for some q ∈ N we
have N |=“p ≤Q
′
q & q ∈ Q”,
(e) Q′ is explicitly nep (with the same BQ and parameters).
3. Assume in addition
(⊠3) for any Q–candidate N , if N ′ is a generic extension of N for the
forcing notion Levy(ℵ0, |P(Q)|N ), then N ′ is a Q–candidate.
Then we can add
(e)+ Q′ is explicitly local nep (see Definition 2.8).
4. We can replace above (in the assumption and conclusion) nep by snep,
or nep by simple nep.
Remark 6.4. The definition of “local” (in 2.8) and the statement (⊠3) in
6.3(3) can be handled a little differently. We can (in 2.8(2)) demand less
on N ′ (it is not a Q–candidate), just have some of its main properties and
in ⊠3 of 6.3(3), ZFC
−
∗ says that H(θ) is a set (so has a cardinality) and
is a Q–candidate. So we may consider having ZFC−ℓ for several ℓ’s, ZFC
∗
ℓ
speaks on χ0 > . . . > χℓ−1 and the generic extensions of a model of ZFC
∗
ℓ+1
for Levy(ℵ0, χℓ) is a model of ZFC
−
ℓ . Similar remarks hold for §7. But, as
we can deal with the nice case (see Definition 5.3), we may start with a
countable N ≺ (H(iω),∈) (or even better (H(iω1),∈) so that “countable
depth can be absorbed”), we ignore this in our main presentation.
Does (⊠3) of 6.3(3) occur at all? Let G be a subset of Levy(ℵ0, |P(Q)|N )
generic over N . Then N ′
def
= N〈G〉 is a Q–candidate.
Proof of 6.3 1) Clause (a): Assume q1 ≤ q2 ≤ q3; we have 23 = 8
cases according to truth values of qi ∈ Q:
Case (A): q1, q2, q3 ∈ Q.
Trivial.
Case (B): q1, q2 ∈ Q, q3 /∈ Q.
Check.
Case (C): q1 /∈ Q, q2, q3 ∈ Q.
Check.
Case (D): q1 ∈ Q, q2 /∈ Q, q3 ∈ Q.
Then q2 = p2 &
∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r and q1 ≤Q p2 (by 6.2(b)(β)) and p2 ≤Q q3
(by 6.2(b)(γ)). Hence q1 ≤Q q3 follows.
Case (E): q1 ∈ Q, q2 /∈ Q, q3 /∈ Q.
Let qℓ = pℓ &
∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r for ℓ = 2, 3. So q1 ≤Q p2 (see 6.2(b)(β))
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and p2 ≤Q p3 (see 6.2(b)(γ), (δ)). Hence q1 ≤Q p2 (as ≤Q is transitive) and
so q1 ≤ q3 (see 6.2(b)(β)).
Case (F): q1 /∈ Q, q2 /∈ Q, q3 ∈ Q.
Let qℓ = pℓ &
∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r for ℓ = 1, 2 and suppose that q1 6= q2
(otherwise trivial). Then, by 6.2(b)(δ), q1 ≤ p2 and by 6.2(b)(γ), p2 ≤ q3
so by the previous case (C), q1 ≤ q3 as required.
Case (G): q1 /∈ Q, q2 ∈ Q, q3 /∈ Q.
Let qℓ = pℓ &
∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r for ℓ = 1, 3. Now, by 6.2(b)(β), q2 ≤ p3
and by the previous case (C), q1 ≤ p3 and hence, by 6.2(b)(δ), q1 ≤ q3 as
required.
Case (H):
∧
ℓ
qℓ /∈ Q.
Let qℓ = pℓ &
∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r. If q1 = q2 or q2 = q3 then the conclusion
is totally trivial. So assume not. Thus
q1 ≤ p2 (by clause (δ) a case defined in (γ))
q2 ≤ p3 (by clause (δ)).
Hence p2 ≤ p3 (see clause (γ)), so “a previous case” applies. This finishes
the proof of the clause (a).
Clause (b): Totally trivial.
Clause (c): Let q ∈ Q′; if q ∈ Q then there is nothing to do; otherwise
for some Q–candidate N we have q = p &
∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r and use nep
(i.e. clause (c) of 2.3(1)) on the Q–candidate N .
2) Assume (⊠2).
Clause (d): Proved inside the proof of clause (e).
Clause (e): More pedantically we have to define
ϕQ
′
0 , ϕ
Q′
1 , ϕ
Q′
2 ,B
Q′ , θQ
′
and then prove the required demands for a Q′–candidates. We let BQ
′
=
B
Q, θQ
′
= θQ, the formulas will be different, but with the same parameters.
So the Q′–candidates are the Q–candidates. What is ϕQ
′
0 ? It is
ϕQ0 (x) ∨ “ x has the form p &
∧
I∈pdQ(M)
∨
r∈I∩M
r, where
M is a Q-candidate (so countable) and ϕQ0 (p) ”.
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Clearly ϕQ
′
0 defines Q
′ through Q′–candidates. Note that if N is a Q′–
candidate and N |=“M is a countable Q–candidate”, then we have M ⊆ N ,
and ifM |=“x is countable”, then x ⊆M ⊆ N ; soM is really aQ–candidate.
Consequently, ϕQ
′
0 is upward absolute for Q
′-candidates and it defines Q′.
So clause (a) of Definition 2.3(1) holds.
Now we pay our debt proving clause (d). Let N be a Q′–candidate and
N |=“p ∈ Q′”, i.e. N |= ϕQ
′
0 (p). By the definition of Q
′, either N |=“p ∈ Q”
and we are done, or for some p′,M ∈ N we have
N |= “M is a Q′–candidate, p′ ∈ QM , and p =
(
p′ &
∧
I∈pd(M,Q)
∨
r∈I∩M
r
)
”.
By the assumption (⊠2), for some q ∈ QN we have N |=“ q is explicitly
〈M,Q〉–generic” and N |=“p′ ≤Q q”. Then for some 〈〈rI,ℓ : ℓ < ω〉 : I ∈
pd(M,Q)〉 ∈ N we have: N |=“{rI,ℓ : ℓ < ω} enumerates I ∩M” and
N |=“ϕQ2 (rIℓ,0, rI,1, . . . , q)”. Now it follows from the definition of Q
′ that
N |=“p ≤Q
′
q”, so q is as required.
What is ϕQ
′
1 ? Just write the definition of p ≤
Q′ q from clause (b) of
6.2. Clearly also ϕQ
′
1 is upward absolute for Q
′–candidates and it defines
the partial order of Q′ (even in Q′–candidates). So clause (b) of Definition
2.3(1) holds.
What is ϕQ
′
2 ? Let it be:
ϕQ
′
2 (p0, p1, . . . , pω)
def
=
“there are M,p, q such that: M is a Q′–candidate and p ∈ QM
and q =
(
p &
∧
I∈pd(M,Q)
∨
r∈I∩M
r
)
and q ≤Q
′
pω and for some J ∈
pd(M,Q), if r ∈ J ∩M then there is ℓ such that pℓ ≤Q
′
r”.
To show that ϕQ
′
2 is upward absolute for Q
′–candidates suppose that N is a
Q′–candidate and N |= ϕQ
′
2 (p0, p1, . . . , pω) and let M,p, q witness it. Then,
in N , M is a Q′–candidate, so p ∈ Q, q ∈ Q′ and for some J ∈ pd(M,Q)
we have:
if r ∈ J ∩M , then there is ℓ such that pℓ ≤
Q′ r.
By the known upward absoluteness all those statements hold in V, too.
Assume now that ϕQ
′
2 (p0, p1, . . . , pω) holds as witnessed by M,p, q and J ∈
pd(M,Q). Suppose q′ ≥ pω and we may assume that q′ ∈ Q (by (1)(c)).
Then q ≤ q′ and (by clause (γ) of the definition of ≤Q
′
) we have q′′ ∈ Q
such that q′′ ≤ q′ and ϕQ2 (r0, r1, . . . , q
′) for some list {rn : n < ω} of J ∩M .
Thus J ∩ M is predense (in Q) above q′′ and we find r ∈ J ∩ M such
that r, q′ are compatible. But now, there is ℓ < ω such that pℓ ≤
Q′ r, so
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necessarily pℓ, q
′ are compatible (in Q′). This shows 2.3(2)(b)+. Let us turn
to clause (c)+ of Definition 2.3(2). So suppose that N is a Q′–candidate and
p ∈ Q′ ∩N . By clause (d), there is p′ such that N |=“p ≤Q
′
p′ & p′ ∈ Q”.
Let q = p′ &
∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r, clearly q ∈ Q′ and Q′ |=“p′ ≤ q”. Hence,
by 6.3(1)(a), we know Q′ |=“p ≤ q”. For J ∈ pd(N,Q′) let
J ′ = {q ∈ QN : N |= “q is above some member of J in Q′ ”}.
Note that if J ∈ pd(N,Q′) then J ′ ∈ pd(N,Q), and so J ′ ∩N is predense
above q. Moreover, (∀r ∈ J ∩ N)(∃r′ ∈ J ′ ∩ N)(r ≤Q
′
r′). So let J ∈
pd(N,Q′) and let 〈pn : n < ω〉 be an enumeration of J ∩N . It should be
clear that ϕQ
′
2 (p0, p1, . . . , q) holds as witnessed by N, p
′, q and I ′.
3) Compared to (e) of 6.3(2) we have also to prove (e)+, i.e. strengthen the
clause (c)+ of Definition 2.3(1) by (∗) of Definition 2.8(2).
Let N+ be a generic extension of a Q′–candidate N by the forcing notion
Levy(ℵ0, |P(Q)|N ). Clearly for every p ∈ QN , the condition
p &
∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r
belongs to N+. So by the proof of clause (c)+ of Definition 2.3(1) in the
proof of (e) above, we are done.
4) Similar proof. 6.3
Discussion 6.5. If we would like not to use 6.3, we may like to try the
following Definition 6.6. Note that there: cl1(Q) cannot serve as a forcing
notion as it contains “false”, cl2(Q) is the reasonable restriction, and cl3(Q)
has the same elements but more “explicit” quasi order. We do not define
a quasi order on cl1(Q), but it is natural to use the one of cl2(Q) adding:
ψ ≤ ϕ if ϕ ∈ cl1(Q)\cl2(Q). No harm in allowing in the definition of cl1(Q)
also ¬ (the negation). The previous cl(Q) is close to cl3(Q).
Definition 6.6. Let Q be a forcing notion.
1. Let cl1(Q) be the closure of the set Q by conjunctions and disjunctions
over sequences of members of length ≤ ω [we may add: and ¬ (the
negation)]; wlog there are no incidental identification and Q ⊆ cl1(Q).
2. For a generic G ⊆ Q over V and ψ ∈ cl1(Q) let ψ[G] be the truth
value of ψ under G where for ψ = p ∈ Q, ψ[G] is the truth value of
p ∈ G. (We will use t for “truth”.)
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3. Qˆ = cl2(Q) = {ψ ∈ cl1(Q) : for some p ∈ Q we have p ⊢“ψ[G
˜
Q] =
t”}, ordered by:
ψ1 ≤
Qˆ ψ2 ⇔ (∀p ∈ Q)[p ⊢Q “ψ2[G
˜
Q] = t” ⇒ p ⊢Q ‘‘ψ1[G
˜
Q] = t”].
4. Let Q be explicitly nep. We let cl3(Q) be the following forcing notion:
(a) the set of elements is cl2(Q),
(b) the order ≤Qˆ3=≤
Q
3=≤
cl3(Q)
3 =≤cl3(Q) is the transitive closure of ≤
Qˆ
0
which is defined by
ψ1 ≤
Qˆ
0 ψ2 iff one of the following occurs
(i) ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Q and ψ1 ≤Q ψ2,
(ii) ψ1 is a conjunct of ψ2 (meaning: ψ1 = ψ2 or ψ2 =
∧
n<α
ψ2,n,
and ψ1 ∈ {ψ2,n : n < α}),
(iii) ψ2 ∈ Q and there is a Q-candidateM such that p, ψ1 ∈M , p ∈
QM , p ≤Q ψ2, ψ2 is explicitly 〈M,Q〉–generic and M |=“p ⊢
ψ1[G
˜
Q] = t” and if q ∈ Q is a conjunct of ψ1 then M |=“q ≤Q
p”.
Proposition 6.7. 1. Q ⊆ Qˆ, ≤Qˆ is a quasi order, and ≤Qˆ |`Q = {(p, q) :
q ⊢Q“p ∈ G
˜
Q”}, so if Q is separative then ≤Qˆ |`Q =≤Q; and Q is a
dense subset of Qˆ.
2. Assume Q is temporarily explicitly nep. Then:
(a) Q ⊆ cl3(Q) and ≤
Q
3 |`Q ⊇≤
Q and ≤Q3⊆≤
Qˆ,
(b) Q is a dense subset of cl3(Q).
3. Assume in addition
(⊛3) Q is correctly explicitly nep in V and in every Q–candidate.
Then
(d) if N is a Q–candidate and N |=“p ∈ cl3(Q)”
then for some q ∈ N we have N |=“p ≤cl3(Q) q & q ∈ Q”,
(e) Q′ is explicitly nep and correct.
4. Assume in addition
(⊛4) for any Q–candidate N , if N ′ is a generic extension of N for the
forcing notion Levy(ℵ0, |P(Q)|N ), then N ′ is a Q–candidate.
Then we can add
(e)+ cl3(Q) is explicitly local nep (see Definition 2.8).
Proof Straight, e.g.
(2) Clause (b): Assume ψ ∈ cl3(Q), so ψ ∈ cl2(Q) and for some p ∈ Q we
have p ⊢Q“ψ[G
˜
Q] = t”. There is a Q–candidate M to which p and ψ belong
(as ZFC−∗ is ∅–good). Let q be explicitly (M,Q)–generic, and Q |= p ≤ q.
So, by clause (iii) of 6.6(4)(b), we have cl3(Q) |=“ψ ≤ q′′, as required.
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(3) Clause (e): Let ϕ30(x) say that there is a Q–candidate M such that
M |=“x ∈ cl3(Q)”. Let ϕ31(x, y) say the definition of ≤
θ
3. Lastly, ϕ
3
2(〈xi :
i ≤ ω〉) says that for some 〈yi : i ≤ ω〉 we have
ϕQ2 (〈yi : i ≤ ω〉), yω ≤
Q
3 xω (i.e. ϕ
3
1(yω, xω)) and
∧
i<ω
∨
j<ω
xj ≤
Q
3 yi.
Remark 6.8. Instead of using cl(Q) from 6.2 below we can have in ϕ¯, a
function which from an ω–list of the elements of N and from p computes
an element of Q having the role of p &
∧
I∈pd(N,Q)
∨
r∈I∩N
r. The choice does
not seem to matter.
Definition 6.9. For a forcing notion P and a cardinal (or ordinal) κ, we
define what is an hc-κ-P–name (here hc stands for hereditarily countable),
and for this we define by induction on ζ < ω1 what is such a name of depth
≤ ζ.
ζ = 0: It is α, that is αˇ, for some α < κ.
ζ > 0: It has the form τ
˜
= {〈pi, τ
˜
i〉 : i < i∗}, where i∗ < ω1, pi ∈ cl1(P)
from Definition 6.6(1) and τ
˜
i an hc-κ-P–name of some depth < ζ; that is
for G ⊆ P generic over V, we let τ
˜
[G] = {τ
˜
i[G] : pi[G] = t}.
An hc-κ-P–name is an hc-κ-P–name of some depth < ω1. An hc-κ-P–name
τ
˜
has depth ζ if it has depth ≤ ζ, but not ≤ ξ for ξ < ζ.
Remark: Why did we use p ∈ cl1(Q) and not p ∈ cl3(Q)? As the mem-
bership in cl1(Q) is easier to define.
Proposition 6.10. 1. If τ
˜
is an hc-κ-P–name and G ⊆ P is generic
over V then τ
˜
[G] ∈ H<ℵ1(κ). If in addition P ⊆ H<ℵ1(κ) then τ
˜
∈
H<ℵ1(κ).
2. Let ϕ(x0, . . . , xn−1) be a first order formula and τ
˜
0, . . . , τ
˜
n−1 be hc-κ-
P–names. Then there is p ∈ cl1(P) such that for every G ⊆ P generic
over V:(⋃
ℓ<n
Tcord(τ
˜
ℓ[G]),∈
)
|= ϕ(τ
˜
0[G], . . . , τ
˜
n−1[G]) iff p[G] = t.
3. The set of hc-κ-P–names is closed under the following operations:
(a) difference,
(b) union and intersection of two, finitely many and even countably
many,
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(c) definition by cases: for pn ∈ cl1(P) and hc-κ-P–names τ
˜
n (for
n < ω) there is a hc-κ-P–name τ
˜
such that for a generic G ⊆ Q
over V we have
τ
˜
[G] is :
τn
˜
[G] if pn[G] = t &
∧
ℓ<n
¬pℓ[G] = t
∅ if
∧
ℓ<ω
¬pℓ[G] = t.
Definition 6.11. 1. A forcing notion Q (or ϕ¯) is temporarily, explicitly
straight (κ, θ)–nep for B if: old conditions from Definition 2.3(1),(2)
(for explicitly (κ, θ)–nep) but possibly B ⊆ H<ℵ1(κ); and
(d) Q ⊆ H<ℵ1(θ) (i.e. Q is simple) and ℵ1 + θ ≤ κ,
(e) for ℓ < 3 the formula ϕQℓ (x¯) is of the form
(∃t)[t ∈ H<ℵ1(κ) & t = Tc
ord(t) & t ∩ ω1 is an ordinal & ψ
Q
ℓ (x¯, t)],
where in the formula ψQi the quantifiers are of the form (∃s ∈ t)
and the atomic formulas are “x ∈ y”,“x is an ordinal” and those
of BQ.
2. In clause (e) of part (1), we call such t an explicit witness for ϕQi (x¯).
We call t a weak witness, if for every Q–candidate N , x¯ ∈ N , if t ∈ N
then N |= ϕQℓ (x¯). We call it a witness if:
(i) ℓ = 0 and it is an explicit witness, or
(ii) ℓ = 1 (so x¯ = 〈x0, x1〉) and t gives k, y0, . . . , yk, t0, . . . , tk−1,
s0, . . . , sk such that: sℓ explicitly witnesses ϕ0(yℓ), tℓ explicitly
witnesses yℓ ≤
Q yℓ+1 and y0 = x0, yk = x1 (so yℓ ∈ t, sℓ ∈ t,
xℓ ∈ t),
(iii) ℓ = 2 (so x¯ = 〈xi : i ≤ ω〉) and t gives 〈yi : i ≤ ω〉, 〈ki : i < ω〉,
〈si : i ≤ ω + 1〉 such that sω is a witness to yω ≤ xω, sω+1 is an
explicit witness to ϕQ2 (〈yi : i ≤ ω〉), si is a witness to xi ≤
Q yki (so
also they all belong to t, as well as witnesses to xi, yj ∈ Q).
Proposition 6.12. 1. Assume Q is temporarily explicitly straight (κ, θ)–
nep for B. Then Q is temporarily simply explicitly (κ, θ)–nep for B.
Sufficient conditions for “K–absolutely” are as in §2.
2. Assume Q is temporarily correctly simply explicitly (κ, θ)–nep for B
and θ + ℵ1 ≤ κ. Then Q is temporarily straight explicitly (κ, θ)–nep
for B and is correct.
[Nevertheless, “simple” and “straight” are distinct as properties of (B, ϕ¯, θ),
i.e. the point is changing ϕ¯.]
Proof Straight.
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Definition/Theorem 6.13. By induction on α we define and prove the
following situations:
(A) [Definition] Q¯ = 〈(Pi,Q
˜
i
, ϕ¯i,B
˜
i, ri, θi) : i < α〉 is nep–CS–iteration.
(B) [Definition] κQ¯ = κ[Q¯], in short κα abusing notation.
(C) [Definition] We define Bα = BQ¯.
(D) [Definition] Lim(Q¯) = Pα and Pα,w for any set w of ordinals < α for
Q¯ as above.
(E) [Claim] If Q¯ is a nep–CS–iteration, and α = ℓg(Q¯), then Q¯ |`β is a
nep–CS–iteration (for β < α), Lim(Q¯ |` β) = Pβ and Pβ ⊆ H<ℵ1(κβ).
(F) [Claim] For Q¯ as in (A), aBα–candidate N , γ ≤ β ≤ α and p, q ∈ Pβ:
(a) p is a function with domain a countable subset of β (pedantically
see clause (D)),
(b) Pβ is a forcing notion (i.e. a quasi order) satisfying (d) + (e) of
6.11 and (a), (b), (b)+ of 2.3(1),(2),
(c) p |` γ ∈ Pγ and Pβ |=“p |` γ ≤ p”,
(d) Pγ |=“p |` γ ≤ q” implies Pβ |=“p ≤ (q ∪ p |` [γ, β))”,
(e) Pγ ⊆ Pβ and even Pγ <◦ Pβ,
(f) p ∈ Pβ iff p a function with domain ∈ [β]≤ℵ0 and
ζ ∈ Dom(p) ⇒ p |` ζ ∈ Pζ+1.
(G) [Definition] For a Bα–candidate N and w, β, γ such that N |=“w ⊆
α”, γ < β ≤ α and β, γ ∈ (w ∪ {α}) ∩ N , and q ∈ Pβ, p ∈ N such
that N |=“p ∈ Pβ” and q |` γ is (N,Pγ)–generic we define when q is
[β, γ)–canonically (N,Pβ , w)–generic above p.
(H) [Theorem] If q ∈ N is a [β, γ)–canonically (N,Pβ, w)–generic above
p, then q is (N,Pβ)–generic and p ≤ q.
(I) [Theorem] Pα is explicitly straight correct κα–nep for ϕ¯,Bα.
(J) [Theorem] For any κ ≥ κα,
⊢Pα “ (H<ℵ1(κ))
V[Pα] = {τ
˜
[G
˜
Pα ] : τ
˜
is an hc–κ–Pα–name })”.
Let us carry out the clauses one by one.
Clause (A), Definition: Q¯ = 〈(Pi,Q
˜
i
, ϕ¯i,B
˜
i, κi, θi) : i < α〉 is a nep–
CS–iteration if:
(α) β < α ⇒ Q¯ |` β is a nep–CS–iteration,
(β) if α = β + 1 then
(i) Pβ = Lim(Q¯ |` β) (use clause (D))
(ii) ϕ¯β = 〈ϕβ,ℓ : ℓ < 3〉 is formally as in the definition of nep (the
substantial demand in (v) below, but the parameterBβ is a name!)
(iii) κβ , θβ are infinite cardinals (or ordinals)
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(iv) B
˜
β is a Pβ–name of a model with universe κβ or even H<ℵ1(κβ),
whose vocabulary is a fix countable one τ0 ⊆ H(ℵ0), but for each
atomic formula ψ(x0, . . . , xn−1) and α0, . . . , αn−1 < κβ the name
of the truth value B
˜
β |=“ψ(α0, . . . , αn−1)” is an hc–κ-Pβ–name
(i.e. is defined by one p = pβψ∗ ∈ cl1(Pβ))
(v) ⊢Pβ“Q
˜
β
defined by ϕ¯β is temporarily straight explicitly (κβ , θβ)–
nep as witnessed by B
˜
α and ZFC
−
∗ is good (hence is correct, see
6.12(1))”.
Clause (B), Definition: We define κα = sup[{κi : i < α} ∪ {α}] (of
course, if the result is an ordinal we can replace it by its cardinality, coding
it assuming the κi’s are cardinals; remember that κi ≥ θi).
Clause (C), Definition: We define Bα = BQ¯, a model with universe
⊆ H<ℵ1(κ
α) or write κα and the usual vocabulary such that
(∗) Bα codes (by its relations) α, {(β, ϕ¯β , κβ , θβ) : β < α} and 〈B
˜
β :
β < α〉; i.e. for every atomic formula in the vocabulary τ0 (so is of
B
˜
β), ψ = ψ(x0, . . . , xn−1) for some function symbol Fψ we have: if
αℓ < κβ for ℓ < n then Fψ(x¯)(β;α0, . . . , αn−1) is p
β
ψ(α0,... ,αn−1)
(see
clause (A)(iv)) and
if the B’s are on κ, we have also Fψ,ℓ, functions of B
α
such that:
if αℓ < κβ for ℓ < n then {Fψ(β, ℓ, α0, . . . , αn−1) :
ℓ < ω} lists the ordinals in Tcord(pβ
ψ(α0,... ,αn−1)
) (the
condition in Pβ saying. . . ) and F ′ψ codes how p was
gotten from them (so we need κα ≥ ω1).
So in any case
(∗∗) if N is a Bα–candidate, and β ∈ α ∩N then N is a Bβ–candidate.
Clause (D), Definition:
Case 1: If α = 0 then Pα = {∅}.
Case 2: If α = β + 1 then
Pα =
{
p : p is a function, Dom(p) ⊆ α, p |`β ⊆ Pβ and if β ∈ Dom(p)
then for some r = rp,β ∈ cl1(Pβ) determined by p we have:
p(β) is defined by cases:
if r[G
˜
Pβ ] = t, it is in cl(Q
˜
β
), and an explicit witness
is provided (say p[β] codes it and having r[G
˜
Pβ ] = t says so),
if not , p(β) is ∅ = ∅Q
˜ β
= min(Q
˜
β
)
}
.
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Pedantically, p ∈ Pα if and only if p has the form p′ ∪ {〈β, ℓ, xℓ〉 : ℓ < 3}
where p′ ∈ Pβ, x0 ∈ cl1(Pβ), x1, x2 are hc–κ–Pβ–names of members of
H<ℵ1(θβ) and x0 is the truth value of “x2[Gβ ] is a witness to x1[Gβ ] ∈ θβ”.
Case 3: If α is limit, then
Pα = {p : p is a function, Dom(p) ∈ [α]
≤ℵ0 and β ≤ α ⇒ p |`β ∈ Pβ}.
The order:
For α = 0 nothing to do.
For α limit: p ≤ q if and only if
∧
β<α
Pβ |=“p |`β ≤ q |`β” (equivalently:∧
β∈Dom(β)
Pβ+1 |=“p |` (β + 1) ≤ q |` (β + 1)”), (see (C)).
For α = β + 1: the order is the transitive closure of the following cases:
(α) p ∈ Pβ, q ∈ Pα, Pβ |=“p ≤ q |` β”,
(β) p(β) = q(β) and Pβ |=“p |` β ≤ q |`β”,
(γ) p |` β = q |`β and there is a Bα–candidate N such that q |` β is a [0, β)–
canonical (N,Pβ)–generic above p′ |`β, Pβ |=“p′ |` β ≤ q |`β”, p′ ∈ PNα
and
N |= “ p′ |` β ⊢ N [G
˜
β] |= [cl(Q
˜
β
) |= p(β) ≤ p′(β) and p′(β) ∈ Q
˜
β
] ”
and q(β) is canonically generic for (Qβ , N [G
˜
β]) above p, i.e. is
p′(β) &
∧
I∈pd(N,Pα)
(∀r∈I)r(β)∈Q
˜ β
∨
{r(α) : N |= “ r ∈ I ” and r |` β ∈ G
˜
β}
if q |`β ∈ G
˜
Pβ and p
′(β) if q |`β /∈ G
˜
Pβ .
Lastly, Pα,w = {p ∈ Pα : Dom(p) ⊆ w} for w ⊆ α (note that if w ⊆ β ≤ α
we get the same forcing notion).
Clause (E), Claim: Trivial.
Clause (F), Claim: Subclauses (a) and (c)–(f) are trivial.
Subclause (b): Here we should be careful as we do not ask just that the
order is forced but there is a hc witness; as we ask for a witness and not
explicit witness (see Definition 6.11) this is okay. See more in the proof of
clause (I).
Clause (G), Definition:
Case 1: For β < α note that N is also a Bβ–candidate and use the
definition for Q¯ |`β.
Case 2: If γ = β = α – trivial.
Case 3: For β = α, α = 0 – trivial.
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Case 4: For γ < β = α and β = β′ + 1, β′ /∈ w – trivial.
Case 5: Suppose γ < β = α, α = β′ + 1, β′ ∈ w.
Then: q |`β′ is [γ, β′)–canonically (N,Pβ, w)–generic and for some τ
˜
,
N |= “ τ
˜
is a hc–κβ–Pβ∩w–name of a member of Q
˜
β
which is above p(β) (which is in cl(Q
˜
β
)!) and is in N〈G
˜
Pβ∩w〉 ”
and
q(β) = τ
˜
&
∧
I∈pd(N,Pα,w)
(∀r∈I)r(β)∈Q
˜ β
∨
{r(β) : N |=|= “r ∈ I ” and r |` β ∈ G
˜
Pβ}.
Case 6: γ < β = α, β a limit.
Say that diagonalization was used.
Clause (H), Theorem: Prove by induction.
Clause (I), Theorem: We have defined Bα and κα (so θα = κα). The
formulas ϕPαℓ (ℓ < 3) are implicitly defined (in the induction).
Why ϕPα0 is absolute enough? As the demand on p(β) above says that
rp |` (β+1),β , the witness for p(β) ∈ cl(Q), is such that r[G
˜
Pβ ] = t gives all the
required information.
Why ϕPα1 is absolute enough? Because the canonical genericity is about
ϕ2 and the properness requirement, see clause (G), fit.
Now one proves by induction on β ≤ α:
(⊗) if N is a Bα–candidate, w ∈ N , N |=“w ⊆ α”, γ0 ≤ γ1 ≤ β,
{γ0, γ1, β} ⊆ (α+ 1) ∩N ∩ w, p ∈ PNβ , q ∈ Pγ , p |` γ1 ≤ q, q is [γ0, γ1)–
canonically (N,Pγ1 , w)–generic
then we can find q+ such that:
(α) q+ ∈ Pβ, q+ |` γ = q,
(β) p ≤+,
(γ) q+ is [γ, β)–canonically (N,Pβ, w)–generic.
Clause (I), Theorem: Straight. 6.13
Proposition 6.14. The iteration in 6.13 is equivalent to the CS iteration.
More formally, assume
Q¯ = 〈(Pi,Q
˜
i
, ϕ¯i,B
˜
i, κi, θi) : i < α〉 is an CS–nep iteration.
We can define Q¯′ = 〈P′i,Q
˜
′
i
: i < α〉 and 〈Fi : i < α〉 such that
(a) Q¯′ is a CS iteration,
(b) Fi is a mapping from Pi into P′i,
(c) j < i ⇒ Fj = Fi |`Pj,
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(d) Fi is an embedding of Pi into P′i with dense range,
(e) Q
˜
i
is mapped by Fi to Q
˜
′
i
.
Proof Straight.
Proposition 6.15. In the context of 6.14:
1. Assume that each B
˜
β is essentially a real; i.e. κβ = ω and if R is in
the vocabulary of B
˜
β then R
B
˜
β ⊆ n(R)ω. If α < ω1 then so is the Bα.
(If α ≥ ω1 we get weaker results).
2. Assume that ⊢Pβ“ the universe of Bβ is κβ ”. Then we can make “Bβ
has universe κβ”, coding the pβψ’s.
Proof Left to the reader.
Remark 6.16. 1) Note that 6.13, 6.14 (and 6.15(4)) say something even
for α = 1 so it speaks on cl(Q0) = P1 (or cl3(Q0) = P1).
2) Concerning 6.15 note that if κ(B) ≥ ω1, the difference between nep and
snep is not large, so the case α < ω1 has special interest.
3) In 6.13, 6.14, we can replace the use of Q′ = cl(Q) from 6.2 by cl3(Q)
from Definition 6.6 (using 6.7).
4) We can derive a theorem on local in 6.14, but for strong enough ZFC−∗ ,
then any follows.
Of course, we can get forcing axioms.
Proposition 6.17. 1. Assume for simplicity that V |= 2ℵ0 = ℵ1 & 2ℵ1 =
ℵ2. Then for some proper ℵ2–c.c. forcing notion P of cardinality ℵ2
we have in VP:
(⊕) Axω1 [(ℵ1,ℵ1)–nep]: if Q is a (κ, θ)–nep forcing notion, κ, θ ≤
ℵ1 and Ii is a dense subset of Q for i < ω1 and S
˜
i as a Q–name
of stationary subset of ω1 for i < i(∗) ≤ ω1,
then for some directed G ⊆ Q we have: i < ω1 ⇒ G∩Ii 6= ∅ and
S
˜
i[G]
def
= {ζ < ω1 : for some q ∈ G we have q ⊢Q “ ζ ∈ S
˜
i ”}
is a stationary subset of ω1.
2. We can demand that P is explicitly (ℵ2,ℵ2)–nep provided that in (⊕)
we add “explicitly simply” to the requirements on Q.
3. In parts 1) and 2), we can strengthen (⊕) to AXω1 [nep].
Proof Straight (as failure of “Q, i.e. ϕ¯, is nep” is preserved when ex-
tending the universe).
Proposition 6.18. We can generalize the definitions and claims so far by:
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(a) a forcing notion Q is (Q,≤,≤pr, ∅Q), where ≤pr is a quasi order, p ≤pr
q ⇒ p ≤ q and ∅Q the minimal element;
(b) in the definition of nep in addition to ϕ1 we have ϕ1,pr defining ≤pr,
which is upward absolute from Q–candidates, and in Definition 2.3(2)(c)
we strengthen p ≤ q to p ≤pr q;
(c) the definition of CS iteration 〈Pi,Q
˜
i
: i < α〉 is modified in one of the
following ways:
(α) Pi =
{
p : p is a function, Dom(p) is a countable subset of i, j ∈
Dom(p)⇒⊢Pj“p(j) ∈ Q
˜
j
” and the set {j ∈ Dom(p) : 6 ⊢Pj“∅Q
˜ j
≤pr
p(j)”} is finite
}
,
with the order
p ≤ q if and only if j ∈ Dom(p) ⇒ q |` j ⊢ p(j) ≤
Q
˜ j q(j) and the
set {j ∈ Dom(p) : q |` j 6 ⊢Pj≤
Q
˜ jpr q(j)”} is finite;
(if each ≤
Q
˜ jpr is equality, this is FS iteration)
(β) Pi =
{
p : p is a function, Dom(p) is a countable subset of i,
j ∈ Dom(p) ⇒ ⊢Pj“p(j) ∈ Q
˜
j
”
}
,
with the order
p ≤ q if and only if j ∈ Dom(p) ⇒ q |` j ⊢Pj“p(j) ≤
Q
˜ j q(j)” and
{j ∈ Dom(p) : q |` j 6 ⊢Pj“p(j) ≤
Q
˜ jpr q(j)”} is finite;
(d) similarly for the CS-nep iteration.
Proof Left to the reader.
6. When a real is (Q, η)–generic over V.
Definition 7.1. 1. We say that (Q, W¯ ) is a temporary (B, θ, σ, τ)–pair
if for some Q–name η
˜
the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Q is a nep-forcing notion for (B, ϕ¯, θ); possibly B expands BQ,
(b) ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ στ”,
(c) W¯ = 〈Wn : n < σ〉,
(d) for each n < σ, Wn ⊆ {(p, α) : p ∈ Q, α < τ},
(e) if (pℓ, αℓ) ∈ Wn for ℓ = 1, 2 and α1, α2 are not equal, then p1, p2
are incompatible in Q,
(f) for each n < σ the set In = In[W¯ ]
def
= {p : (∃α)[(p, α) ∈ Wn]} is a
predense subset of Q,
(g) so τ = τ [W¯ ] = τ [Q, W¯ ] and (abusing notation) let σ = σ[W¯ ] =
σ[Q, W¯ ].
2. For (Q, W¯ ) as above, η
˜
= η
˜
[W¯ ] = η
˜
[Q, W¯ ] is the Q–name⋃
{(p, (n, α)) : (∃p ∈ G
˜
Q)((p, (n, α)) ∈Wn), so n < σ}.
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3. We replace the temporary by K if this (specifically the demand (f))
holds in any K–extension.
4. We may write (Q, η
˜
), W¯ = W¯ η˜ abusing notation. If we omit B we
mean B = BQ. If τ = ℵ0 we may omit it; if τ = σ = ℵ0 we may omit
them, if θ = σ = τ = ℵ0, we may write κ.
5. We say that η
˜
[Q, W¯ ] is a temporarily generic real (or function) for Q
if for no distinct G1, G2 ⊆ Q generic over V do we have η
˜
[G1] = η
˜
[G2].
6. Instead (Q, W¯ ) we may write ((BQ, ϕ¯Q, θQ), W¯ ) (or with η
˜
instead W¯ ).
Definition 7.2. 1. Let Kκ,θ,σ,τ be the class of all (Q, η
˜
) which are tem-
porary (B, θ, σ, τ)–pairs for some B with κ(B) ≤ κ, ‖B‖ ≤ κ.
2. Let (Q, η
˜
) be a temporary (κ, θ)–pair (actually more accurately write
(B, ϕ¯, θ), W¯ ); so σ = τ = ℵ0.
Let N be a Q–candidate and η ∈ ωω. We say that η is a (Q, η
˜
)–
generic real over N if for some G ⊆ QN which is generic over N we
have η = η
˜
[G].
3. We say that η
˜
= η
˜
[W¯ ] is hereditarily countable if each Wn is countable
(note: the generic reals of the forcing notions from [14] are like that,
but for our purpose just “absolute enough” suffices).
Definition 7.3. 1. (Q, W¯ ) is a temporary explicitly (B, θ, σ, τ)–pair (or
nep pair) if for some Q–name η
˜
we have:
(a) Q is an explicit nep forcing notion for (B, ϕ¯, θ),
(b) ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ στ”,
(c) W¯ = 〈ψα,ζ : α < σ, ζ < τ〉,
(d) ψα,ζ ∈ cl1(Q) for α < σ, ζ < τ ,
(e) ⊢Q“ η
˜
(α) = ζ iff ψα,ζ [G
˜
Q] = t ”.
2. In this case η
˜
= η
˜
[W¯ ] = η
˜
[Q, W¯ ] is the Q–name above (it is unique).
Abusing notation we may write (Q, η
˜
) instead (Q, W¯ ) and then let
W¯ = W¯ [η
˜
] = W¯ [Q, η
˜
].
3. We introduce the notions from 7.1(3)–(6) for the current case with
almost no changes.
Definition 7.4. Kexκ,θ,σ,τ = {(Q, η
˜
) ∈ Kκ,θ,σ,τ : (Q, η
˜
) is temporarily explic-
itly (B, θ, σ, τ)–pair for some model B with κ(B) ≤ κ, ‖B‖ ≤ κ}.
Proposition 7.5. Assume that:
(a) Q is an explicitly nep forcing notion which satisfies the c.c.c.
(b) ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ σω” and (for α < σ and m < ω) ψα,m ∈ cl1(Q) are such that
⊢Q “ η
˜
(α) = m iff ψα,m[G
˜
Q] = t ”
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(c) Q′
def
= B2(Q, η
˜
) is the following suborder of cl2(Q):
{p ∈ cl2(Q) : p is generated by the ψα,m i.e. it belongs to the closure of
{ψα,m : α < σ,m < ω} under ¬,
∧
i<γ
for γ < ω1 in cl2(Q)}
(i.e. it is the quasi order ≤Q2 restricted to this set).
Then:
1. Q′ <◦ cl2(Q) and η
˜
∈ σω is a generic function for Q′.
2. Assume additionally that
(∗) if M is a Q–candidate, M |=“I is a maximal antichain of Q”,
then IM is a maximal antichain of Q.
Then we also have
(α) Q′ is (κ, θ)-nep c.c.c. forcing notion,
(β) if Q is simple, then Q′ is simple,
(γ) if Q is K–local, then Q′ is K–local.
Proof Straight.
Now the hypothesis (∗) in 7.5(2) is undesirable, so we use B3(Q, η
˜
) (see
7.6(c) below), which has a suitable quasi order.
Proposition 7.6. Assume that:
(a) Q is explicitly nep forcing notion which satisfies the c.c.c.
(b) ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ σω” and ψα,m ∈ cl2(Q) are such that
⊢Q “ η
˜
(α) = m iff ψα,m[G
˜
Q] = t ”,
(c) Q′
def
= B3(Q, η
˜
) is a forcing notion defined as follows:
the set of elements is like B2(Q, η); i.e. it is the closure of {ψα,m : α <
σ,m < ω} under ¬,
∧
i<γ
for γ < ω1 inside cl2(Q);
the quasi order ≤3=≤
B3(Q,η
˜
)
3 is ≤
cl3(Q) restricted to B3(Q, η
˜
),
(d) the statements (⊛3) and (⊛4) of 6.7 hold.
Then:
(α) Q′ is essentially a suborder of cl2(Q); i.e. ψ ∈ Q′ ⇒ ψ ∈ cl2(Q), and
for ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Q′ we have: ψ1 ≤3 ψ2 ⇔ ψ1 ≤cl3(Q) ψ2,
(β) η
˜
is a Q′–name, ⊢Q′“η
˜
∈ σω” and η
˜
is a generic function for Q′,
(γ) Q′ is explicitly nep c.c.c. forcing notion with BQ
′
= BQ, ϕ¯Q
′
=
ϕ¯B3(Q,η˜
), θQ
′
= θQ,
(γ)+ each forcing extension of V which preserves the assumption (a) (hence
also (b)) preserves (γ),
(δ) if Q is simple (or straight) then Q′ is simple (or straight),
44 S. SHELAH
(ε) if Q is K–local, then Q′ is K-local.
Proof Straight.
Proposition 7.7. In 7.1–7.6 above, we can replace Q by Q |` {p ∈ Q : p ≥ q}
preserving the properties of (Q, η
˜
).
Fact 7.8. If Q is simply correctly nep for K, Q is in V, and V1 is a K–
extension of V then
(i) in V1, QV ≤ic QV1 (see [17, Ch.IV]), i.e. for p, q ∈ V0, “p ∈ Q”,
“p ≤ q”, “¬(p ≤ q)”, “p, q compatible”,“p, q compatible” are preserved
from V to V1,
(ii) for p, pn ∈ V the statements “p /∈ Q” and “I = {pn : n < ω} is
predense above p in Q” are preserved from V to V1,
(iii) if Q satisfies the c.c.c. then in clause (ii) above we can omit the count-
ability of I.
Proof Straight, for example:
“p, q are incompatible” iff there is no Q–candidate M such that
M |= “ p, q have a common ≤Q–upper bound ”.
So by Shoenfield–Levy absoluteness, if this holds in V, it holds in V1.
(ii) Similarly.
(iii) Follows (and repeated in 8.11).
Proposition 7.9. Let (Q, η
˜
) be temporarily explicitly nep pair. Assume N
is a Q–candidate. If N |=“η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over a Q–candidate M”,
then η∗ is a (Q, η
˜
)–generic for M .
Proof Straight.
Proposition 7.10. Assume that:
(a) Q is explicitly nep,
(b) Q is c.c.c. moreover it satisfies the c.c.c. in every Q–candidate,
(c) incompatibity in Q is upward absolute from Q–candidates (but see 7.8),
(d) η
˜
is a hc–κ(BQ)–Q–name of a member of ωω defined from BQ (so we
demand this in every Q–candidate).
Furthermore, suppose that
(A) N1, N2 are Q–candidates, N2 is a generic extension of N1 for a forcing
notion R, (so BN2 = BN1 and N1 |=“R is a forcing notion”),
(B) N1 |=“ for every countable X ⊆ Q and n < ω there is a Q-candidate
N0 ≺Σn N1 to which X and R belong”,
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(C) η∗ ∈ ωω is a (Q, η
˜
)–generic real over N2.
Then η∗ ∈ ωω is a (Q, η
˜
)–generic real over N1.
Remark 7.11. 1. In (B), we can replace X by “a maximal antichain of
Q, η
˜
”.
2. Clearly we can replace “maximal antichain” by “predense set” or “pre-
dense set over p” (note IN2 = IN1 as N2 = NR1 ).
3. We can weaken “N0 ≺Σn N1” in clause (B).
Proof of 7.10 Clearly it suffices to prove that (assuming (a)-(d),(A),(B)
and (C)):
(∗) if N1 |=“I is a maximal antichain of Q”,
then IN1 = IN2 and N2 |=“I is a maximal antichain of Q”.
Assume that this fails for I. Then some r ∈ R forces this failure (in N1).
By assumption (b), in N1 the set IN1 is countable so let N1 |=“I = {pn :
n < α}”, where α ≤ ω. Let n < ω be large enough. By clause (B) in N1
there is a Q–candidate N0 to which I and r and R belong and N0 ≺Σn N1.
Since
N1 |= “(∃r ∈ R)[r ⊢R “I is not a maximal antichain of Q
(and N1[G
˜
R] is a Q–candidate)”]”,
there is r0 ∈ R ∩N0 such that
N0 |= “[r0 ⊢R “I is not a maximal antichain of Q
(and N0[G
˜
R] is a Q–candidate)]”.
Now, as N1 satisfies enough set theory and N1 “thinks” that N0 is countable
and RN0 is a forcing notion in N0, there is in N1 a subset G′R of R∩N0 = R
N0
generic over N0 to which r0 belongs. So in N0[G
′
R] there is p ∈ Q
N0[G′R]
incompatible (in QN0[G
′
R
]) with each pn. By the assumption (c) this holds
in N1, contradiction to the choice of I (see (∗)). 7.10
Definition 7.12. 1. We say that ϕ¯ or (ϕ¯,B) is a temporary (κ, θ)-
definition of a strong c.c.c.–nep forcing notion Q if:
(a) ϕ0 defines the set of elements of Q and ϕ0 is upward absolute from
(B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates,
(b) ϕ1 defines the partial ordering of Q (even in (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates)
and ϕ1 is upward absolute from (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidates,
(c) for any (B, ϕ¯, θ)–candidate N , if N |=“I ⊆ Q is predense”, then
also in V, IN is a predense subset of Q.
2. We say that ϕ¯ or (ϕ¯,B) is a temporarily [explicitly] (κ, θ)–definition
of a c.c.c.–nep forcing notion Q if
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(α) it is a temporary [explicitly] (κ, θ)-definition of a nep forcing no-
tion,
(β) for every Q–candidate N we have N |=“Q satisfies the c.c.c.”.
3. The variants are defined as usual.
Proposition 7.13. 1. If Q is strongly c.c.c.–nep forcing notion and N1 ⊆
N2 are Q–candidates, then every η which is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N2 is
also (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N1.
2. If ZFC−∗ is normal and Q is temporarily c.c.c.–nep then Q satisfies
the c.c.c.
Comment 7.14. We can spell out various absoluteness, e.g.
1. If Q is simple nep, c.c.c. and “〈pn : n < ω〉 is predense” has the form
(∃t ∈ H<ℵ1((κ+θ)))[t |= . . . ] (e.g. κ
Q = ω and it is Π12) then predensity
of countable sets is preserved in any forcing extension.
2. Note that strong c.c.c.–nep (from 7.13(1)) does not imply c.c.c.–nep
(from 7.13(2)). But if ZFC−∗∗ ⊢ ZFC
−
∗ and ZFC
−
∗∗ says that ZFC
−
∗ is
normal and Q is strong c.c.c.–nep for ZFC−∗ , then Q is c.c.c.–nep for
ZFC−∗ .
7. Preserving a little implies preserving much. Our main intention
is to show that, for example if a “nice” forcing notion P satisfies ⊢P“(ω2)V
is not null”, then it preserves “X ⊆ ω2 (X ∈ V) is not null”.
By Goldstern Shelah ([17, Ch.XVIII, 3.11]) if a Souslin proper forcing
preserves “(ωω)V is non-meagre” then it preserves “X ⊆ ωω is non-meagre”
and more (in a way suitable for the preservation theorems there).
The main question not resolved there was: is it special for Cohen forcing
(which is a way to speak on non-meagre), or it holds for nice c.c.c. forcing
notions in general, in particular does a similar theorem hold for “non-null”
instead of “non-meagre”. Though there have been doubts about it, we
succeed to do it here. In fact, even for a wider family of forcing notions but
we have to work more in the proof.
See §11 on a generalization. The reader may concentrate on the case that
Q is strongly c.c.c. nep and P,Q are explicitly ℵ0–nep and simple. It is
natural to assume that η
˜
is a generic real for Q but we do not ask for it
when not used.
Convention 8.1. 1. Q is an explicitly nep forcing notion.
2. η
˜
∈ ωω is a hereditarily countable Q-name which is B–definable.
We would like to preserve something like: “x is Q–generic over N”.
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Definition 8.2. 1. I(Q,η
˜
)
def
= {A ∈ Borel(ωω) : ⊢Q“η
˜
/∈ A”} (it is an
ideal on the Boolean algebra of Borel subsets of ωω).
2. Iex(Q,η
˜
) is the ideal generated by I(Q,η
˜
) on P(
ωω). (So for A ∈ Borel(ωω)
we have: A ∈ I(Q,η
˜
) ⇔ A ∈ I
ex
(Q,η
˜
)). Let
Idx(Q,η
˜
)
def
= {X ⊆ ωω : for a dense set of q ∈ Q, for some Borel set B ⊆ ωω,
we have X ⊆ B and q ⊢“η
˜
/∈ B”}.
3. For an ideal I (on Borel sets, respectively), the family of I–positive
(Borel, respectively) sets is denoted by I+.
(Thus, for a Borel subset A of ωω, A ∈ I+(Q,η
˜
) iff there is q ∈ Q such
that q ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ A”.
Definition 8.3. 1. A forcing notion P is I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving if for every
Borel set A
A ∈ (I(Q,η
˜
))
+ ⇒ ⊢P “ A
V ∈ (Iex(Q,η
˜
))
+”
(AV means: the same set, i.e. A ∩V).
2. P is strongly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving if for all X ⊆
ωω (i.e. not only Borel
sets)
X ∈ (Idx(Q,η
˜
))
+ ⇒ ⊢P “X ∈ (I
ex
(Q,η
˜
))
+”.
[See 8.4(7) for Q which is c.c.c.]
3. We say that a forcing notion P is weakly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving if ⊢P“
(ωω)V ∈ (Iex(Q,η
˜
))
+ ”.
4. P is super–I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving if for all X ⊆
ωω we have:
X ∈ (Idx(Q,η
˜
))
+ ⇒ ⊢P X
V ∈ (Idx(Q,η
˜
))
+.
Proposition 8.4. 1. I(Q,η
˜
) is an ℵ1–complete ideal (in fact, if 〈Ai : i ≤
α〉 ∈ V, each Ai ∈ Borel(ωω) and ⊢Q“A
V[G
˜
]
α ⊆
⋃
i<α
A
V[G
˜
]
i ” and Ai ∈
I(Q,η
˜
) for i < α then Aα ∈ I(Q,η
˜
)).
2. If (Q, η
˜
) is not trivial (i.e. ⊢Q“η
˜
/∈ (ωω)V), then singletons belong to
I(Q,η
˜
).
3. ωω /∈ I(Q,η
˜
).
4. Assume (ZFC−∗ is K–good and) Q is correct. If in V, X ∈ I
ex
(Q,η
˜
) and
P ∈ K, then in VP still X ∈ Iex(Q,η
˜
) (but see later).
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5. Assume (ZFC−∗ is K–good, particularly (c) of 2.11 and) Q is correct.
If, in V, B is a Borel subset of ωω from I(Q,η
˜
) and V1 = V
P then also
V1 |=“B ∈ IQ,η
˜
”.
6. Iex(Q,η
˜
), I
dx
(Q,η
˜
) are ideals of P(
ωω) and
Iex(Q,η
˜
) |` (the family of Borel sets) = I
dx
(Q,η
˜
) |` (the family of Borel sets).
7. If Q satisfies the c.c.c. then Idx(Q,η
˜
) is generated by I(Q,η
˜
), so equal to
Iex(Q,η
˜
).
8. Iex(Q,η
˜
) is ℵ1–complete.
9. If for some stationary S ⊆ [χ]ℵ0 , Q is S–proper then Idx(Q,η
˜
) is ℵ1–
complete.
Proof We will prove parts 5) and 4) only, the rest is left to the reader.
5) First work in VP. If the conclusion fails then for some q ∈ Q we
have q ⊢“η
˜
∈ B”. So there is a Q–candidate M to which q,B (i.e. the
code of B) belong. There is q′ such that q ≤ q′ and q′ is (M,Q)–generic.
Now for every G ⊆ Q generic oner VP, η
˜
[G] ∈ BV
P[G]. By absoluteness,
also M〈G〉 |= η
˜
〈G ∩ QM 〉 ∈ BM〈G〉 and hence (by the forcing theorem)
for some p ∈ G ∩ QM we have M |= [p ⊢Q “η
˜
∈ B”]. Now, returning to
V, by Shoenfield–Levy absoluteness there are such M ′, p′ in V. Let p′′ be
(M ′,Q)–generic, p′ ≤Q p′′. So similarly to the above, p′′ ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ B”.
4) As X ∈ Iex(Q,η
˜
), clearly for some Borel set B ∈ I(Q,η
˜
) we have X ⊆ B.
By part (5), also in VP we have B ∈ Iex(Q,η
˜
) and trivially X ⊆ B
V ⊆ BV
P
.
Proposition 8.5. 1. If a forcing notion P is I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving, then P is
weakly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving.
2. If P is strongly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving, then P is I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving.
3. Assume that Q satisfies the c.c.c. and (Q, η
˜
) is homogeneous (see (⊛)
below). Then: P is I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving iff P is weakly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving,
where
(⊛) (Q, η
˜
) is homogeneous if:
for any (Borel) sets B1, B2 ∈ (I(Q,η
˜
))
+ we can find a Borel set
B′1 ⊆ B1, B1 ∈ (I(Q,η
˜
))
+ and a Borel function F from B′1 into B1
such that
(α) for every Borel set A ∈ I(Q,η
˜
), F
−1[A ∩B2] ∈ I(Q,η
˜
),
(β) this is absolute (or at least it holds also in VP).
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Proof 3) By part (1) it suffices to show “non–preserving” assuming
“not weakly preserving”. So there are p,B∗, A
˜
, q
˜
such that B ∈ (I(Q,η
˜
))
+ is
a Borel subset of ωω and
p ⊢P “ (a) A
˜
is a Borel set
(b) q
˜
∈ Q (in VP!)
(c) q
˜
witnesses A
˜
∈ I(Q,η
˜
), that is q
˜
⊢Q “η
˜
/∈ A
˜
”
(d) ν ∈ A
˜
for every ν ∈ (B∗)V. ”
Let
J = {B : B ∈ (I(Q,η
˜
))
+, so a Borel subset of ωω, and
for some Borel one-to-one function F from B to B∗ we have
F is absolutely (I(Q,η
˜
))
+–preserving }.
Choose a maximal family {Bi : i < i∗} ⊆ J such that i 6= j ⇒ Bi ∩ Bj ∈
I(Q,η
˜
). As Q satisfies the c.c.c. necessarily i
∗ < ω1, so wlog i
∗ ≤ ω. By the
assumption, ωω \
⋃
i<i∗
Bi ∈ I(Q,η
˜
). Let Fi witness that Bi ∈ J . Let
A
˜
i = {η ∈
ωω : η ∈ Bi and Fi(η) ∈ A
˜
}.
Then A
˜
i is a Borel subset of
ωω and p ⊢P“A
˜
i ∈ I(Q,η
˜
)” as p ⊢P“A
˜
∈ I(Q,η
˜
)”.
Hence
p ⊢ “
⋃
i<i∗
A
˜
i ∪ (
ωω \
⋃
i<i∗
) ∈ I(Q,η
˜
) ”
(call this set A
˜
∗). Now
p ⊢P “ (
ωω)V = (ωω\
⋃
i<i∗
Bi)
V∪
⋃
i<i∗
BVi ⊆ (
ωω\
⋃
i<i∗
Bi)∪
⋃
i<i∗
Ai ∈ I(Q,η
˜
) ”
so we are done.
Comment: 1) It is easy to find a forcing notion P which is I(Q,η
˜
)–
preserving, but not strongly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving, e.g. for Q = Cohen (see 8.10
below). However, for sufficiently nice forcing notion P, “I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving”
and “strongly I(Q,η
˜
)-preserving” coincide, as we will see in 8.8. (Parallel to
the phenomenon that for “nice” sets, CH holds).
2) It is even easier to find a weakly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving forcing notion P which
is not I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving.
Assume that for ℓ < 2 we have (Qℓ, η
˜
ℓ) as in 8.1, e.g. Q0 is Cohen forcing,
Q1 is random real forcing. Let Q = {∅} ∪
⋃
ℓ<2
{ℓ}×Qℓ, ∅ minimal, (ℓ1, q1) ≤
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(ℓ2, q2) iff ℓ1 = ℓ2 and Qℓ |= q1 ≤ q2. We define a Q–name η
˜
by defining for
a generic G ⊆ Q over V:
η
˜
[G] is
〈0〉⌢(η0[G0]) if {0} ×Q0 ∩G 6= ∅, and G0 = {q ∈ Q0 : (0, q) ∈ G}
〈1〉⌢(η1[G1]) if {1} ×Q1 ∩G 6= ∅, and G1 = {q ∈ Q1 : (1, q) ∈ G}.
Then usually (and certainly for our choice) we get a counterexample.
Proposition 8.6. Assume that A is a Borel subset (better: a definition of
a Borel subset) of ωω, M is a Q–candidate (so η
˜
∈ M , i.e. 〈ψα,m : α <
ω,m < ω〉 ∈ M) and A ∈ M (i.e. the definition). Further, suppose that
q ∈ QM is such that q ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ A”. Then
(α) M |=“q ⊢Q η
˜
∈ A”,
(β) there is η ∈ A which is a (Q, η
˜
)–generic real over M .
Proof As for (α), if it fails then for some q′ ∈ QM , we have
M |= “ q ≤Q q′ and q′ ⊢Q η
˜
/∈ A ”,
and let r ∈ Q be 〈M,Q〉–generic above q′. So if G is a subset of Q generic
over V to which r belongs then q′ ∈ G and G ∩ QM is a subset of QM
generic over M to which q′ belongs. Hence M〈G〉 |=“η
˜
[G ∩ QM ] /∈ A”
and η
˜
[G ∩ QM ] ∈ ωω. By absoluteness also V[G] |= η
˜
[G ∩ QM ] /∈ A and
η
˜
[G ∩ QM ] ∈ ωω. But as η
˜
∈ M clearly η
˜
[G ∩ QM ] = η
˜
[G] and as q′ ∈ G
also q ∈ G, so we get contradiction to q ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ A”.
By clause (α) clause (β) is easy: we can find a subset G ∈ V of QN to
which q belongs which is generic over M . So η
˜
[G] ∈ ωω and it belongs to
A as M |=“q ⊢Q η
˜
∈ A”. 8.6
Proposition 8.7. Assume Q is correct and satisfies the c.c.c. The follow-
ing conditions are equivalent for a set X ⊆ ωω:
(A) X ∈ Iex(Q,η
˜
),
(B) for some ρ ∈ ω2, for every Q–candidate N to which ρ belongs there is
no η ∈ X which is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N ,
(C) for every p ∈ Q for some Q–candidate N such that p ∈ QN , there is
no η ∈ X which is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N .
Proof (A)⇒ (B): So assume (A), i.e. X ∈ Iex(Q,η
˜
). Then for some Borel
set A ∈ I(Q,η
˜
) we have X ⊆ A. Let ρ ∈
ω2 code A. Since ⊢Q“η
˜
/∈ AV[G˜ Q
]”,
it follows from 8.6 that
(*) for any Q–candidate N to which ρ belongs there is no (Q, η
˜
)–generic
real η over N which belongs to X (or even just to A).
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(B) ⇒ (C): Easy as Q is correct.
(C) ⇒ (A): Assume (C). Let
I = {p ∈ Q : for some Borel subset A = Ap of ωω
we have p ⊢ “ η
˜
/∈ Ap ” and X ⊆ Ap}.
Suppose first that I is predense in Q. Clearly it is open, so we can find
a maximal antichain J of Q such that J ⊆ I. As Q satisfies the c.c.c.,
necessarily J is countable. So A
def
=
⋂
p∈J
Ap is a Borel subset of
ωω (as J
is countable) and it includes X (as each Ap does). Moreover, since J is a
maximal antichain of Q (and p ∈ J ⇒ p ∈ I ⇒ p ⊢Q“η
˜
/∈ Ap” ⇒
p ⊢Q“η
˜
/∈ A”) we have ⊢Q“η /∈ A”. Consequently (A) holds.
Suppose now that I is not predense in Q and let p∗ ∈ Q exemplifies it,
i.e. it is incompatible with every member of I. Let N be a Q–candidate to
which belongs some ρ given by the assumption (C) for p∗. Thus p∗ ∈ QN
and no η ∈ X is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N . Let q be a member of Q which is
above p∗ and is 〈N,QN 〉–generic (i.e. q ⊢“GP ∩QN is generic over N”). Let
A
def
= {η ∈ ωω : η is not (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N}. Now
(a) A is a Borel subset of ωω and X ⊆ A
(why? as N is countable),
(b) q ⊢Q“η
˜
/∈ AV[GQ]”
(why? by the definition of A),
(c) q ∈ I
(why? by (a)+(b)).
Thus p∗ ≤ q ∈ I and we get contradiction to the choice of p∗. 8.7
Theorem 8.8. Assume that:
(a) Q, η
˜
are as above (see8.1), and Q is correct,
(b) P is nep-forcing notion with respect to our fixed version ZFC−∗ ,
(c) P is I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving,
(d) ZFC−∗∗ is a stronger version of set theory including clauses (i)–(v) below
for some χ1 < χ2,
(i) (H(χ2),∈) is a (well defined) model of ZFC
−
∗ ,
(ii) (a), (b) and (c) (with BP, BQ, η
˜
as individual constants),
(iii) Q,P ∈ H(χ1) and (H(χ2),∈) is a semi P–candidate and a semi Q-
candidate with (BP) interpreted as (BP)N |` H(χ2)N and similarly
for Q, so (natural to assume) BP, BQ ∈ H(χ2),
(remember, “semi” means omitting the countability demand)
(iv) forcing of cardinality < χ1 preserves the properties (i), (ii), (iii),
and χ1 is a strong limit cardinal,
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(v) forcing by P preserves “I is a predense subset of Q” (follows if Q
satisfies the c.c.c. by 7.8(ii)).
Then:
(α) if, additionally,
(e) ZFC−∗∗ is normal (see Definition2.11(3))
then P is strongly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving,
(β) if N is a P–candidate (and Q–candidate) and moreover it is a model
of ZFC−∗∗ and N |=“p ∈ P” and η
∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N ,
then for some q we have:
(i) p ≤ q and q ∈ P,
(ii) q is 〈N,P〉–generic; i.e. q ⊢P“G
˜
P ∩ PN is generic over N” (see
5.1),
(iii) q ⊢P“ η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N [PN ∩G
˜
P] ”.
(α)+ We can strengthen the conclusion of (α) to
“P is super–I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving”.
Remark 8.9. 1) We consider, for a nep forcing notion Q
(∗)1 Q satisfies the c.c.c.
We also consider
(∗)2 being a predense subset (or just a maximal antichain) of Q is K–
absolute.
By results of the previous section, (∗1) ⇒ (∗2) under reasonable conditions.
You may wonder whether (∗2) ⇒ (∗1), but by the examples in section 11
the answer is not.
2) Note that in (α), (α)+ we can use the weak normality if Q satisfies the
c.c.c., see 8.11. We do not use “P is explicitly nep” so we do not demand it.
Before we prove the theorem, let us give an example for a forcing notion
failing the conclusion and see why many times we can simplify assumptions.
Example 8.10. Start with V0. Let s¯ = 〈si : i < ω1〉 be a sequence of
random reals, forced by the measure algebra on ω1(ω2). Let V1 = V0[s¯],
V2 = V1[r], r a Cohen over V1 and
V3 = V2[t¯] where t¯ = 〈ti : i < ω1〉 is a sequence of random reals
forced by the measure algebra.
Then in V3 (in fact, already in V2), {si : i < ω1} is a null set, whereas
{ti : i < ω1} is not null. But t¯ is also generic for the measure algebra over
V1. So V
′
2 = V1[t¯] is a generic extension of V1. We have V3 = V
′
2[r],
where r is generic for some algebra, more specifically for
R
def
= (Cohen ∗ measure algebra adding t¯)/t¯.
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So in V′2 the sets t¯ and s¯ are not null and R makes s¯ null, but not t¯.
How can R do that? R uses 〈ti : i < ω1〉 in its definition, so it is not
“nice” enough. 8.10
Remark In the proof of 8.8, of course, we may assume N ≺ (H(χ,∈))
if (H(χ,∈)) |= ZFC−∗∗, as this normally holds. In (α) the use of such N
does not matter. In (β) it slightly weakens the conclusion. Now, (α) is our
original aim. But (β) both is needed for (α) and is a step towards preserving
them (as in [17]). So typically N is an elementary submodel of appropriate
H(χ).
Proof of 8.8 Clause (α): To prove (α) we will use (β). So let
X ⊆ ωω, X ∈ (Idx(Q,η
˜
))
+. Then there is a condition q∗ ∈ Q such that
(∗)1 for no Borel subset B of ωω do we have: X ⊆ B and q∗ ⊢Q“η
˜
/∈ B”.
Let χ be large enough. We can find N ⊆ (H(χ),∈) as in (β), moreover
N ≺ (H(χ),∈) a model of ZFC−∗∗ (and so a P–candidate and a Q-candidate)
[it exists because by clause (e) of the assumptions, ZFC−∗∗ is normal so for
χ large enough any countable N ≺ (H(χ),∈) to which C,BQ,BP belong is
a model of ZFC−∗∗ and is a P–candidate and a Q–candidate, so as required].
Towards a contradiction, assume p∗ ∈ P and p∗ ⊢P“X ∈ Idx(Q,η
˜
)”. So for
some P–name A
˜
we have
p∗ ⊢P “ A
˜
is a Borel subset of ωω, X ⊆ A
˜
and A
˜
∈ I(Q,η
˜
), i.e. ⊢Q η
˜
/∈ A
˜
”.
Without loss of generality the name A
˜
is hereditarily countable and A
˜
, p∗, q∗
belong to N . In V, let
B = {η ∈ ωω : η is a (Q≥q
∗
, η
˜
)–generic real over N , which means:
η = η
˜
[G] for some G ⊆ QN generic over N
such that q∗ ∈ G}
Clearly, it is an analytic set (if η
˜
was generic real then Borel; both holds
as “η
˜
is a generic real for Q” follows from ZFC−∗∗). So B =
⋃
i<ω1
Bi, each
Bi is Borel. Let q ∈ Q be 〈N,Q〉–generic and q∗ ≤ q. Then q ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ B”
and hence wlog for some i < ω1 we have q ⊢Q“η
˜
∈ Bi”. Since q ⊢Q“η
˜
/∈
(ωω \Bi)” (as q∗ ≤ q, q∗ ⊢“η
˜
∈ Bi”), we may apply (∗)1 to the set ωω \Bi
to conclude that X 6⊆ ωω \ Bi. Take η∗ ∈ X ∩ Bi (so it is (Q, η
˜
)–generic
over N). So by clause (β) (proved below), there is a condition p ∈ P, p ≥ p∗
which is 〈N,P〉–generic (i.e. it forces that G
˜
P ∩ PN is generic over N , not
necessarily G
˜
P ∩N) and such that
p ⊢P “ η
∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N [G
˜
P ∩ P
N ] ”.
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Choose GP ⊆ P, generic over V, such that p ∈ GP. In V[GP], N [GP∩PN ] is
a generic extension of N (for PN !), a Q candidate, and η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic
over it. As p∗ ≤ p ∈ GP, clearly if GQ ⊆ QV[GP] is generic over V[GP]
then η
˜
[GQ] /∈ A
˜
[GP]. But N [GP ∩ PN ] ≺ (H(χ)V[GP],∈), so N [GP ∩ PN ]
satisfies the parallel statement. Since η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N [GP ∩ PN ],
it cannot belong to A
˜
[GP ∩PN ]. But easily A
˜
[GP ∩PN ] = A
˜
[GP] and hence,
by absoluteness, η∗ ∈ X ⊆ A
˜
[GP], a contradiction. This ends the proof of
8.8, clause (α).
Clause (α)+: Like the proof of clause (α). We start like there but now
we choose functions r∗, A∗,I such that
(∗)2 Dom(r∗) = Dom(I) is the set of all hereditarily countable canonical
P–names for elements of Q (so it is a member of H<ℵ1(κ(P) + κ(Q))),
and
Dom(A∗) = {(p, q
˜
) : p ∈ I(q
˜
), q
˜
∈ Dom(r∗)},
(∗)3 for each q
˜
∈ Dom(r∗) = Dom(I), I(q
˜
) is a predense subset of P such
that for each p ∈ I(q
˜
) we have:
p ⊢P “ A∗(q
˜
) is a Borel subset of ωω ”,
p ⊢P [r∗(q
˜
) ⊢Q “ η
˜
/∈ A∗(q
˜
) ”],
p ⊢P “ X ⊆ A∗(q
˜
) ”.
Without loss of generality, the set X, and the functions r∗, A∗,I belong to
N . We choose conditions q ∈ Q, p ∈ P and a real η∗ ∈ X and a generic
filter GP ⊆ P over V in a similar manner as in clause (α). We note that
q
˜
∈ Dom(r∗) ∩N ⇒ N ∩ I(q
˜
) ∩GP 6= ∅,
so say p[q
˜
] ∈ GP ∩ N . Since η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N [GP ∩ PN ], there
is G∗ ⊆ QN [GP∩P
N ] generic over N such that η∗ = η
˜
[G∗]. By the choice of
r∗, A∗ there is q
˜
∈ N ∩Dom(r∗) such that r∗[q
˜
][GP ∩ PN ] ∈ G∗. Now, A =
A∗(p[q
˜
], q
˜
) ∈ N [GP∩PN ] is a Borel subset of ωω and N [GP∩PN ] |=“η
˜
/∈ A”,
hence N [GP ∩ PN ] |=“η
˜
[G∗] /∈ A. But
N [GP] = N [GP ∩ P
N ] |= “ X \ A = ∅ ”,
contradicting η∗ = η
˜
[G∗] ∈ X \ A.
Clause (β): So N, η∗,Q,P, p are given. Let N1 = N [G∗] be a generic
extension of N by a subset G∗ of QN generic over N and such that η∗ = η
˜
[G]
(see7.2). Now choose (in N) a model M ≺ (H(χ2),∈)N such that
(i) P,Q, η
˜
, p ∈M ,
(ii) QN ⊆M and PN ⊆M ,
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(iii) the family of maximal antichains of P and of Q from N are included
in M ,
(iv) M ∈ N , moreover M ∈ H(χ2)N ,
(v) M |=“forcing by P preserves predensity of subsets of Q”
[Why is clause (v) possible? As N |` H(χ1) inherits clause (v) of (d) of the
assumptions].
Hence, by assumption (d),
(
⊗
) M is a P-candidate and a Q-candidate and
N |= “ M is a semi P-candidate and semi Q-candidate ”.
Let R = Levy(ℵ0, |M |). In V let GR ⊆ R be generic over N1 = N [G∗] (note
that as N1 is countable, clearly GR exists) and let N2 = N1[GR] (note that
it too is a P-candidate and a Q-candidate).
Note: η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over M too and G∗ is a subset of QM generic
over M (by clauses (ii) + (iii)) and QN = QM , PN = PM (note that in N2
the model M is countable).
Now we ask the following question:
Is there q ∈ PN2 such that
N2 |=“ p ≤P q, q is (M,PM )–generic and q ⊢P“η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–
generic over M [GP ∩ PM ]” ”?
Depending on the answer, we consider two cases.
Case 1: The answer is “yes”.
Choose q′ ∈ P, q′ ≥ q, q′ is (N2, PN2)-generic. Then we have
q′ ⊢P “ in V[G
˜
P], G
˜
P ∩ PN2 is generic over N2, p, q ∈ G
˜
P, and
in N2[G
˜
P ∩ PN2 ], η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over M [G
˜
P ∩ PM ],
hence also over N [G
˜
P ∩ PN ] ”.
[Why does q′ force this? As:
(A) “G
˜
P ∩ PN2 is generic over N2” holds because q′ is (N2,PN2)–generic;
(B) “p, q ∈ G
˜
P” holds as p ≤ q ≤ q′ ∈ GP (forced by q′!);
(C) “in N2[G
˜
P∩PN2], η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over M [GP∩PM ]” holds because
of the choice of q (i.e. the assumption of the case ad as q ∈ GP);
(D) “η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N [GP∩PN ] for Q” holds by clause (C) above
and clause (iii) of the choice of M .]
By absoluteness we can omit the “in N2[G
˜
P ∩ PM ]”, i.e. q′ ⊢P“η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–
generic over N [G
˜
P ∩ PN ]”. So q′ is as required.
Case 2: The answer is “no”.
Let ψ(x) be the following statement:
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there is no q such that:
q ∈ P, P |=“p ≤ q”, q is (M,PM )–generic and q ⊢P“x is a
(Q, η
˜
)–generic real over M [G
˜
P ∩ PM ]”.
So ψ is a first order formula in set theory, all parameters are in N1 =
N [G∗] ⊆ N2 = N [G∗][GR], and by the assumption of the case
N [G∗][GR] |= ψ[η
∗].
Since R is homogeneous we may assume that r = ∅. As GR ⊆ R is generic
over N [G∗] for R, necessarily (by the forcing theorem), for some r ∈ GR
N [G∗] |= “ r ⊢R ψ[η
∗] ”.
So necessarily, for some q ∈ G∗ ⊆ QN = QM we have
N |=
(
q ⊢Q [r ⊢R ψ(η
˜
[G
˜
Q])]
)
.
Now R ∈ N (as it members are finite sets of pairs of ordinals) so
(⊗) N |=
(
(q, r) ⊢Q×R ψ(η
˜
[G
˜
Q])
)
.
Next, N [GR] is a generic extension by a “small” forcing of N which is a
model of ZFC−∗∗, so N [GR] satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii) of the clause (d) of
the assumptions. Note that N |=“M is a semi Q-candidate and a semi P–
candidate”, see clause (d)(iii) of the assumptions and the choice ofM , so also
N [GR] satisfies this. Moreover, N [GR] |=“M is countable”, so N [GR] |=“M
is a Q-candidate and a P–candidate”. Hence by assumption (d)(ii) there
are p1, η
⊗, G⊗Q ∈ N [GR] such that:
N [GR] |= “ p1 ∈ P, p ≤P p1, p1 is (M,PM )–generic and
p1 ⊢P [η⊗ is a (Q, η
˜
)–real over M [G
˜
P ∩ PM ] satisfying q]
moreover, p1 ⊢P “ η⊗ = η
˜
[G⊗Q ] ”, and
G⊗Q ⊆ Q
M [GP∩P
M ] is a generic set over M such that q ∈ G⊗Q ”.
[Here we use the following: if G ⊆ PN [GR] is generic over N [GR] then
N [GR]〈G〉 is a Q–candidate (apply clause (iv) of the assumption (d) to
R ∗ P
˜
).] It follows from clause (d)(v) of the choice of M that
G⊗Q ∩Q
M is generic over M .
Let p
˜
1, η
˜
⊗, G
˜
⊗
Q ∈ N be R–names such that η
˜
⊗[GR] = η
⊗, G⊗Q = G˜
⊗
Q[GR] and
p
˜
1[GR] = p1, and without loss of generality in N we have
r ⊢R “ η
˜
⊗ is a (Q, η
˜
)–generic real over M satisfying q and p
˜
1 ∈ P and
p
˜
1 forces (⊢P) that η
˜
⊗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over M [G
˜
P ∩ PM ],
G
˜
⊗
Q is a subset of Q
M generic over V ”.
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Let G′R ⊆ R be generic over N [GR], to which r belongs, so N [GR][G
′
R] is a
forcing extension of N [GR] so both are generic extensions of N by a small
forcing.
Now G
˜
⊗
Q is essentially a complete embedding of Q |` (≥ q) into R (by basic
forcing theory, see the footnote to 2.11(1)(d); and we can use the value for
0 of the function
⋃
{f : f ∈ GR} to choose q′, q ≤ q′ ∈ QN ). Hence, for
some Q–name R
˜
∗ we have (Q |` (≥ q)) ∗R
˜
∗ is R, so GR = G
⊗
Q ∗GR∗ for some
GR∗ ∈ V[GR], where R∗ = R
˜
∗[G⊗Q ], R˜
∗ a Q–name. So we can represent
N [GR][G
′
R] also as N
3 def= N [G⊗Q ][G
′
R][GR∗ ]; i.e. forcing first with Q |` (≥ q),
then with R, lastly with R
˜
∗[G⊗Q ]. Now let N
2 def= N [G⊗Q ][G
′
R], so N
2 is a
generic extension of N and N3 is a generic extension of N2 (both by “small”
forcing), and in N3 we have p1 and η⊗ and G⊗Q . But G
⊗
Q ×G
′
R is a generic
subset of (QN |` ≥ q) × R over N , so essentially a generic (over N) subset
of QN × R to which (q, r) belongs, hence (by (⊗) above) N2 |= ψ(η
˜
[G⊗Q ]).
Therefore there is no p′ ∈ N2 such that6:
(⊠) N2 |= [p′ ∈ P, p ≤ p′, p′ ⊢P“η
˜
[G⊗Q ] is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over M [G
˜
P ∩
PM ]”].
In N2 we can find a countable M ′ ≺ (H(χ2)N
2
,∈) to which P, Q, η
˜
⊗, p
˜
1,
R
˜
∗, and G⊗Q , G
′
R, M belong (so N
2 |=“M ′ is countable and is a P–candidate
and a Q-candidate”) and M ′′ = M ′ |`N ∈ N . In N2 we can find G′
R
˜
∗[G⊗
Q
]
⊆
R
˜
∗[G⊗Q] ∩M
′ which is generic over M ′. In M3 = M ′′[G⊗Q ][G
′
R
˜
∗[G⊗
Q
]
], again
by the forcing theorem, there is p′ as required in (⊠) above. So M3 is a
P–candidate inside N2, hence there is p′1 such that N
2 |=“p′ ≤ p′1 and p
′
1
is (M3,P)–generic”. By the amount of absoluteness we require (moving
up from M3 to N2) this p′1 can serve in N
2 for (⊠), contradiction to the
previous assertion. 8.8
Proposition 8.11. Assume (a),(b),(c) and (d) of 8.8 and
(e) ZFC−∗∗ is weakly normal,
(f) Q is c.c.c. and simple (for simplicity) and correct.
Then P is strongly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving.
Proof First note that Iex(Q,η
˜
) = I
dx
(Q,η
˜
). Now, if the conclusion fails as
witnessed by a set X, then, by 8.7, the statements (A), (B), (C) of 8.7 fail.
6of course, we can use a weaker demand on G⊗Q
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Hence, by ¬(A), X ∈ (Iex(Q,η
˜
))
+ and p ∈ P and a P–name y
˜
such that
p ⊢P “ y
˜
∈ H<ℵ1(Q) and for no Q-candidate M such that y
˜
∈M
there is ν ∈ X which is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N [G
˜
P] ”.
As we can increase p, without loss of generality y
˜
is a hereditarily countable
P–name. As ZFC−∗∗ is weakly normal we can find a model N of ZFC
−
∗∗
which is a P–candidate and a Q–candidate and to which p, y
˜
belongs. Let
η∗ ∈ X ⊆ ωω (in V) be (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N (exists by the negation of
(B) of 8.7). By (β) of 8.8 there is q ∈ P such that p ≤ q, q is 〈N,P〉-generic
and q ⊢P“η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N [G
˜
P]”, a contradiction.
Proposition 8.12. Assume (a), (b), (c) of 8.8. Let P,Q be normal and
forcing with P preserves “I ⊆ P is predense”. Then
(α)′ P is strongly I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving,
(β) for χ large enough, if N ≺ (H(χ),∈) is countable (and C,BQ,BP, η
˜
∈
N) and N |=“p ∈ P” and η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N then for some q
we have
(i) p ≤ q, q ∈ P,
(ii) q is 〈N,P〉–generic; i.e. q ⊢P“G
˜
P ∩ PN is generic over N”,
(iii) q ⊢P“η∗ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over N [PN ∩GP]”.
Proof Let χ1 be a large enough strong limit, and χ2 = iω(χ1), χ =
iω(χ2), and repeat the proof of 8.8 usingN ≺ (H(χ3),∈) to which C,BQ,BP
and P,Q, θ, χ1, χ2 belong. 8.12
Proposition 8.13. Assume (a),(b),(c) of 8.8 and
(d)′ ZFC−∗∗ is a version of set theory including, for some χ1 < χ2
(i) (H(χ2),∈) is a (well defined) model of ZFC
−
∗ ,
(ii) (a) and (b) (with BP,BQ, η
˜
as individual constants) and (c),
(iii) Q,P ∈ H(χ1) and (H(χ2),∈) is a P–candidate and a Q–candidate
with BP interpreted as (BP)N |` H(χ2) and similarly for Q, so
“ BP,BQ ∈ H(χ2) ”,
(iv) forcing with P preserves being a Q–candidate,
(v) Q satisfies the c.c.c. and being incompatible in Q is upward abso-
lute from Q–candidates.
Then for models of ZFC−∗∗, forcing with P preserves “I is a predense subset
of Q” (i.e. (d)(v) of8.8).
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Remark: 1) When ZFC−∗∗ is normal, this applies to 11.6.
2) Compare with 7.8(iii). Here we have redundant assumptions as we have
a use for 8.8 in mind.
Proof Let N be a model of ZFC−∗∗ and let N |=“I is a predense subset
of Q”. As N |=“Q satisfies the c.c.c.” we can find in N a set J ⊆ {q : N |=
(∃p ∈ I)(p ≤ q ∈ Q)} such that
N |= “ J is countable, say {pn : n < ω}, and J is predense in Q ”.
Toward contradiction assume p∗ ∈ QN and r
˜
∈ N are such that
N |= “ p∗ ⊢P r
˜
∈ Q is incompatible with every pn ”.
We can replace N by H(χ2)N . Let M ∈ N be such that
N |= “ M ≺ (H(χ2)N ,∈) is countable and
P,Q,BP,BQ, 〈pn : n < ω〉, p∗, r
˜
∈M ”.
In N we can find G ⊆ PN generic over M , so M inherits from H(χ2) the
propertyM [G] is a Q–candidate and alsoM [G] |=“r
˜
[G], pn are incompatible
in Q”. So r
˜
[G] ∈ QN contradicts the choice of J .
Conclusion 8.14. For 8.8(β) to hold, we can omit clause (v) of (e) there if
we add:
(g) Q satisfies the c.c.c. in Q-candidates and being incompatible in Q is
upward absolute from Q–candidates.
We can conclude (phrased for simplicity for strongly c.c.c. nep).
Conclusion 8.15. Assume that
(a) Q is strongly c.c.c. explicitly nep (see Definition 7.12) and simple and
correct,
(b) η
˜
∈ ωω generic for Q, a hereditarily countable Q–name.
If P0 is nep, I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving and ⊢P0“P
˜
1 is nep, I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving”
then P0 ∗ P
˜
1 is (nep and) I(Q,η
˜
)–preserving.
The reader may ask: what about ω limits (etc)? We shall address these
problems in the continuation [21].
8. Non-symmetry. The following hypothesis 9.1 will be assumed in
this and the next section, though for the end (including the main theorems
10.11–10.15) we assume snep (i.e. 9.2).
Hypothesis 9.1. Q is correct c.c.c. simple, strongly c.c.c. nep, η
˜
is a hered-
itarily countable name of a generic real, i.e. (Q, η
˜
) ∈ K (see Definition 7.2)
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for ZFC−∗ and ZFC
−
∗ (and the properties above) are preserved by a forcing
of cardinality < χ¯, |Q|ℵ0 < χ¯, for Q-candidates.
Hypothesis 9.2. Like 9.1 with snep.
Definition 9.3. Let Q, η
˜
be as in 9.1 and let α be an ordinal.
1. Let Q[α] be Pα, where 〈Pi,Q
˜
j
: i ≤ α, j < α〉 is a FS iteration and
Q
˜
j
= QV[Pj ].
2. We let η
˜
[α] be 〈η
˜
ℓ : ℓ < α〉, where η
˜
ℓ is η
˜
“copied to Q
˜
ℓ
” (see 9.4(1)
below).
3. (Q〈α〉, η
˜
〈α〉) is defined similarly as an FS product.
4. For a finite set u ⊆ α we define F = Fα,uQ : Q −→ Q
[α] by F (p) = p¯,
where p¯ = 〈pℓ : ℓ < α〉, pℓ = p if ℓ ∈ u and pi = ∅Q otherwise.
5. The FS iteration Q¯ = 〈Pi,Q
˜
j
, η
˜
j : i ≤ α, j < i〉 of neps means
(Q
˜
j
, η
˜
j) ∈ K.
We write η
˜
to mean η
˜
j = F
α,{j}
Q (η
˜
).
Proposition 9.4. 1. In Definition 9.3(4), for finite u ⊆ α, F = Fα,uQ
is a complete (<◦) embedding, as “p ≤ q”, “p, q compatible”, “p, q
incompatible”, “〈pn : n < ω〉 is predense set above q” are upward
absolute from Q–candidates (holds as Q is strongly c.c.c. by 9.1). So
η
˜
ℓ is F
α,{α}
Q (η
˜
) if α ∈ u.
2. Q[α] satisfies the c.c.c.
3. Same holds for Q〈α〉.
4. (Q[α], η
˜
∗[α]) for α < ω1 are as in 9.1, too.
Proof For example:
3) It is enough to prove it for finite α, and this we prove by induction on
α for α = n+ 1. For the c.c.c. use “incompatibility is absolute” for forcing
by Q〈n〉, so we can use the last phrase in 9.1.
4) The main point here is the strong c.c.c., so let N be a Q-candidate (and
α+ 1 ⊆ N) and
N |= “ I ⊆ Q[α] is predense ”.
Let G[α] ⊆ Q[α] be generic over V and for β ≤ α, G[β] = G[α] ∩Q[β]. Show
by induction on β that G[β] ∩ (Q[β])N is a generic subset of (Q[β])N over
N〈G[β]〉.
Definition 9.5. 1. We say that Q is [n]–symmetric if:
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if 〈η∗ℓ : ℓ < n〉 is generic for 〈Pℓ,Q
˜
ℓ
, η
˜
ℓ : ℓ < n〉 and σ is
a permutation of {0, . . . , n− 1}
then 〈ησ(ℓ) : ℓ < n〉 is generic for 〈Pℓ,Q
˜
ℓ
, η
˜
: ℓ < n〉.
2. If (Q′, η
˜
′), (Q′′, η
˜
′′) are as in 9.1, we say that they commute if:
if r′ is (Q′, η
˜
′)–generic over V and r′′ is (Q′′, η
˜
′′)–generic
over V[r′]
then r′ is (Q′, η
˜
′)–generic over V[r′′]
(note that η′′ is (Q′′, η
˜
′′)–generic over V is always true by 7.6).
3. For (Q′, η
˜
′), (Q′′, η
˜
′′) we say that they weakly commute if (Q′ |` (≥
q′), η
˜
′), (Q′′ |` (≥ q′′), η
˜
′′) commute for some q′ ∈ Q′ and q′′ ∈ Q′′.
Proposition 9.6. 1. “Commute” is a commutative relation.
2. For n ≥ 2 we have:
Q is [n]–symmetric iff
Q,Q[n−1] commute and Q is [n− 1]–symmetric iff
Q is [2]-symmetric.
3. If P,Q[n] commute, m ≤ n then P,Q[m] commute. Similarly, if P,Q
commute and Q′ <◦ Q, the P,Q′ commute.
4. In part 3) we can replace [−] by 〈−〉.
5. If (Q′, η
˜
′), (Q′′, η
˜
′′) weakly commute and Q′,Q′′ are homogeneous, then
they commute.
Proof 1) Let (Q′, η
˜
′), (Q′′, η
˜
′′) be as in 9.1. Then “(Q′, η
˜
′), (Q′′, η
˜
′′)
commute” says Q′ ∗Q
˜
′′ = Q′′ ∗Q
˜
′, which is symmetric.
2) For the second “iff”, use “the permutations πℓ = (ℓ, ℓ + 1) for ℓ < n
generate the group of permutations of {0, . . . , n− 1}”. 9.6
Proposition 9.7. 1. If Q[ω] and Cohen do not commute, then for some
n < ω, Q[n] and Cohen do not commute.
(The inverse holds by 9.6(3), second phrase.)
2. If Q〈ω〉 and Cohen do not commute, then for some n < ω, Q〈n〉 and
Cohen do not commute.
Proof 1) Since Cohen and Q[ω] do not commute, there is a Q[ω]–name
I
˜
of a dense open subset of Cohen (i.e. of (ω>2,⊳)) such that for some
condition (p, q
˜
) ∈ Cohen ∗Q
˜
[ω] we have
(p, q
˜
) ⊢ “ η
˜
Cohen has no initial segment in I
˜
”.
Without loss of generality for some n∗ < ω we have p ⊢Cohen“Dom(q
˜
) ⊆
{0, . . . , n∗ − 1}”. Let I
˜
′ be the Q[n
∗]–name for the following set:
{η ∈ ω>2 : for some p ∈ Q[ω], p |`n∗ ∈ G
˜ Q
[n∗] and p ⊢Q[ω] “η ∈ I˜
”}.
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It should be clear that ⊢Q[n∗]“I˜
′ is a dense open subset of (ω>2,⊳)”. Now
we ask the following question.
Does (p, q
˜
) ⊢Cohen∗Q
˜
[n∗]“ η
˜
Cohen |`n /∈ I
˜
for each n < ω ”?
If yes, we have gotten the desired conclusion (i.e. Cohen and Q
˜
[n∗] do not
commute). If not, for some (p′, q
˜
′) such that (p, q
˜
) ≤ (p′, q
˜
′) ∈ Cohen ∗Q
˜
[n∗]
and for some n < ω we have:
(p′, q
˜
′) ⊢Cohen∗Q
˜
[n∗] “ η
˜
Cohen |`n = η ∈ I
˜
′ ”.
Without loss of generality, for some p ∈ (Q[ω])V we have (p′, q′) ⊢“p |`n∗ ∈
GCohen∗Q
˜
[n∗]” and p ⊢“η ∈ I
˜
”. Then (p′, q′ ∪ p |` [n∗, ω)) forces (in Cohen ∗
Q
˜
[ω]) that η
˜
Cohen |`n = η ∈ I
˜
, a contradiction.
2) Similarly. 9.7
Proposition 9.8. 1. If Q[n] and Cohen do not commute (Q as before),
then Q and Cohen do not commute (both “absolute”).
2. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) Q commutes with Cohen,
(ii) ⊢Q“(ω2)V is not meagre”,
(iii) (∀A)[V |=“A ⊆ ω2 non-meagre” ⇒ ⊢Q“A is non-meagre”]
(all “absolutely”, i.e. not only in the present universe but in its generic
extensions too).
3. We can replace Cohen by others to which 8.8 applies and are homoge-
neous (see 8.5).
Proof 1) Assume toward contradiction that Q and Cohen commute
(absolutely). Let η ∈ ω2 be a Cohen real over V. Let Gℓ ⊆ QV[G0,... ,Gℓ−1,η]
be generic over V[G0, . . . , Gℓ−1, η] for ℓ < n, and let ηℓ = η
˜
[Gℓ]. We
now prove by induction on ℓ, that η is a Cohen real over V[G0, . . . , Gℓ−1].
The induction step is by the assumption “Q and Cohen commute”. The
net result is that η is a Cohen real over V[η0, . . . , ηn−1], contradicting the
assumption.
2) The second clause implies the third by 8.8. The third clause implies
the second trivially.
Let us argue that the implication (i) ⇒ (ii) holds. Add ℵ1 Cohen reals
{ηi : i < ω1} and then force by Q. Let GQ ⊆ QV[〈ηi:i<ω1〉] be generic over
V, and η
˜
= η
˜
Q[GQ]. Then (i) implies that for every j < ω1 we have: ηj is
Cohen over V[〈ηi : i < ω1, i 6= j〉, η]. Hence in V[〈ηi : i < ω1〉, η] = V[〈ηi :
i < ω1〉][GQ], the set {ηi : i < ω1} is not meagre and consequently (ii) holds.
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Lastly, assume (iii) and let ν ∈ ω|Q| be generic for Levy(ℵ0, |Q|). Let η
be (Q, η
˜
)–generic real over V[ν]. By (ii), we can find in V[ν] a real ρ ∈ ω2
which is in no meagre set from V[η] (note that there are countably many
such meagre sets from the point of view of V[ν]). Now we easily finish.
3) Same proof. 9.8
9. Poor Cohen commutes only with himself.
Definition 10.1. 1. We say a Q–name x
˜
of a subset of some countable
a∗ ∈ V is [somewhere] essentially Cohen if B2(Q, x
˜
) is [somewhere]
essentially countable; i.e. [above some p] has countable density.
2. We say (Q, η
˜
) ∈ K¬c (a non-Cohen pair) if:
(a) (Q, η
˜
) is as in 9.2,
(b) (Q, η
˜
) (see Definition 7.5) is nowhere essentially Cohen (i.e. above
every condition).
Hypothesis 10.2. χ is regular large enough cardinal, and (Q, η
˜
) ∈ K¬c will
be fixed as in 10.1, and ZFC−∗ is normal (see Definition 2.11).
Definition 10.3. 1. D = D≤ℵ0(H(χ)) is the filter of clubs on [H(χ)]
≤ℵ0 .
2. C0 = {a : a ≺ (H(χ),∈) is countable, and (Q, η
˜
) ∈ a (i.e. their defini-
tions) so is a Q–candidate}.
Definition 10.4. We say that q ∈ Q is strong on a ∈ C0 if:
(⊛)a,q the set {p ∈ a ∩Q: p, q are incompatible in Q} is dense in the (quasi)
order Q ∩ a.
Proposition 10.5. 1. For every a ∈ C0 there is q ∈ Q which is strong
on a.
2. Moreover, for every p ∈ Q and a ∈ C0 there is q strong on a such that
p ≤Q q.
Proof Clearly G
˜
Q ∩ a is a Q–name of a countable subset of an old set
Q ∩ a, so it can be considered as a real. Note that
(∗)1 G
˜
Q ∩ a is not somewhere essentially Cohen.
Why? We can restrict ourselves to be above some fix p ∈ Q. From G
˜
Q ∩ a
we can compute η
˜
(as η
˜
∈ a, i.e. the relevant maximal antichains belong to
a), so η
˜
can be considered a B2[Q, G
˜
Q ∩ a]–name. But “any (name of) a
real in an essentially Cohen forcing notion is essentially Cohen itself”, so η
˜is essentially Cohen Q–name, contradicting Hypothesis 10.2.
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Consequently, ⊢Q“G
˜
Q ∩ a is not a generic subset of Q |` a (over V)” and
hence p ⊢Q“G
˜
Q ∩ a is not a generic subset of Q |` a (over V)”. Thus there
are q and I such that:
(i) p ≤ q ∈ Q,
(ii) I ⊆ Q ∩ a is a dense open subset of Q |` a,
(iii) q ⊢Q“G
˜
Q is disjoint to I”.
But this means that
(∗)2 q is incompatible with every r ∈ I.
[Why? Otherwise q 6 ⊢Q“r /∈ G
˜
Q”.]
So {r ∈ a ∩ Q : q, r incompatible (in Q)} is a subset of Q ∩ a including I
hence it is dense in Q |` a. 10.5
Choice 10.6. We choose p¯ = 〈pa : a ∈ C0〉 such that pa ∈ Q is strong on a
(possible by 10.5).
Definition 10.7. 1. For R ⊆ Q let A[R]
def
= {a ∈ C0 : pa ∈ R}.
2. Dp¯ = DQ,p¯
def
= {R ⊆ Q : A[R] ∈ D}.
The family of Dp¯–positive sets will be denoted D
+
p¯ (so for a set S ⊆ Q,
S ∈ D+p¯ iff R ∩ S 6= ∅ for each R ∈ Dp¯).
3. For R ⊆ Q and q ∈ Q let R[q]
def
= {p ∈ R : p, q are incompatible in Q}
(so R[q] is in a sense the orthogonal complement of q inside R).
Fact 10.8. 1. Dp¯ is an ℵ1–complete filter on Q.
2. For R ⊆ Q we have R ∈ D+p¯ ⇔ A[R] ∈ D
+.
Proposition 10.9. If R ∈ D+p¯ then the set
R⊗
def
= {q ∈ Q : R[q] ∈ D+p¯ }
is dense in Q.
Proof Assume not, so for some q∗ ∈ Q we have
(∗)1 there is no q ∈ Q such that q∗ ≤ q ∈ Q & R[q] ∈ D
+
p¯ .
Thus
q∗ ≤ q ∈ Q ⇒ R[q] = ∅ mod Dp¯ ⇒ A[R[q]] = ∅ mod D
⇒ for some club Cq ⊆ C0 of [H(χ)]≤ℵ0 we have
(∀a ∈ Cq)[pa /∈ R[q], i.e. pa, q are compatible].
Let C∗ = {a ∈ C0 : q∗ ∈ a and (∀q)[q∗ ≤ q ∈ a ∩ Q ⇒ a ∈ Cq]}. As each
Cq is a club of [H(χ)]≤ℵ0 clearly C∗ (as a diagonal intersection) is a club of
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[H(χ)]≤ℵ0 , i.e. C∗ ∈ D. Since R ∈ D+p¯ we have A[R] ∈ D
+, so together with
the previous sentence we know that there is a∗ ∈ A[R] ∩ C∗. By the choice
of p¯ (see 10.6, and Definition 10.4) as q∗ ∈ a∗ ∩Q (see the choice of C∗) for
some q we have:
q∗ ≤ q ∈ a∗ and pa∗ , q are incompatible.
Now this contradicts “a∗ ∈ Cq”. 10.10
Definition 10.10. Assume χ1 = (2
χ)+ (so H(χ) ∈ H(χ1)) and N is a
countable elementary submodel of (H(χ1),∈) to which {χ,Q, p¯} belong (so
Dp¯ ∈ N). Further, assume that Q is snep.
1. We let CohenN = CohenN,Q be (D
+
Q,p¯,⊇) |`N (so this is a countable
atomless forcing notion and hence equivalent to Cohen forcing).
2. IfGN ∈ Gen(N,D
+
Q,p¯)
def
= {G : G ⊆ CohenN is generic for (N, (D
+
Q,p¯,⊇
) |`N)} (possibly in a universe V′ extending V) then let p
˜
N [G] be the
sequence (i.e. in ωω or just member of ωθ(Q)) such that for each ℓ < ω
and γ
(p
˜
N [GN ])(ℓ) = γ ⇔ (∃R ∈ G)(∀p ∈ R)[p(ℓ) = γ].
Proposition 10.11. Assume 9.2 and, additionally, Q is Souslin c.c.c. (i.e.
the incompatibility relation is Σ11). If χ1, N and G ∈ Gen(N,D
+
Q) are as
in 10.10 (so G is possibly in some generic extension V1 of V but CohenN
is from V) then
(a) p
˜
N [G] is an ω–sequence (i.e. for each ℓ there is one and only one γ),
(b) p
˜
N [G] ∈ Q,
(c) p
˜
N [G] is strong for N |` H(χ) (which belongs to C0).
Proof For every p ∈ Q there is νp ∈ ωω which witnesses p ∈ Q, i.e.
p ∗ νp ∈ lim(T
Q
0 ). So choose such a function p 7→ νp. Now in V, for n < ω
the function pa 7→ (pa |`n, νpa |`n) is a mapping from {pa : a ∈ C0} ∈ Dp¯ with
countable range. Since Dp¯ is ℵ1–complete
(∗)1 in V, if R ∈ D
+
p¯ and n < ω then for some R
′ ⊆ R and (ηn, νn) we have
R′ ∈ D+p¯ and (∀p ∈ R
′)[(p |`n, νp |`n) = (η
n, νn)].
This is inherited by N , hence p
˜
N [G] satisfies clauses (a), (b) (in fact
ν
˜
[G] =
⋃
{ν∗ : for some n < ω and R ∈ G we have (∀p ∈ R)[νp |`n = ν
∗]}
is a witness for p
˜
N [G] ∈ Q). Also for each q ∈ Q ∩N the set
Jq =
{
R ∈ D+p¯ : for some q
′ ∈ Q stronger than q we have:
(∀p ∈ R)[p, q′ are incompatible (in Q)]
}
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is a dense subset of (D+p¯ ,⊇) (remember pa is strong on a; use Fodor lemma).
Clearly it belongs to N , so by the demand on G we know that G ∩ Jq 6= ∅.
Choose Rq ∈ G ∩ Jq and let q′ ∈ Q ∩N witness it, so
Rq ∈ D
+
p¯ ∩N and (∀p ∈ Rq)[p, q
′ are incompatible].
Now “incompatible in Q” is a Σ11–relation (belonging to N) hence as above,
p
˜
N [G], q
′ are incompatible. As q was any member of Q∩N we have finished
proving clause (c). 10.11
Proposition 10.12. Assume 9.2 and let Q be Souslin c.c.c. Then Q[ω] (see
9.3) and Cohen do not commute.
Proof Assume that Q[ω] and Cohen do commute. Let χ be large enough,
N ≺ (H(χ),∈) be countable such that (Q, η
˜
) ∈ N (as in 10.10). Now we
can interpret a Cohen real ν (over V) as a subset of D+p¯ ∩N called gν . Thus
it is CohenN,Q–generic over V so p
˜
N [gν ] is well defined, and it belongs to
QV[ν] (by 10.11). Moreover, in V[ν] we have:
{q ∈ QN : q, p
˜
N (gη) are incompatible } is dense in Q
N .
Let 〈ηℓ : ℓ < ω〉 be generic for (Q[ω], η
˜
[ω]) and let ν be Cohen generic over
V[〈ηℓ : ℓ < ω〉]. For each ℓ, clearly ηℓ is (Q, η
˜
)–generic over V, so let
ηℓ = η
˜
[Gℓ], where Gℓ ⊆ Q is generic over V. Clearly Gℓ ∩ N is a subset
of QN generic over V (by “Q is strongly c.c.c.”). So 〈Gℓ ∩ N, gν〉 is a
subset of QN ∗ (D+p¯ ∩ N,⊇) generic over N . By 10.11, for any q ∈ Q
N
and R ∈ (D+p¯ ∩ N), for some R
′ ⊆ R and q′ we have R′ ∈ (D+p¯ ∩ N),
N |=“q ≤ q′ ∈ Q” and
N |= (∀a ∈ R′)(pa, q
′ are incompatible).
So look at the set
{(q,R) ∈ QN × (D+p¯ ∩N) : (∀a ∈ R
′)(pa, q are incompatible)}
– there is (q,R) ∈ (G∩N)× gν which belongs to it. Hence, as in 10.11, for
each ℓ, p
˜
N [gν ] is incompatible with some q ∈ GQ[ηℓ].
By the assumption that the forcing notions commute we know that 〈ηℓ :
ℓ < ω〉 is generic for (Q[ω], η
˜
[ω]) over V(ν). Necessarily (by FS + genericity)
for some ℓ we have F
ω,{ℓ}
Q (p
˜
N (gη)) ∈ GQ[〈ηℓ : ℓ < ω〉]; a contradiction. 10.12
Conclusion 10.13. Assume 9.2 and let Q be Souslin c.c.c. Then (Q, η
˜
) does
not commute with Cohen (even above any q ∈ Q).
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Proof If we restrict ourselves above q0 ∈ Q, the Hypothesis 10.2 still
holds so we can ignore this. By 10.12 we have (Q[ω], η
˜
[ω]) does not com-
mute with Cohen. So by 9.7 we have that, for some n, (Q[n], η
˜
[n]) does not
commute with Cohen and by 9.8 we finish. 10.13
Proposition 10.14. If Q is Souslin c.c.c. then for suitable ZFC−∗ , Q sat-
isfies 9.2.
Proof Let ρ ∈ ω2 be the real parameter in the definition of Q. Let
ZFC−∗ say:
(a) ZC (i.e. the axioms of Zermelo satisfied by (H(iω),∈)),
(b) Q (defined from ρ which is an individual constant) satisfies the c.c.c.
(c) for each n < ω, generic extensions for forcing notions of cardinality
≤ iω preserve (b) (and, of course (a)).
Now the desired properties are easy. 10.14
Conclusion 10.15. If Q is a Souslin c.c.c. forcing notion which is not ωω–
bounding (say p ⊢“ there is an unbounded η
˜
∈ ωω ”), but adds an essentially
non-Cohen real then Q does not commute with itself.
Proof By [20], Q adds a Cohen real; now by the assumptions, for some
Q–name η
˜
, (Q, η
˜
) ∈ K¬c. By 10.13 we know that Q and Cohen do not
commute, so by 9.6(3) we are done. 10.15
Conclusion 10.16. If Q is a Souslin c.c.c. forcing notion adding a non-Cohen
real, then the forcing by Q makes the old reals meagre.
10. Some c.c.c. nep forcing notions are not nice. We may wonder
can we replace the assumption “Q is Souslin c.c.c.” by weaker one in §8 and
in [20]. We review limitations and then see how much we can weaken it.
Proposition 11.1. Assume that η∗ ∈ ω2 and ℵ1 = ℵ
L[η∗]
1 . Then there is a
definition of a forcing notion Q (i.e. ϕ¯) such that
(a) the definition is Σ11 (with parameter η
∗), so p ∈ Q, p ≤Q q, “p, q
incompatible”, “{pn : n < ω} ⊆ a is a maximal antichain of Q” are
preserved by forcing extensions,
(b) Q is c.c.c. (even in a forcing extension; even σ–centered),
(c) there is Q–name η
˜
of a generic for Q,
(d) η
˜
is not essentially Cohen (preserved by extensions not collapsing ℵ1),
in fact has cardinality ℵ1,
(e) Q commutes with Cohen,
(f) Q is nep (though not Souslin c.c.c.).
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Proof A condition p in Q is a quadruple 〈Ep,Xp, up, wp〉 consisting of:
a 2-place relation Ep on ω and subset Xp of ω and a finite subset up of Xp
and a finite subset wp of ω such that:
Np
def
= (ω,Ep) is a model of ZFC
− +V = L (let <
Np
∗ be the
canonical ordering of Np, we do not require well foundedness)
such that:
(Np,Xp) |= “ (α) every x ∈ Xp is an infinite subset of ω,
(β) if x 6= y are from Xp then x ∩ y is finite,
(γ) if x ∈ X then there is no y satisfying
y <
Np
∗ x & (∀z ∈ Xp)(z <
Np
∗ x⇒ z ∩ y finite) & y an infinite subset of ω,
(δ)
∧
n<ω
(∀z1 . . . zn ∈ Xp)
( n∧
ℓ=1
zℓ <
Np
∗ x⇒ (∃∞m < ω)(m /∈ x ∪
n⋃
ℓ=1
zℓ
)
”.
The order is defined by: p ≤ q if and only if one of the following occurs:
(A) p = q,
(B) there are Y ⊆ ω and a ∈ Nq and f ∈ Y ω such that:
(i) [x ∈ Y & Np |= y ∈ x] ⇒ y ∈ Y ,
(ii) [Np |=“rk(x) = y”, y ∈ Y ] ⇒ x ∈ Y ,
(iii) Np |`Y is a model of (ZFC
− +V = L),
(iv) the set {x : Np |=“x an ordinal”, x /∈ Y } has no first element,
(v) Nq |=“a is a transitive set”,
(vi) f is an isomorphism from Np |`Y onto Nq |` {b : Nq |= b ∈ a},
(vii) f maps Xp onto Xq |`Rang(f),
(viii) f maps up ∩ Y into uq ∩Rang(f),
(ix) wp ⊆ wq,
(x) if n ∈ wq\wp and x ∈ f(up) then Nq |=“the n-th natural number
does not belong to x”.
The reader can now check (note that w
˜
=
⋃
{wp : p ∈ G
˜
Q} is forced to be
an infinite subset of ω almost disjoint to every A ∈ X∗, X∗ a reasonably
defined MAD family in L); see more details in the proof of 11.3. 11.1
Proposition 11.2. Assume V = L. There is Q = Q0 ∗Q
˜
1
such that:
(a) Q0 is nep c.c.c. not adding a dominating real,
(b) ⊢Q0“Q
˜
1
is nep c.c.c. (even Souslin c.c.c.) not adding a dominating
real”,
(c) Q adds a dominating real,
(d) in fact, bQ0 is the Cohen forcing (so in any V1 it is c.c.c. strongly
c.c.c., correct, very simple nep (and snep), and it is really absolute,
i.e. it is the same in V1 and V, and its definition uses no parameters),
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(e) moreover, Q1 is defined in L, really absolute, and in any V1 it is c.c.c.,
strongly c.c.c. nep (and even snep). In V1, Q1 adds a dominating real
iff (ωω)L is a dominating family in V1.
Proof Let Q0 be Cohen. We shall define Q1 in a similar manner as Q
in the proof of 11.1.
A condition in Q
˜
1
is a triple 〈Ep, up, wp〉 such that Ep is a 2-place relation
on ω, up is a finite subset of ω and wp is a finite function from a subset of
ω to ω and:
Np
def
= (ω,Ep) is a model of ZFC
− +V = L (let <
Np
∗ be the
canonical ordering of Np, we do not require well founded-
ness); so in formulas we use ∈.
[What is the intended meaning of a condition p? Let
Mp = Np |` {x : (Tc(x)
Np , Ep |`Tc(x)
Np) is well founded},
where Tc(x) is the transitive closure of x. LetM ′p be the Mostowski collapse
of Mp, hp : Mp −→ M ′p be the isomorphism. Now, p gives us information
on the function w
˜
=
⋃
{wp : p ∈ G
˜
} from ω to ω, it says: w
˜
extends the
function wp and if x ∈ Mp ∩ up is a function from ω to ω then for every
natural number n /∈ Dom(wp) we have x(n) ≤ w
˜
(n). Note that hp(x) is a
function from ω to ω iff Mp |=“ x is a function from ω to ω ” iff Np |=“ x
is a function from ω to ω ”.]
The order is defined by: p ≤ q if and only if one of the following occurs:
(A) p = q,
(B) there are Y ⊆ ω and a ∈ Nq and f ∈ Y ω such that
(i) [x ∈ Y & Np |= y ∈ x] ⇒ y ∈ Y ,
(ii) [Np |=“rk(x) = y” & y ∈ Y ] ⇒ x ∈ Y ,
(iii) Np |`Y is a model of (ZFC
− +V = L),
(iv) the set {x : Np |= “x an ordinal”, x /∈ Y } has no first element (by
Ep),
(v) Nq |=“a is a transitive set”,
(vi) f is an isomorphism from Np |`Y onto Nq |` {b : Nq |= b ∈ a},
(vii) f maps up ∩ Y into uq ∩Rang(f),
(viii) wp ⊆ wq,
(ix) if n ∈ Dom(wq)\Dom(wp) and x ∈ up, Np |=“x is a function from
the natural numbers to the natural numbers” and x∗ = f(x) then
Nq |=“if y is the n-th natural number then wq(y) > x(y)”.
Clearly Q is equivalent to Q′ = (the Hechler forcing)L, just let us define,
for p ∈ Q1, g(p) = (wp, F p) where F p = {hp(x) : x ∈ Mp}. Now, g is onto
70 S. SHELAH
Q′ and
Q1 |= p ≤ q ⇒ Q′ |= g(p) ≤ g(q) ⇒
¬(∃p′)(p ≤Q p′ & p′, q are incompatible in Q).
The rest is left to the reader. 11.2
Proposition 11.3. 1. Assume that:
(a) ϕ¯ = (ϕ0(x), ϕ1(x, y)) defines, in any model of ZFC
−
∗ , a forcing
notion Qϕ¯ with parameters from Lω1,
(b) for every β < ω1 such that Lβ |= ZFC
−
∗ , for every x, y ∈ Lβ we
have:
[x ∈ Q
Lβ
ϕ¯ ⇔ x ∈ Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ ] and [x < y in Q
Lβ
ϕ¯ ⇔ x < y in Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ ],
(c) for unboundedly many α < ω1 we have Lα |= ZFC
−
∗ ,
(d) any two compatible members of Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ have a lub,
(e) like (c) for compatibility and for existence of lub.
Then there is an ℵ0–snep forcing notion Q equivalent to Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ : the Σ
1
1
(i.e. Souslin) relations have just the real parameters of ϕ¯.
2. We can use a real parameter ρ and replace Lα by Lα[ρ].
Proof It is similar to the proof of 11.1. Let Q be the set of quadruples
p = (Ep, np, α¯p, a¯p) such that:
(α) Ep is a two-place relation on ω,
(β) Np
def
= (ω,Ep) is a model of ZFC
−
∗ +V = L,
(γ) for some n = np we have
α¯p = 〈αp,ℓ : ℓ < n〉, a¯p = 〈ap,ℓ : ℓ < n〉,
(δ) Np |=“αp,ℓ is an ordinal, ap,ℓ ∈ Lαp,ℓ , Lαp,ℓ |= ZFC
−
∗ , and for k ≤ ℓ < n
we have Lαp,ℓ |= ϕ0(ap,k), αp,ℓ < αp,ℓ+1”, and
(ε) if m ≤ k ≤ ℓ < n then Np |=“ Lαp,ℓ |= ϕ1(ap, αm, ap,αk) ”.
The order is given by: p0 ≤Q p1 if and only if (p0, p1 ∈ Q and) for some
Y0, Y1 ⊆ ω and f we have:
(i) for ℓ = 0, 1: Yℓ is an Ep–transitive subset of Np,
(∀x ∈ Npℓ)(x ∈ Yℓ ≡ rk
Npℓ (x) ∈ Yℓ),
(ii) f is an isomorphism from Np0 |`Y0 onto Np1 |`Y1,
(iii) in {x ∈ Np0 : Np0“x is an ordinal} there is no Ep–minimal element,
(iv) f maps {αp0,ℓ : ℓ < n
∗} ∩ Y0 into {αp1,ℓ : ℓ < np1} ∩ Y1,
(v) if f(αp0,k) = αp1,m then Np1 |=“ Lαp1,m |= ϕ1(f(ap0,k), ap1,m) ”.
Claim 11.3.1. Q is a quasi order.
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Proof of the claim: Check.
Now define Mp, hp,M
′
p as in the proof of 11.2.
Claim 11.3.2. The set
Q′
def
= {p ∈ Q : Np is well founded, np > 0}
is dense in Q.
Proof of the claim: Check.
Define g : Q′ −→ Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ by g(p) = hp(ap,np−1).
Claim 11.3.3. g is really a function from Q′ onto Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ and
p0 ≤Q p1 ⇒ Q
Lω1
¯̟ |= g(p0) ≤ g(p1) ⇒
[if p1 ≤Q p2 then for some p3 we have p2 ≤Q p3 and p0 ≤Q p3].
Proof of the claim: The first implication is immediate (by clause (v) in
the definition of ≤Q. For the second implication assume Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ |= g(p0) ≤
g(p1) and let p1 ≤Q p2. For ℓ = 0, 1, 2 let
nℓ = min{n : n = np or n < npℓ and αpℓ,n /∈Mp}.
Let p3 be defined as follows: Mp = Lγ , Lγ |= ZFC
−
∗ , and γ > M
′
p0
∩ω1,M ′p1∩
ω1,M
′
p2
∩ ω1. Let g∗ℓ be the isomorphism from Mpℓ onto Lγℓ , γℓ < γ, and
let w = {fℓ(αpℓ,m) : m < nℓ, ℓ < 2}. List it as {αp3,k : k < np3} (increasing
enumeration) and let Υ = {fℓ(apℓ,m) : m < nℓ, ℓ < 2}. Now, f2(ap2,n2−1)
is a ≤
Q
Lω1
ϕ¯
–upper bound of Υ. Consequently, by clauses (d) and (e) of the
assumptions, we can define ap3,m as required. 11.3
Proposition 11.4. Assume that ϕ = ϕ(x, y) is such that
(i) ZFC−∗ ⊢ for every infinite cardinal x ∈ X
def
= {α : α = ω or ωα = α
(ordinal exponentiation) }, there is a unique Ax, an unbounded subset
of x of order type x such that ϕ(x,Ax), and ψ(·) defines a set S ⊆ X
not reflecting,
(ii) ZFC−∗ ⊢ if µ1 < µ2 are from X then Aµ1 * Aµ2 ,
(iii) ω1 = sup{α : Lα |= ZFC
−
∗ }, and the truth value of “β ∈ Aγ , β ∈ S”
is the same in Lα for every α < ω1 for which Lα |= ZFC
−
∗ ,
(iv) the set S, i.e. {β < ω1 : (∃α)(Lα |= ZFC
−
∗ & ψ(β))}, is a stationary
subset of ω1
[a kind of “ℵV1 is below first ineffable of L” and is not weakly com-
pact].
Then for some ϕ¯ as in the assumptions of 11.3, and η
˜
we have:
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(a) Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ is a c.c.c. forcing notion,
(b) η
˜
∈ ω2 is a generic real of Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ , and is nowhere essentially Cohen,
(c) Q
Lω1
ϕ¯ commute with Cohen.
Proof Let pr(α, β) = (α + β)(α + β) + α, it is a pairing function. By
coding, without loss of generality (e.g. letting
A′α = {pr
+(n, prn(β1, . . . , βn)) : n < ω, {β1, . . . , βn} ⊆ Bα},
where pr1(β) = β, prn+1(β1, . . . , βn+1) = pr(prn(β1, . . . , βn), βn+1))
(ii)′ if x, x1, . . . , xn are distinct cardinals in Lω1 , then Ax *
n⋃
ℓ=1
Axℓ .
For δ ∈ X let f0(δ) = min(X \ (δ + 1)) and let f1δ be the first (in the
canonical well ordering of L) one-to-one function from f0(δ) onto δ. Let Cδ
be the first club of δ disjoint to S. For α ∈ [ω, ω1), let δα = max(X ∩ δ)
and let
B∗α = {pr3(ε, ζ, ξ) : ε ∈ Cδα , ζ = f
1
δα
(α), ξ ∈ A′δα and ε > ζ, ε > ξ}.
Note that
(∗) B∗α is an unbounded subset of δα such that
(a) β ∈ S ∩ α ⇒ β > sup(B∗α ∩ β),
(b) if α1, . . . , αn ∈ [ω, ω1) \ {α} then Bα \
n⋃
ℓ=1
B∗αℓ is unbounded in δα.
[Why? For (a), suppose that β ∈ S ∩ α. Trivially, min(B∗α) > min(Cα), so
γ = sup(Cδα ∩ β) is well defined. Now,
B∗α ∩ β ⊆ {pr3(ε, ζ, ξ) : ε, ζ, ξ ≤ γ} ⊆ (γ + γ + γ)
3 < β
(the last inequality follows from the fact that β ∈ X). To show (b) suppose
that γ0 < δα and choose ξ ∈ B∗α \
n⋃
ℓ=1
B∗αℓ . Let ζ = f
1
δα
(α) and let ε ∈ Cδα
be large enough. So pr3(ε, ζ, ξ) ∈ B
∗
α (by definition) and pr3(ε, ζ, ξ) /∈ B
∗
αℓ
(use the third coordinate) and pr3(ε, ζ, ξ) > ε > γ0.]
Let Iα be the ideal of subsets of B
∗
α generated by
{B∗α ∩B
∗
β : ω ≤ β < ω1, β 6= α} ∪ {B
∗
α ∩ β : β < δα}.
Let Q be the set of finite functions p from ω1 \ ω to {0, 1, 2} ordered by:
p ≤ q if and only if:
if α ∈ Dom(p), β ∈ Dom(q) ∩Aα\Dom(p)
then q(β) = p(α) and β > sup(δα ∩Dom(p)) ∨ q(β = 2).
Claim 11.4.1. Q is a partial order.
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Claim 11.4.2. For each α ∈ [ω, ω1) the set Iα = {p : α ∈ Dom(p)} is
dense in Q.
Proof of the claim: Let p ∈ Q and suppose that α /∈ Dom(p). Let
q = p ∪ {〈α, 2〉}.
Let f
˜
be the Q–name defined by ⊢ f
˜
=
⋃
G
˜
Q.
Claim 11.4.3. For α ∈ [ω,α),
⊢Q “ for some ℓ < 3, for any m < 3 we have
{β ∈ B∗α : f
˜
(β) = m} 6= ∅ mod Iα iff m ∈ {′, ℓ} ”.
Proof of the claim: Take p ∈ G
˜
Q such that α ∈ Dom(p) and let
B =
⋃
{B∗α ∩B
∗
γ : γ ∈ Dom(p) \ {α}},
so B ∈ Iα. Clearly, p ⊢“ if β ∈ B∗α \B then f
˜
(β) ∈ {2, p(α)} ”, hence
p ⊢Q “ if m ∈ {0, 1, 2} \ {2, p(α)} then m /∈ Rang(f
˜
|` (B∗α \B)) ”.
Now, if B′ ∈ Iα, and p ≤Q q then there is γ ∈ Aα \ B′ \
⋃
{B∗γ : γ ∈
Dom(p) \ {α}} such that q ∪ {〈γ, 2〉} and q ∪ {〈γ, p(α)〉} are in Q above q.
Reflecting we are done.
Claim 11.4.4. One can define f
˜
from f
˜
|`ω ∈ ω3.
Proof of the claim: Define f
˜
|`α by induction on α ∈ X using 11.4.3.
Claim 11.4.5. The forcing notion Q is nowhere essentially Cohen.
Proof of the claim: For every α∗ < ω1 and for every large enough γ < ω1
and for ℓ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the condition qℓ = {〈γ, ℓ〉} is compatible with every
q ∈ Q such that Dom(p) ⊆ α∗.
Claim 11.4.6. The Q–name f
˜
(for a real) is nowhere essentially Cohen.
Proof of the claim: By 11.4.4, 11.4.5.
Claim 11.4.7. The forcing notion Q satisfies the demands in 11.4.
Proof of the claim: Check.
Claim 11.4.8. The forcing notion Q satisfies the c.c.c.
Proof of the claim: Use “S ⊆ ω1 is stationary”. 11.4
Remark 11.5. 1. Of course, such forcing can make ℵ1 to be ℵ
L[η]
1 . But it
seems that we can have such forcing which preserves the Lω1–cardinals
(and even their being “large” in suitable senses). For this it should be
like “coding the universe by a real” of Jensen Beller Welch [1], and see
Shelah Stanley [21].
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2. Instead of coding ℵ1–Cohen we can iterate adding dominating reals or
whatever.
Definition 11.6. 1. We say that forcing notions Q0,Q1 are equivalent if
their completions to Boolean algebras (BA(Q0),BA(Q1)) are isomor-
phic.
2. Forcing notions Q0,Q1 are locally equivalent if
(i) for each p0 ∈ Q0 there are q0, q1 such that
p0 ≤ q0 ∈ Q0 & q1 ∈ Q1 & BA(Q0 |` (≥ q0)) ∼= BA(Q1 |` (≥ q1)),
(ii) for every p1 ∈ Q1 there are q0, q1 such that
q0 ∈ Q0 & p1 ≤ q1 ∈ Q1 & BA(Q0 |` (≥ q0)) ∼= BA(Q1 |` (≥ q1)).
Now we may phrase the conclusions of 11.3, 11.4.
Proposition 11.7. 1. Assume ϕ¯1 = 〈ϕ10, ϕ
1
1〉 and ϕ¯
2
2 = 〈ϕ
2
0, ϕ
2
1〉 are as
in 11.3. Then we can find ϕ¯33 as there, only with the parameters of
ϕ¯, ϕ¯2 and such that:
(a) if in Lω1 there is a last cardinal µ (i.e. ℵ
V
1 is a successor cardinal
in L), then Q
Lω1
ϕ¯3 is locally equivalent to⋃
{QLαϕ¯1 : µ < α, Lα |= µ is the last cardinal},
(b) if in Lω1 there is no last cardinal (i.e. ℵ
V
1 is a limit cardinal in
L), then Q
Lω1
ϕ¯3 is locally equivalent to⋃
{QLω,α
ϕ¯12
: Lω1 |= α a cardinal}.
2. In 11.3, 11.4(1) we can replace Lω1 by Lω1 [η
∗], η∗ ∈ ωω.
3. In 11.3, 11.4(1) we can replace Lω1 byLω1 [A] where A ⊆ ω1 but have
ℵ1-snep instead of ℵ0-snep.
Proof Let ϕ3,0(x) say
(i) x = 〈α¯x, β¯x, a¯x, b¯x〉, α¯x = 〈αxℓ : ℓ ≤ n
x〉, 〈〈βxℓ,k : k ≤ k
x
ℓ 〉 : ℓ ≤ n
x〉,
a¯x = 〈〈axℓ,k : k ≤ k
x
ℓ 〉 : ℓ < n
x〉, a¯x = 〈axℓ : ℓ ≤ n
x〉, b¯x = 〈bxℓ : ℓ < n
x〉,
(ii) αxℓ < β
x
ℓ,0 < β
x
ℓ,1 . . . , Lβxℓ |=“α
ℓ
x the last cardinal”,
(iii) Lβx
ℓ
|=“ϕ1,0(bxℓ )”, Lαxℓ+1 |=“ϕ2,0(a
x
ℓ )” for ℓ < n
x,
(iv) Lβx
nx
|=“αxℓ is a cardinal”,
(v) Lαx
ℓ+1
|=“ϕ21(a
x
ℓ , a
x
ℓ+1)”.
Let β(x) = x. Let ϕ3,1(x, y) say:
(α) βxnx ≤ β
y
ny ,
(β) {αxℓ : ℓ ≤ n
x and Lβyy |=“α
x
ℓ is a cardinal”} is a subset of {α
y
ℓ : ℓ ≤ n
y},
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(γ) if αx
ℓ(∗) is maximal in {α
x
ℓ : ℓ < n
x,Lβy
ny
|=“αxℓ is a cardinal”} then
α¯x |` ℓ(∗) = α¯y |` ℓ(x), β¯x |` ℓ(∗) = β¯y |` ℓ(∗), a¯x |` ℓ(∗) = a¯y |` ℓ(∗), b¯x |` ℓ(∗) =
b¯y |` ℓ(∗),
(δ) αx
ℓ(∗) = α
y
ℓ(∗),
(ε) βx
ℓ(∗) ≤ β
y
ℓ(∗) and Lβyℓ(∗)
|= ϕ10,1(b
x
ℓ(∗), b
y
ℓ(∗)).
Now check. 11.7
11. Preservation of “no dominating real”. The main result of §7:
(for homogeneous c.c.c. Q) if a nep forcing P preserves (ωω)V ∈ (Iex(Q,η
˜
))
+
then it preserves X ∈ (Iex(Q,η
˜
))
+ (see 8.8) is a case of the following
Thesis 12.1. Nep forcing notions do not discern sets X ⊆ ωω built by
diagonalization, say between X,Y ⊆ ωω which are generic enough.
But there are interesting cases not covered by 8.8, most prominent is:
Question 12.2. If a nep forcing notion preserves “F ⊆ ωω is unbounded”
for some (unbounded) F ⊆ ωω then does it preserve this for every (un-
bounded) F ′ ⊆ ωω?
Definition 12.3. 1. For a Borel 2-place relation R on ωω let IR be the
ℵ1–complete ideal on ωω generated by the sets of the form Aν = {η ∈
ωω : ¬(ηRν)}.
2. We say that ν is R–generic over N if η ∈ N ∩ ωω ⇒ ηRν.
3. A forcing notion P is weaklyR–preserving if for any η0, η1, . . . , ηn, . . . ∈
(ωω)V
P
there is ν ∈ (ωω)V such that n < ω ⇒ ηnRν (i.e. ⊢P (ωω)V ∈
I+R).
4. We say that a forcing notion P is R–preserving if for any Borel subset
B of ωω from V which is in I+R, for any η0, η1, . . . , ηn, . . . ∈ (
ωω)V
P
there is ν ∈ BV such that n < ω ⇒ ηnRν (i.e. ⊢P BV ∈ I
+
R).
5. We say that a forcing notion P is strongly R–preserving if for any
X ∈ I+R (in V) we have ⊢P“X ∈ I
+
R”.
6. We say that a forcing notion P is super R–preserving as witnessed by
(B,ZFC−∗∗) if
(a) every (B,ZFC−∗ )–candidate is a P–candidate,
(b) for any (B,ZFC−∗∗)–candidate N such that p ∈ N and for any
ν ∈ ωω which is R–generic over N , there is q such that p ≤P q ∈ P,
q is 〈N,P〉–generic and q ⊢“ν is R–generic over N〈G
˜
P〉 = N〈G
˜
P ∩
PN 〉”.
76 S. SHELAH
Proposition 12.4. 1. If P is super R–preserving, then P is strongly R–
preserving (also for P nep).
2. If P is strongly R–preserving, then P is R–preserving.
3. If P is R–preserving, then it is weakly R–preserving.
Proof Easy.
Proposition 12.5. A sufficient condition for “P is super R–preserving as
witnessed by (B,ZFC−∗∗)” is that for some nep forcing notion Q and hc–Q-
name η
˜
∗ and a Borel relation R1 we have
(α) every (B,ZFC−∗∗)–candidate is a Q–candidate and η
˜
∗ ∈ N and also it
is a P–candidate,
(β) if N is a (B,ZFC−∗∗)–candidate (so countable) and ν is R–generic over
N then for some GQ ⊆ QN generic over N , in V we have
(∀x)(x R1 η
˜
∗[GQ]) ⇒ x R1 ν)
and for every GQ ⊆ QN , generic over N , and p ∈ PN there is q such
that p ≤ q ∈ P and q is (N,P)–generic and
q ⊢P “ η
˜
∗[GQ] is R1–generic over N〈GP ∩ P
N 〉 ”.
Proof Straight.
Remark 12.6. In 12.7 below we phrase a sufficient condition. Note that
clause (δ) can be naturally phrased as “an appropriate sentence ψ fol-
lows from ZFC−∗∗; this is slightly stronger as possibly ψ holds only for all
(B,ZFC−∗∗)–candidates but not for some (e.g. non-well founded) models of
ZFC−∗∗ (this does not matter).
Proposition 12.7. Assume that:
(α) P,Q are nep forcing notions, η
˜
∗ is a hc–Q–name, R,R1 are Borel
relations,
(β) every (B,ZFC−∗∗)–candidate N is a Q–candidate and P-candidate, η
˜
∗ ∈
N ,
(γ) for every (B,ZFC−∗∗)–candidate N and ν ∈
ωω which is R–generic
over N and r ∈ QN we can find GQ ⊆ QN generic over N such that
r ∈ GQ and (∀x)(x R ν ⇒ x R1 η
˜
∗[GQ]),
(δ) if N is a (B,ZFC−∗∗)–candidate then for every GQ ⊆ Q
N generic over
N and GR ⊆ Levy(ℵ0, 2|P| + 2|Q|)N generic over N [GQ] we have
N [GQ][GR] |=“ there are GQ and q, p ≤ q ∈ P such that q is ex-
plicitly (N,P)–generic and GQ is a generic over N subset of QN and
q ⊢P“η
˜
∗[GQ] is R1–generic over N [GQ, G
˜
P]”.
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Then “P is super R–preserving as witnessed by ZFC−∗∗” .
Proof Clause (α) of 12.5 holds by clause (β) here. Next, the first
demand in clause 12.5(β) (“for some GQ ⊆ QN generic over N”) follows
from clause (γ) of 12.7. Finally, suppose that GQ ⊆ QN is generic over N ,
equivalently, ν∗ is a Q–generic real. Let G ⊆ Levy(ℵ0, |2P|N ) be generic
over N , equivalently over N [ν∗]. In N , by clause (e) of the assumptions, in
N [G], there is a semi P–candidate M , P(PN )N = P(PM )M . So in N [G],
M [G] is a P–candidate. So there is q ∈ PN [G] such that N [G] |=“p ≤ q and
q is (M,PM )–generic”. As above possibly increasing q,
(⊛) N [G] |= [q ⊢P“ ν is R–generic over M [G
˜
P] ” and ν is Cohen over M ].
So for some ν
˜
,
N |= “ ν
˜
, q
˜
are Levy(ℵ0, |2(P)|N )–names of a Cohen real and
a member of P, respectively, and some r ∈ Levy(ℵ0, (|2|P||)N )
forces the statement (⊛) above on q
˜
, ν
˜
”.
Now we can find G′ ⊆ Levy(ℵ0, (2|P|)N ) generic over N to which r belongs
and ν
˜
[G′] =∗ ν (i.e. they are equal except for finitely many coordinates).
Let q′ ∈ P be ≥ q
˜
[G′] and be (N〈G′〉,PN〈G
′〉)–generic, so we are done. 12.7
Theorem 12.8. Assume that:
(a) R is: fRg iff g is non-decreasing and (∃∞n)(f(n) > g(n));
R1 is: fR1g iff (∃∞n)(f(n) > max{g(m) : m ≤ n}),
(b) Q = ({η ∈ ω>ω : η non-decreasing}), η
˜
∗ is the generic real
⋃
G
˜
Q (so
really Q is the Cohen forcing),
(c) P is nep,
(d) every (B,ZFC−∗∗)–candidate N is a P–candidate (and easily it is a Q–
candidate),
(e) ZFC−∗∗ says: “P is nep, P(P) ∈ H(χ), H(χ) is a semi P–candidate and
after forcing with Levy(ℵ0, 2|P| + 2|Q|) still is, and forcing with P does
not add a dominating real”.
Then the conditions (α)–(δ) of 12.7 hold.
Proof Let N be a P–candidate and let q ∈ Q. Now, for any ν ∈ ωω⊗
1 there are g1, g2 such that
(a) gℓ is a subset of QN generic over N to which q belongs; and let
η∗ℓ = η
˜
∗[gℓ] ∈
ωω,
(b) m ∈ [ℓg(q), ω) ⇒ η1(m) < ν(m) ∨ η2(m) < ν(m) ∨ ν(m) = 0.
[Why? Quite easy, letting 〈Ik : k < ω〉 list the dense open subsets of QN in
N , we choose inductively mk and (η
1
k, η
2
k) such that η
1
k ∈
(mk)ω, η2k ∈
(mk)ω,
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η10 = η
2
0 = q, η
1
k ⊳ η
1
k+1, η
2
k ⊳ η
2
k+1, η
1
2k+1 ∈ Ik, η
2
2k+2 ∈ Ik and the demand
in (b) is satisfied and η1
def
=
⋃
k<ω
η1k, η2
def
=
⋃
k<ω
η2k induce g1, g2 respectively].
Next,⊗
2 if ν is R–generic over N
′ (any P–candidate), then η∗2 is R–generic over
N ′ or η∗1 is R–generic over N
′.
[Why? Assume this fails, as η∗1 is not R–generic over N
′ then some f1 ∈
(ωω)M dominates η∗1 , and as η
∗
2 is not R–generic over N
′ some f2 ∈ (ωω)M
dominates η∗2, so f
∗ = max{f1 + 1, f2 + 1} ∈ N ′ dominates ν (i.e. f∗(m) =
max{f1(m) + 1, f2(m) + 1}).]⊗
3 if ν ∈
ωω is non-decreasing R–generic over N (so it is not dominated
by N and is non-decreasing), q ∈ Q, then there is GQ ⊆ QN generic
over N , q ∈ GQ and η
˜
∗[GQ] ≤∗ ν.
[Why? Let 〈In : n < ω〉 list the dense open subset of Q in N . We choose by
induction on n, qn ∈ knω ⊆ Q such that q0 = 1, qn ≤ qn+1, and qn |` [k0, kn) ≤
ν |` [k0, kn) and qn+1 ∈ In. For n = 0 trivial, for n + 1 choose in N by
induction on ℓ, mn,ℓ, ρn,ℓ such that mn,0 = kn and
mn,ℓ < mn,ℓ+1, ρm,ℓ ∈
[mn,ℓ,mn,ℓ+1)ω, qn ∪ 0[kn,mn,ℓ) ∪ ρm,ℓ ∈ In.
This is easy and 〈ρ(mn,ℓ, ρm,ℓ) : ℓ < ω〉 ∈ N . Now define ρ
∗ ∈ ωω by:
ρ∗ |` [mn,ℓ,mn,ℓ+1) is constantly max
( ⋃
i≤ℓ+1
Rang(ρi) ∪ Rang(qn)
)
.
So (∃∞j < ω)(ρ∗(j) < ν(j)) hence for some ℓ and some m ∈ [mn,ℓ,mn,ℓ+1)
we have ρ∗(m) < ν(m). So
(∀m′)(mn,ℓ+1 ≤ m
′ < mn,ℓ+2 ⇒ ρn,ℓ+1(m
′) < ν(m)),
but ν(m) < min{ν(j) : mn,ℓ+1 ≤ j < mn,ℓ+2}, so we are done.]
Now we have to check the conditions in 12.7, so obviously clauses (α), (β)
hold. Also clause (γ) there holds by ⊗3. So let us prove clause (δ). Let N
be a (B,ZFC−∗∗)–candidate and p ∈ P
N . Let q be 〈N,P〉–generic, p ≤ q (by
⊗1 + ⊗2). Let G ⊆ Levy(ℵ0, |2P|N ) be generic over N (equivalently over
N [ν∗]. In N , by clause (e) of the assumptions, in N [G], there is a semi P–
candidate M , P(PN )N = P(PM )M . Then in N [G], M [G] is a P–candidate.
So there is q ∈ PN [G] such that N [G] |=“p ≤ q and q is (M,PM )–generic”.
As above possibly increasing q,
N [G] |= [q ⊢P “ ν is R–generic over M [G
˜
P]” and ν is Cohen over M ].
12.8
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Remark 12.9. Clearly this proof is similar to §7, so we can replace “Cohen”
by more general Q. More exactly, the point is that in §7 the demand was
q ⊢P“η
˜
is Q–generic over N”. Here we replace it by other demands.
Conclusion 12.10. For any Souslin proper forcing notion P, if P add no
dominating real, then forcing with P adds no member of ωω dominating
some F ⊆ ωω from V not dominated there.
Proof By 12.8, 12.6, 12.7.
Conclusion 12.11. 1. Suppose that
(a) P is a forcing notion adding no dominating real,
(b) Q
˜
is a P–name for a Souslin proper forcing notion not adding a
dominating real.
Then P ∗Q
˜
adds no dominating real.
2. P ∗ Q
˜
adds no real dominating an old undominated family if both P
and Q
˜
satisfy this and are Souslin proper.
Proof By 12.10.
12. Open problems.
Problem 13.1. 1. Can we in [20] weaken the assumptions (from Souslin
c.c.c.) to “Q is nep and c.c.c.”?
2. Similarly in the symmetry theorem.
3. Similarly other problems here have such versions too.
Problem 13.2. 1. (von Neumann) Is it consistent that every c.c.c. ωω–
bounding atomless forcing notion is a measure algebra? We may now
rephrase: is the non-existence consistent?
2. (Velickovic) Is it consistent that every c.c.c. forcing notion adding new
reals adds a real f
˜
∈ ωω such that
if S ∈
∏
n<ω
[ω]2
n
∩V then (∃∞n ∈ ω)(f
˜
(n) /∈ S(n)).
[Note that [20] answers a relative of 13.2(2): there is no such Souslin
c.c.c. forcing notion.]
A relative of the von Neumann problem is a problem which Fremlin [6]
stresses and has many equivalent versions (see [6] on its history). Half way
between them and our context is the following.
Problem 13.3. Assume Q is a Souslin c.c.c. ωω–bounding forcing notion.
Is it random forcing?
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Problem 13.4. 1. Is it consistent that every c.c.c. forcing notion adding
an unbounded real adds a Cohen real? (See B laszczyk Shelah [5] for
a proof of the σ-centered version).
2. If P satisfies [20, 1.5], does it imply P adds a Cohen real?
Problem 13.5. Are there any symmetric (or (< ω)-symmetric) c.c.c. Souslin
forcing notions in addition to Cohen forcing and random forcing?
[“Yes” here implies “no” to 13.3 so not of present interest.]
Problem 13.6 (Gitik Shelah [8], [9]). 1. Assume I is an ℵ1–complete
ideal on κ such that P/I is atomless. Can I+ (as a forcing notion) be
a c.c.c. Souslin forcing generated by a real.
2. Replace Souslin by “definable in an (H<σ(θ),∈,B), B has universe κ
or H<σ(κ), and I is (θ + κ)+–complete (see [8]).
3. Generalize the results of the form “if P(κ)/I is the measure algebra
with Maharam dimension µ (or is the adding of µ Cohen reals) then
λ is large enough”, see [9], [7] for those results.
4. Combine (2) and (3).
Problem 13.7 (Judah). Can a Souslin c.c.c. forcing notion add a minimal
real? (Note: this is of interest only if the answer in 13.3 is NO and/or the
answer to 13.11 is NO.).
Problem 13.8. Give examples of a Souslin forcing notion which is only
temporarily c.c.c. and/or proper (L) (see §10).
Problem 13.9. Do iterations (CS,FS) of Souslin c.c.c. forcing notions not
adding a dominating real have this property? Is each almost ωω–bounding?
[Maybe 8.8 answers need better: replace η∗ is generic real for (N,Q, eta
˜
) by
less]. See §11 + §10.
Problem 13.10. 1. Is there a pair (Q, r
˜
) such that:
(a) ⊢Q“r
˜
∈ ω2 is new”,
(b) if P is a Souslin c.c.c. forcing notion with no P–name r
˜
′ of a real
such that the forcing notion BP(r
˜
′) is ωω–bounding but P adds a
nowhere essentially Cohen real
then forcing with P adds a (Q, r
˜
) real,i.e. for some P–name r
˜
′′ for
a real we have ⊢P“for some G′′ ⊆ QV generic over V, r
˜
′′[GP] =
r
˜
[G′′]”.
2. As above P is σ–centered.
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3. If P is a Souslin c.c.c. forcing notion adding new reals but not adding
a real r
˜
′ with BP(r
˜
′) being ωω–bounding,
then forcing with P adds a new real r
˜
′′ such that BP(r′′) is σ–centered.
Problem 13.11. 1. Let Q be a Souslin c.c.c. forcing notion and ⊢Q“r
˜
∈
ω2”. Is B(r
˜
) also a Souslin c.c.c. forcing notion?
2. Similarly for nep c.c.c.
Problem 13.12. Assume Q is a Souslin c.c.c. forcing notion which is snep
and even “x ∈ Q”, “x ≤Q y”, “{pn : n < ω} predense above q′” are Σ11
relations. Does Q add Cohen or random real?
Problem 13.13. Develop the theory of “definable forcing notions” when
we allow an ultrafilter on ω as a parameter.
Problem 13.14. Does nep 6=snep? (the case θ = κ = ℵ0, of course).
Problem 13.15. Try to generalize our present context to λ–complete forc-
ing notions (Baumgartner’s Axiom; [19], [16]).
Problem 13.16. When QV <◦ QV
P
?
Problem 13.17. Does Axω1 [(ℵ1,ℵ1)–nep] imply 2
ℵ0 = ℵ2?
Or does Axω1 [nep] imply 2
ℵ0 = ℵ2?
[The parallel question for Souslin proper was formulated in xxx]
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